I've been busy lately and don't have much time now, either, but I wanted to say a quick word about the developments in Iraq.
How can the Shi'a and Kurdish blocs with a straight face define "voter" in two different ways? Changing the interpretation of the referendum law is a horrible decision. If before we were saying either way, at least the Sunni will participate, this is a way to tell them that their votes don't matter (let alone all the Shi'a and Kurds who might happen to not agree with the constitution). Two-thirds of registered voters is going to be pretty tough especially considering that many might not even turn out in some of the more violent provinces (even though we all agree turnout will go up, it probably won't go up that much).
To explain for those who do not know, what the National Assembly decided is that a majority of voters who actually vote (nationwide) is all that is necessary to ratify the constitution; while two-thirds of registered voters in three provinces are needed to reject it.
So basically this is a blatant attempt by the dominant factions to prevent the constitution from being rejected at all costs. This decision undercuts the political efforts to integrate opposition, particularly Sunni opposition. Fortunately the UN has rejected the idea outright and the bloggers at Iraq the Model were good enough to be quite worried about it as well, though I haven't heard anything from the U.S. government as yet (admittedly I may have missed it).
The most important thing above all, is that everyone feels the October referendum means something. If it doesn't, the best opportunity has been lost.
Tuesday, October 04, 2005
Saturday, September 17, 2005
Clark scrapes by, or so it seems
Well, I'm up late disregarding the advice of my sleep doctor, because I'm a nerd, and I want to see the New Zealand election returns come on. And quite honestly it's been a hell of a race. As the first returns were trickling in, National (out of power since 1999) had taken an 8 to 10 point lead; now, it's within 0.25 percent between National and Labour and it looks like the result's going to be a hung parliament, if you add up all the other parties. Labour plus the Greens, the new Maori party and Anderton's Progressives have 61 of 122; National plus NZ First, United Future, and ACT are at 61. If I had to hazard a guess i'd say United Future (which I believe currently supports the Clark government) will support another Labour government and give them 64 seats, but it's still a pretty thin margin.
Results are coming in as we speak; in my latest refresh the margin was 999 votes nationwide, National over Labour.
And Israel has finally disengaged from Gaza, though the failure of Palestinian police to prevent looting of settlements and the streaming over the Egyptian border was both sad and inevitable. Honestly, if you are the Palestinian police, is it really worth the effort? When it would cost you so much in terms of public image? Probably not. Sharon's speech at the UN, meanwhile, was a bunch of rhetoric that really means nothing, because everyone still knows he's not going to concede the Palestinians the state they need in order to end this conflict. Well, it's not fair to say it means nothing; as many Israeli commentators are suggesting it means a domestic Israeli political realignment. But in terms of the peace process it will not get Sharon anywhere unless there are concrete proposals for 100% of the occupied territory or its equivalent to return to Palestine, and that includes East Jerusalem.
Labour has taken the lead for the first time tonight, although ironically the additional seat was stolen from the Progressives, meaning the left-center bloc is still at exactly half the seats overall.
Coming up in the next few weeks I'll have more to say about a lot of issues, including domestic American security, the Middle East (of course), and issues more directly affecting college students, as well as my advocacy of proportional representation and my dislike of hippies. For now, it's back to the NZ electoral site and then back to sleep.
Results are coming in as we speak; in my latest refresh the margin was 999 votes nationwide, National over Labour.
And Israel has finally disengaged from Gaza, though the failure of Palestinian police to prevent looting of settlements and the streaming over the Egyptian border was both sad and inevitable. Honestly, if you are the Palestinian police, is it really worth the effort? When it would cost you so much in terms of public image? Probably not. Sharon's speech at the UN, meanwhile, was a bunch of rhetoric that really means nothing, because everyone still knows he's not going to concede the Palestinians the state they need in order to end this conflict. Well, it's not fair to say it means nothing; as many Israeli commentators are suggesting it means a domestic Israeli political realignment. But in terms of the peace process it will not get Sharon anywhere unless there are concrete proposals for 100% of the occupied territory or its equivalent to return to Palestine, and that includes East Jerusalem.
Labour has taken the lead for the first time tonight, although ironically the additional seat was stolen from the Progressives, meaning the left-center bloc is still at exactly half the seats overall.
Coming up in the next few weeks I'll have more to say about a lot of issues, including domestic American security, the Middle East (of course), and issues more directly affecting college students, as well as my advocacy of proportional representation and my dislike of hippies. For now, it's back to the NZ electoral site and then back to sleep.
Thursday, September 01, 2005
Taking a look at today's news
First, everything going on in the Middle East today is overshadowed by the events on the U.S. Gulf Coast... this is a true humanitarian situation and my thoughts are with all of those who have been affected by or have family affected by Hurricane Katrina and the aftermath (my prayers would be with them too were I not agnostic). I wish the best to all those affected and we can only hope for a speedy recovery although that does not seem too likely at the present time. Honestly at this point, who really cares about looting (except for the firearms, that's a problem)... the priority should be to rescue everyone who for some reason stayed in New Orleans.
All right, so now to the world news of the day...
The assets of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the U.S. have been frozen by a federal court. Relatives of some people killed by Hamas in the West Bank in 2000 sued Hamas and the PNA in U.S. civil courts and got a ruling in their favor. Let me kindly say with all due respect that this is a bunch of bullshit; not necessarily the court decision, which is made according to existing law, but first of all the lawsuit, and second of all the fact that the administration has not acted to give the PNA immunity from paralyzing acts. The Palestinian mission in Washington has been unable to pay its employees for three months.
First, the PNA mission deserves basically the same status as the Israeli embassy, in the interests of peace and because the PNA is essentially a nascent state that is engaged in the peace process with full U.S. recognition as the representative of the sovereign Palestinian people. Second, if the PNA is responsible for the actions of Hamas, so too is the Israeli government, which supported the formation of Hamas, and worked so hard to undercut the ability of the PNA to combat terrorism or, indeed, do anything else (I understand that the events in 2000 happened before the massive destruction inflicted by the IDF during the al-Aqsa Intifada).
But if we continue the train of logic here, isn't the U.S. government responsible for every criminal act committed on U.S. territory? After all, the U.S. government and more directly the state governments are responsible for security, and "provided an environment" for the actions of criminal elements. Perhaps closer to the point, I'd like to see the result of a lawsuit in Israel against the Israel Defense Forces or the Israeli government, by the families of the Israeli-Palestinian victims of the bus shooting in Shfaram, seeking compensation because they failed to recognize the destructive capability of the IDF deserter who carried out the action (and used an IDF weapon, I believe). It is true that the Sharon government is offering a payment to the families of the deceased, but it certainly isn't going to take any share of the blame, and it's probably safe to bet that the payment offered by Sharon isn't anywhere near what the U.S. lawsuit sought for its plaintiffs. It's also true that the Sharon government shelters the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories, or in the most kind interpretation, fails to rein in the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories (e.g. in Hebron).
To bridge this conversation into another topic, with regard to the shootings in Shfaram, Israeli law provides compensation to the families of victims of terrorist acts only when the terrorist group is hostile to Israel. This certainly seems a bit out of whack. To the credit (!) of the Sharon government, there is talk about reforming the law so that persons such as the families of the Israeli-Palestinians killed in Shfaram could be compensated...
What are we coming to when Ariel Sharon is regarded as a moderate? Well, he had always been quite good at knowing which way the wind is blowing, and it seems that he wants to secure for himself the legacy of defining Israel's final borders. Perhaps he will be successful yet.
Developments in Iraq
So in Iraq the Sunni leaders have called for rejection of the new constitution. Either way there is a positive result insofar as the Sunni will have to participate in the referendum on the constitution to reject it, so this is a silver lining to an otherwise rather gray cloud (and how would you tell apart the gray and the silver especially if the sun is not out to reflect the metal... hmm...).
I guess time will tell if I was correct in my gut feeling that the Bush administration was dead wrong in pressuring the different factions to come to a compromise by the target date, or correct when I tried to argue on the administration's behalf that perhaps this would just hasten the inevitable result that the Sunni would be pissed off regardless and having the referendum early (no matter what the result) is the better outcome.
I think the constitution in itself is okay, though some aspects of it aren't quite defined as well as one might like. I still think it should be changed to state that only three or four governorates can join to form a federal entity, which would end fears of a Shia superstate within a state, yet still allow substantial devolution to larger areas. I also have qualms about the court, which is ill-defined, and quarrels can be foreseen about Shari'a since the Islamic law is within the constitution to some extent (no law can be passed which comes into conflict), so whose Islamic law will it be? Well probably the Shia, which could present substantial problems...
Just another day in the wonderful world of the Middle East.
All right, so now to the world news of the day...
The assets of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the U.S. have been frozen by a federal court. Relatives of some people killed by Hamas in the West Bank in 2000 sued Hamas and the PNA in U.S. civil courts and got a ruling in their favor. Let me kindly say with all due respect that this is a bunch of bullshit; not necessarily the court decision, which is made according to existing law, but first of all the lawsuit, and second of all the fact that the administration has not acted to give the PNA immunity from paralyzing acts. The Palestinian mission in Washington has been unable to pay its employees for three months.
First, the PNA mission deserves basically the same status as the Israeli embassy, in the interests of peace and because the PNA is essentially a nascent state that is engaged in the peace process with full U.S. recognition as the representative of the sovereign Palestinian people. Second, if the PNA is responsible for the actions of Hamas, so too is the Israeli government, which supported the formation of Hamas, and worked so hard to undercut the ability of the PNA to combat terrorism or, indeed, do anything else (I understand that the events in 2000 happened before the massive destruction inflicted by the IDF during the al-Aqsa Intifada).
But if we continue the train of logic here, isn't the U.S. government responsible for every criminal act committed on U.S. territory? After all, the U.S. government and more directly the state governments are responsible for security, and "provided an environment" for the actions of criminal elements. Perhaps closer to the point, I'd like to see the result of a lawsuit in Israel against the Israel Defense Forces or the Israeli government, by the families of the Israeli-Palestinian victims of the bus shooting in Shfaram, seeking compensation because they failed to recognize the destructive capability of the IDF deserter who carried out the action (and used an IDF weapon, I believe). It is true that the Sharon government is offering a payment to the families of the deceased, but it certainly isn't going to take any share of the blame, and it's probably safe to bet that the payment offered by Sharon isn't anywhere near what the U.S. lawsuit sought for its plaintiffs. It's also true that the Sharon government shelters the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories, or in the most kind interpretation, fails to rein in the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories (e.g. in Hebron).
To bridge this conversation into another topic, with regard to the shootings in Shfaram, Israeli law provides compensation to the families of victims of terrorist acts only when the terrorist group is hostile to Israel. This certainly seems a bit out of whack. To the credit (!) of the Sharon government, there is talk about reforming the law so that persons such as the families of the Israeli-Palestinians killed in Shfaram could be compensated...
What are we coming to when Ariel Sharon is regarded as a moderate? Well, he had always been quite good at knowing which way the wind is blowing, and it seems that he wants to secure for himself the legacy of defining Israel's final borders. Perhaps he will be successful yet.
Developments in Iraq
So in Iraq the Sunni leaders have called for rejection of the new constitution. Either way there is a positive result insofar as the Sunni will have to participate in the referendum on the constitution to reject it, so this is a silver lining to an otherwise rather gray cloud (and how would you tell apart the gray and the silver especially if the sun is not out to reflect the metal... hmm...).
I guess time will tell if I was correct in my gut feeling that the Bush administration was dead wrong in pressuring the different factions to come to a compromise by the target date, or correct when I tried to argue on the administration's behalf that perhaps this would just hasten the inevitable result that the Sunni would be pissed off regardless and having the referendum early (no matter what the result) is the better outcome.
I think the constitution in itself is okay, though some aspects of it aren't quite defined as well as one might like. I still think it should be changed to state that only three or four governorates can join to form a federal entity, which would end fears of a Shia superstate within a state, yet still allow substantial devolution to larger areas. I also have qualms about the court, which is ill-defined, and quarrels can be foreseen about Shari'a since the Islamic law is within the constitution to some extent (no law can be passed which comes into conflict), so whose Islamic law will it be? Well probably the Shia, which could present substantial problems...
Just another day in the wonderful world of the Middle East.
Friday, August 26, 2005
Still working in Iraq
Hey, how about limiting federal regions in Iraq to three provinces or less? Yes? Okay.
Seriously, that would take care of Sunni objections to a Shia "super-region" while still allowing the formation of federal states in different regions of the country. The Kurds would still be OK in the north... basically everybody is happy...
But there is no point to this constitution if it is passed without the Sunni assent. The provinces will then reject the document by more than two-thirds and we will be back to square one; or, even if the constitution squeaks by, insurgents will not be convinced to lay down their arms as they will still enjoy a fair share of support.
"Pat Robertson is an idiot"
Need I say more? These comments are pretty high on the idiocy scale (not quite with those about 9/11, but calling to assassinate Chávez--a democratically elected foreign leader if not particularly democratic--gives Chávez more ammunition to use in railing against the U.S. Not that he's entirely wrong.
Cindy Sheehan--what's up with that?
Yeah... Cindy Sheehan... anti-war protestor wants to meet with Bush because her kid got killed in Iraq... unfortunately that's life. Somebody has to die in war. Taking advantage of Sheehan's rage is a misguided political play by some leftist factions. Bad idea.
Seriously, that would take care of Sunni objections to a Shia "super-region" while still allowing the formation of federal states in different regions of the country. The Kurds would still be OK in the north... basically everybody is happy...
But there is no point to this constitution if it is passed without the Sunni assent. The provinces will then reject the document by more than two-thirds and we will be back to square one; or, even if the constitution squeaks by, insurgents will not be convinced to lay down their arms as they will still enjoy a fair share of support.
"Pat Robertson is an idiot"
Need I say more? These comments are pretty high on the idiocy scale (not quite with those about 9/11, but calling to assassinate Chávez--a democratically elected foreign leader if not particularly democratic--gives Chávez more ammunition to use in railing against the U.S. Not that he's entirely wrong.
Cindy Sheehan--what's up with that?
Yeah... Cindy Sheehan... anti-war protestor wants to meet with Bush because her kid got killed in Iraq... unfortunately that's life. Somebody has to die in war. Taking advantage of Sheehan's rage is a misguided political play by some leftist factions. Bad idea.
Wednesday, August 17, 2005
Binational security
Well, another Jewish Israeli "terrorist" has struck again, firing and killing four Palestinians in the northern West Bank. I put "terrorist" in quotes because the use of the term has become pointless given its various meanings and lack of meaning as the case may be. However, he is a "terrorist" in the same way that a Hamas or Islamic Jihad bomber is a terrorist, and the second in a week to come from the West Bank settlements. It does appear that the rabbis of the settlement areas are going to denounce the shooting and appeal against violence, which is a positive thing, as is the fact that the shooter was arrested and not arbitrarily killed (now we will see the outcome of the Israeli justice system).
I want to go back to what I said yesterday about the binational state and clarify a bit my opinions. It's clear that the binational state is not the first preference of either group--in numerous opinion polls this option is rejected in favor of the two-state solution. The problem is what type of two-state solution?
Palestinians want their own state; this means a state on 21 percent of mandatory Palestine that has territorial contiguity and includes East Jerusalem as the capital, as well as the rights of a state, that is, control of borders and its own security forces. Israelis reluctantly support a Palestinian state; that "Palestinian state" would not even be sovereign given the restrictions that would be imposed in the name of security. Israelis, or at least successive governments, don't take into account the fact that Israel would be clearly stronger than Palestine regardless of the restrictions or lack thereof placed on the new state. Meanwhile, Palestinians want at least a symbolic return of refugees to Israel, something the Jewish state may or may not be willing to accept.
The point of this whole thing is that nobody can agree on just what the two-state solution would look like, and until they do, the settlers (who have essentially been self-governing for years) will continue to expand their colonies in the West Bank to the point where they can't be uprooted and can't be disentangled from Palestinian population centers. Personally, I don't believe there will ever be agreement on what a two-state solution will look like, because Israeli leaders won't have the political ability to make the necessary concessions, and Palestinian leaders (a) can't make concessions either (though from my perspective they have already made the vast majority of those concessions), and (b) have less motivation to do so because the binational solution isn't perceived as negatively by them as it is by Israelis.
That's not to say that binationalism will be readily or happily accepted, and it might take more fighting (figuratively or literally) for equal rights for Palestinians before it is realized. That is if Israel opts for the "bantustan" solution. The other possibility Palestinians must be (and generally are) prepared to resist is expulsion/"involuntary transfer".
The only example we have of this type of binational settlement in practice is that of the Republic of South Africa, and the results are mixed; but South Africa also adopted a nonracial, noncommunitarian constitution, something which would likely be impossible even in the binational state; and Africans far outnumber whites in SA whereas in Israel/Palestine the numbers are closer to even (something which strikes me as a positive when it comes to creating compromise between communities).
Anyway, it is pointless to speculate on the possibilities for the binational state when it doesn't exist yet and may never exist for that matter, but it is interesting, especially for those looking at building institutions and conflict resolution.
I want to go back to what I said yesterday about the binational state and clarify a bit my opinions. It's clear that the binational state is not the first preference of either group--in numerous opinion polls this option is rejected in favor of the two-state solution. The problem is what type of two-state solution?
Palestinians want their own state; this means a state on 21 percent of mandatory Palestine that has territorial contiguity and includes East Jerusalem as the capital, as well as the rights of a state, that is, control of borders and its own security forces. Israelis reluctantly support a Palestinian state; that "Palestinian state" would not even be sovereign given the restrictions that would be imposed in the name of security. Israelis, or at least successive governments, don't take into account the fact that Israel would be clearly stronger than Palestine regardless of the restrictions or lack thereof placed on the new state. Meanwhile, Palestinians want at least a symbolic return of refugees to Israel, something the Jewish state may or may not be willing to accept.
The point of this whole thing is that nobody can agree on just what the two-state solution would look like, and until they do, the settlers (who have essentially been self-governing for years) will continue to expand their colonies in the West Bank to the point where they can't be uprooted and can't be disentangled from Palestinian population centers. Personally, I don't believe there will ever be agreement on what a two-state solution will look like, because Israeli leaders won't have the political ability to make the necessary concessions, and Palestinian leaders (a) can't make concessions either (though from my perspective they have already made the vast majority of those concessions), and (b) have less motivation to do so because the binational solution isn't perceived as negatively by them as it is by Israelis.
That's not to say that binationalism will be readily or happily accepted, and it might take more fighting (figuratively or literally) for equal rights for Palestinians before it is realized. That is if Israel opts for the "bantustan" solution. The other possibility Palestinians must be (and generally are) prepared to resist is expulsion/"involuntary transfer".
The only example we have of this type of binational settlement in practice is that of the Republic of South Africa, and the results are mixed; but South Africa also adopted a nonracial, noncommunitarian constitution, something which would likely be impossible even in the binational state; and Africans far outnumber whites in SA whereas in Israel/Palestine the numbers are closer to even (something which strikes me as a positive when it comes to creating compromise between communities).
Anyway, it is pointless to speculate on the possibilities for the binational state when it doesn't exist yet and may never exist for that matter, but it is interesting, especially for those looking at building institutions and conflict resolution.
Disengaging from reality
It's almost time for the IDF to start using force against those who remain in the Gaza settlements, and I want to comment a bit on some of the comments I've been seeing in Ha'aretz recently (not that they're any different than the norm).
First, those who feel bad for the settlers being "uprooted" from their homes. How does anyone actually feel bad about this? Pretty much none of them have lived there their full lives, and they are probably going to go live about 20 miles away, if they don't join their subsidized brethren in the West Bank stealing land from Palestinians there. They're being ridiculously compensated and lived in their old homes thanks only to the tax and defense burden that fell on ordinary Israel citizens and young conscripts.
Second, those who believe that Gaza somehow "belongs" to Israel. These people are either religious nuts or essentially religious nuts who hide behind a "war" excuse, that is, "Gaza was captured by war so Israel has the right to take over." Well, the religious idea is BS, and the war idea is pretty much the same. If you want to pursue the war idea, then annex Gaza and the West Bank and rule them under Israeli law and grant Israeli citizenship to residents. I don't think many Palestinians would quibble with such a plan.
Finally, I want to point out that the most violent resistance has been carried on by troublemakers from outside the Gaza settlements. They don't belong there and should be treated by the IDF with all the force used on Palestinians (not that they will be).
I sympathize with the Palestinian people and an glad that they will regain the entirety of Gaza's territory, despite those settlers who are destroying greenhouses and residences out of spite and hatred. The settler who whines about how Gaza could be a model for Jewish-Arab cooperation (hey, so could Palestine/Israel if you decided to make it so) just doesn't resonate with me.
I want to make a further point. Those who criticize the Palestinians for terror tactics ignore not only the plentiful state-sanctioned terror carried out by the IDF, but ignore the reality of the situation. In the current state of affairs, with loss of hope, poor living conditions and ongoing oppression (with no credible sponsor), for many Palestinians terror seems a decent option. What if it were the Jewish people who were "losing the war" rather than the Palestinian Arabs? Well, the results were seen in the late '30s-early '40s when Jewish forces felt it necessary to use extralegal means to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state. Forces such as Irgun and Lehi carried out atrocities such as the King David hotel bombing of the British administration and the Deir Yassin massacre of Palestinian civilians. The people committing these atrocities (against civilians) clearly felt they were justified; there was a segment of the population supporting them that would not engage in such action themselves; and there was a segment of the population that condemned the acts. And this in a situation where the Jewish community was much better off than the Palestinian Arabs are today.
My main point is that Jewish people are inherently no morally better or worse than Palestinian Arabs; we all have different conceptions of reality, different mental maps that define our options, but such maps are a result of the situation in which our society and we personally find ourselves. This conception of human action is central to my conception of social democracy: simply put, picture yourself in the other's shoes and think whether or not you might consider certain actions acceptable. That doesn't make actions acceptable in itself--but a key step to combating terror is finding out what will make people stop believing in it. The concept of envisioning the POV of others has universal applicability.
Finally, I will state here (as I have stated elsewhere before) that I believe the inevitable solution will be one binational state for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, not because either side wishes it that way, but because a compromise will not happen in time. As I continue my project to write organic law for a future Israeli/Palestinian state, I will summarize the major points of such a law here:
(1) A secular parliamentary democracy.
(2) Establishment of the two communities as the basis of the state (i.e., federalism based on the person and not geographically).
(3) A bicameral legislature, one chamber using proportional representation and the other representing the two communities.
(4) Division of posts in the security forces, the administration, the courts and the government on a community basis.
(5) As much community self-government as possible: community control over religion, education, culture, etc.
(6) Broad rights guarantees and nondiscrimination.
(7) Rectification of the economic disparities.
(8) A just resolution of property disputes.
(9) Recognition of the state as the homeland of two peoples and the guarantee of the right of "return" for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
A constitution incorporating all these features will be necessary for reconciliation in one binational state to occur, and we may as well examine (as some are) what such a structure will look like today, before the solution is forced upon the two sides without preparation.
First, those who feel bad for the settlers being "uprooted" from their homes. How does anyone actually feel bad about this? Pretty much none of them have lived there their full lives, and they are probably going to go live about 20 miles away, if they don't join their subsidized brethren in the West Bank stealing land from Palestinians there. They're being ridiculously compensated and lived in their old homes thanks only to the tax and defense burden that fell on ordinary Israel citizens and young conscripts.
Second, those who believe that Gaza somehow "belongs" to Israel. These people are either religious nuts or essentially religious nuts who hide behind a "war" excuse, that is, "Gaza was captured by war so Israel has the right to take over." Well, the religious idea is BS, and the war idea is pretty much the same. If you want to pursue the war idea, then annex Gaza and the West Bank and rule them under Israeli law and grant Israeli citizenship to residents. I don't think many Palestinians would quibble with such a plan.
Finally, I want to point out that the most violent resistance has been carried on by troublemakers from outside the Gaza settlements. They don't belong there and should be treated by the IDF with all the force used on Palestinians (not that they will be).
I sympathize with the Palestinian people and an glad that they will regain the entirety of Gaza's territory, despite those settlers who are destroying greenhouses and residences out of spite and hatred. The settler who whines about how Gaza could be a model for Jewish-Arab cooperation (hey, so could Palestine/Israel if you decided to make it so) just doesn't resonate with me.
I want to make a further point. Those who criticize the Palestinians for terror tactics ignore not only the plentiful state-sanctioned terror carried out by the IDF, but ignore the reality of the situation. In the current state of affairs, with loss of hope, poor living conditions and ongoing oppression (with no credible sponsor), for many Palestinians terror seems a decent option. What if it were the Jewish people who were "losing the war" rather than the Palestinian Arabs? Well, the results were seen in the late '30s-early '40s when Jewish forces felt it necessary to use extralegal means to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state. Forces such as Irgun and Lehi carried out atrocities such as the King David hotel bombing of the British administration and the Deir Yassin massacre of Palestinian civilians. The people committing these atrocities (against civilians) clearly felt they were justified; there was a segment of the population supporting them that would not engage in such action themselves; and there was a segment of the population that condemned the acts. And this in a situation where the Jewish community was much better off than the Palestinian Arabs are today.
My main point is that Jewish people are inherently no morally better or worse than Palestinian Arabs; we all have different conceptions of reality, different mental maps that define our options, but such maps are a result of the situation in which our society and we personally find ourselves. This conception of human action is central to my conception of social democracy: simply put, picture yourself in the other's shoes and think whether or not you might consider certain actions acceptable. That doesn't make actions acceptable in itself--but a key step to combating terror is finding out what will make people stop believing in it. The concept of envisioning the POV of others has universal applicability.
Finally, I will state here (as I have stated elsewhere before) that I believe the inevitable solution will be one binational state for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, not because either side wishes it that way, but because a compromise will not happen in time. As I continue my project to write organic law for a future Israeli/Palestinian state, I will summarize the major points of such a law here:
(1) A secular parliamentary democracy.
(2) Establishment of the two communities as the basis of the state (i.e., federalism based on the person and not geographically).
(3) A bicameral legislature, one chamber using proportional representation and the other representing the two communities.
(4) Division of posts in the security forces, the administration, the courts and the government on a community basis.
(5) As much community self-government as possible: community control over religion, education, culture, etc.
(6) Broad rights guarantees and nondiscrimination.
(7) Rectification of the economic disparities.
(8) A just resolution of property disputes.
(9) Recognition of the state as the homeland of two peoples and the guarantee of the right of "return" for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
A constitution incorporating all these features will be necessary for reconciliation in one binational state to occur, and we may as well examine (as some are) what such a structure will look like today, before the solution is forced upon the two sides without preparation.
Monday, August 15, 2005
Thinking constitutionally
The Iraqi draft constitution is set to be unveiled tomorrow and we know a few things about it... e.g. that the name of the country will continue to be "Republic of Iraq"... but there are some things still up in the air. The major questions are the division of oil monies, the nature of the vertical power structure and the rights of women and role of Islam.
According to Iraq the Model, the power structure will give the right to form federal states to any governorate or combination of those. That is to say, it will be like the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías" if this is true. To be honest, that is a novel and appropriate solution to the issue, and succeeds in postponing likely difficult negotiations over exactly what powers everyone will have. At the same time, the financial side of the equation would see oil revenues distributed by population as the Sunni factions would like.
Meanwhile, the role of Islam as a contributing and constraining yet not overriding factor in legislation seems the most likely solution. There is a question about the role of women in the new constitution, whether the rather broad civil rights they currently enjoy will be maintained and whether they will continue to have the guarantee of every third spot on the party lists. Maintaining these guarantees would be a plus for the new Iraqi state but we will see what the draft says; and if women's rights are impinged by the new document will that be enough for it to be rejected and risk further instability?
So we are on the U.S.-imposed deadline (exactly what it is) for the new constitution. Maybe that is not such a bad thing; Iraq needs stability and what more would be achieved in ten days? The tough negotiations might just have been pushed off to the end anyway. I'm not there, I can't say what else they might have done, but it is rather heavy-handed of the administration to exert such pressure on the drafting commission and then have Khalilzad talk about how the constitution should reflect a historic social compact, or whatever he said like that. Again, though, what more would have been done with a 15-day extension?
And a few hundred miles to the west disengagement from Gaza has begun and I will comment on the coming days on its progress... but it is certainly an exciting time for Gazans and for observers of the situation in Palestine/Israel.
According to Iraq the Model, the power structure will give the right to form federal states to any governorate or combination of those. That is to say, it will be like the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías" if this is true. To be honest, that is a novel and appropriate solution to the issue, and succeeds in postponing likely difficult negotiations over exactly what powers everyone will have. At the same time, the financial side of the equation would see oil revenues distributed by population as the Sunni factions would like.
Meanwhile, the role of Islam as a contributing and constraining yet not overriding factor in legislation seems the most likely solution. There is a question about the role of women in the new constitution, whether the rather broad civil rights they currently enjoy will be maintained and whether they will continue to have the guarantee of every third spot on the party lists. Maintaining these guarantees would be a plus for the new Iraqi state but we will see what the draft says; and if women's rights are impinged by the new document will that be enough for it to be rejected and risk further instability?
So we are on the U.S.-imposed deadline (exactly what it is) for the new constitution. Maybe that is not such a bad thing; Iraq needs stability and what more would be achieved in ten days? The tough negotiations might just have been pushed off to the end anyway. I'm not there, I can't say what else they might have done, but it is rather heavy-handed of the administration to exert such pressure on the drafting commission and then have Khalilzad talk about how the constitution should reflect a historic social compact, or whatever he said like that. Again, though, what more would have been done with a 15-day extension?
And a few hundred miles to the west disengagement from Gaza has begun and I will comment on the coming days on its progress... but it is certainly an exciting time for Gazans and for observers of the situation in Palestine/Israel.
Sunday, August 14, 2005
Recent developments
Well, what's gone on in the world lately? China abandoned the dollar peg a while ago and now has a "basket." It's a start. Niger finally got a little bit of attention. Guinea-Bissau had a presidential election and Nino Vieira will be president again which means that the country isn't going to emerge from its problems anytime soon.
Of course, everyone is paying attention to the disengagement right now; Bibi's quit and Arik is determined (even though Netanyahu's popularity is way above Sharon's in the Likud, of course, Bibi's always been an opportunist and will continue to be). But the Right isn't going to stop this from going through, which means the obvious question is how Hamas and Fatah will be able to work together in Gaza.
Palestinian legislative elections won't occur until January 2006 (the new date set by Abbas) so until then there will have to be some sort of collaboration in Gaza. But what sort of collaboration? Hamas has to know that it will only benefit the Palestinian people to have a smooth ride and feel a benefit from the disengagement. I can't see any motivation for Hamas to continue to create trouble against Israel in a pretty much unoccupied (obviously not "free") Gaza. The problem is the possible benefits Hamas could gain against Fatah knowing that Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PA don't want to see trouble in Gaza.
Hamas will have to weigh this desire to achieve political gains in Gaza against the public opinion of Gazans... but the ball would seem to be in their court.
On another note, I've heard a lot of ludicrous things (especially reading about Palestine/Israel), but check this out: http://www.twostarsforpeace.com/.
Finally, why does Mbeki have to bail out Mugabe? South Africa has enough problems without loaning money to a corrupt dictator to help him continue his reign of repression. Yet another reason why I stopped supporting the ANC... and why the Democratic Alliance should win (though it won't) in 2009.
Of course, everyone is paying attention to the disengagement right now; Bibi's quit and Arik is determined (even though Netanyahu's popularity is way above Sharon's in the Likud, of course, Bibi's always been an opportunist and will continue to be). But the Right isn't going to stop this from going through, which means the obvious question is how Hamas and Fatah will be able to work together in Gaza.
Palestinian legislative elections won't occur until January 2006 (the new date set by Abbas) so until then there will have to be some sort of collaboration in Gaza. But what sort of collaboration? Hamas has to know that it will only benefit the Palestinian people to have a smooth ride and feel a benefit from the disengagement. I can't see any motivation for Hamas to continue to create trouble against Israel in a pretty much unoccupied (obviously not "free") Gaza. The problem is the possible benefits Hamas could gain against Fatah knowing that Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PA don't want to see trouble in Gaza.
Hamas will have to weigh this desire to achieve political gains in Gaza against the public opinion of Gazans... but the ball would seem to be in their court.
On another note, I've heard a lot of ludicrous things (especially reading about Palestine/Israel), but check this out: http://www.twostarsforpeace.com/.
Finally, why does Mbeki have to bail out Mugabe? South Africa has enough problems without loaning money to a corrupt dictator to help him continue his reign of repression. Yet another reason why I stopped supporting the ANC... and why the Democratic Alliance should win (though it won't) in 2009.
Tuesday, June 14, 2005
Europe stumbles forward?
The French and the Dutch have rejected the European Constitution; they have sent a clear message--but the content of the message isn't necessarily clear. Most would agree that the people were uncomfortable approving a document whose consequences they were unsure of and that they were reacting against the actions of elites, who they saw as too detached from the reality and from popular opinion.
In retrospect, this European Constitution was not the right one; it might have fulfilled the functions of consolidating treaties, but it failed to bring the Union and its institutions closer to the people. How could that have been done? First, by actions of the Union which showed that it truly respects the principle of subsidiarity; the Union institutions have been far too willing to usurp powers better left to individual states and their governments. Second, elections would be necessary--elections for a powerful body capable of, at the least, monitoring the EU bureaucracy and ensuring that it follows the priorities of the "European public" (if such a thing exists). Now, if there is no European public, can there really be a body that reflects its views? If any body is going to reflect the views of the European people as a whole, it must be a more powerful Parliament with pan-European political parties, fighting elections on a basis of European platforms and within a framework of clearly identified and less flexible powers (that cannot be continually enlarged without popular consultation).
So how should this Constitution have been ratified? National governments must ratify the treaty, as it is still an international treaty; but a document of such importance that it can rightfully be called a "constitution" should be ratified by the people, and should have been done by simultaneous vote in all 25 member states. If such a step was not possible with the document as written, it should have been amended, and indeed, that is now the least that will happen.
A new Constitution should attempt to more greatly define the powers of the Union and the relationship between the Union, the national governments, and the people, not relying solely on those national governments as the liaison between the Union and the people. A new Constitution should fix the Union's powers, not enabling it to continually aggrandize its scope and claim new authority without the approval of the people, who do not vote for political parties in domestic elections on the basis of Europe. And a new Constitution should not be adopted for the sake of adoption; it should be adopted only when there is a fundamental agreement on the type of Europe being adopted, and not a repetition of the same compromise, fudged to look like something new.
When there is a Constitution that all 25 member states are confident of putting to their people, on the same day, to create a true debate about Europe--and such a Constitution can be approved--then it is the right document for Europe.
In retrospect, this European Constitution was not the right one; it might have fulfilled the functions of consolidating treaties, but it failed to bring the Union and its institutions closer to the people. How could that have been done? First, by actions of the Union which showed that it truly respects the principle of subsidiarity; the Union institutions have been far too willing to usurp powers better left to individual states and their governments. Second, elections would be necessary--elections for a powerful body capable of, at the least, monitoring the EU bureaucracy and ensuring that it follows the priorities of the "European public" (if such a thing exists). Now, if there is no European public, can there really be a body that reflects its views? If any body is going to reflect the views of the European people as a whole, it must be a more powerful Parliament with pan-European political parties, fighting elections on a basis of European platforms and within a framework of clearly identified and less flexible powers (that cannot be continually enlarged without popular consultation).
So how should this Constitution have been ratified? National governments must ratify the treaty, as it is still an international treaty; but a document of such importance that it can rightfully be called a "constitution" should be ratified by the people, and should have been done by simultaneous vote in all 25 member states. If such a step was not possible with the document as written, it should have been amended, and indeed, that is now the least that will happen.
A new Constitution should attempt to more greatly define the powers of the Union and the relationship between the Union, the national governments, and the people, not relying solely on those national governments as the liaison between the Union and the people. A new Constitution should fix the Union's powers, not enabling it to continually aggrandize its scope and claim new authority without the approval of the people, who do not vote for political parties in domestic elections on the basis of Europe. And a new Constitution should not be adopted for the sake of adoption; it should be adopted only when there is a fundamental agreement on the type of Europe being adopted, and not a repetition of the same compromise, fudged to look like something new.
When there is a Constitution that all 25 member states are confident of putting to their people, on the same day, to create a true debate about Europe--and such a Constitution can be approved--then it is the right document for Europe.
Friday, May 06, 2005
Labour's victory?
The results are in, and everything went pretty much as expected, the major surprise being the slim majority of Labour: the party now has 355 seats, 31 over the 324 needed for a simple majority in the House of Commons. What does this mean for the UK and for British domestic and foreign policy?
It means that Blair will have to go one of two roads: he will either take measures to gain the support of the more leftist Labour backbench, or work on forming more ad hoc alliances with the Tories on some issues such as public service reform. The second option seems extremely unlikely, given Britain’s traditionally good party discipline, and the disagreement between Conservatives and Labour on the best methods to reform public service (Labour wanting more money and limited privatization, Conservatives basically wanting privatization). Therefore Blair will push ahead with topics such as his African agenda, which appeal to the more socially conscious Left within Labour yet don’t alienate his middle ground. Reform of the House of Lords would seem to be another topic for which he could gain more broad cross-party support.
As for that third party, the Liberal Democrats saw about a 4 percent rise in their share of the vote, winning an extra 10 seats, though they did not do well against the Conservatives, losing more seats than they picked up. The Lib Dem gains came at Labour’s expense alone. The question is what now for the Lib Dems: their policies are a strange mix of personal freedom, high taxation and policies that redistribute from the rich to the middle class, and their foreign policy appeals mostly to the moderate left (joining the euro, more integration, no intervention). Despite this Charles Kennedy has claimed that his party is an option in the middle. Lib Dems gained due to the protest vote, but their challenge now is to consolidate these gains while simultaneously generating a coherent set of policies that could actually guide a governing party. I had, as I said before, hoped that the Lib Dems would pull off a total surprise and, together with the Conservatives, force a hung parliament, but that having not happened, I must admit that Labour was and still is the best governing option at present.
Smaller parties that had hoped to gain seats did not; the only one to pick up a seat was ex-Labour MP George Galloway’s Respect, winning a London seat heavily populated by Muslims. The Euroskeptic UKIP and the nationalist BNP failed to pick up seats. The SDLP did not sustain the heavy losses predicted, maintaining three seats in Northern Ireland, although it lost one seat to Sinn Féin and picked up another due to Unionist divisions. It was the Ulster Unionist Party that was basically wiped out, as former First Minister David Trimble lost his seat and the party was reduced to one MP. The DUP meanwhile took nine seats at Westminster. NI Alliance failed to win any seats—the “middle of the road” is not a productive political strategy at present, especially in a single-member-district system.
As Blair heads into his third and final term, his agenda remains alive and well. His legacy of leading Labour to the political center is certainly mixed in people’s opinions, but succeeded grandly in bringing the party out of the political wilderness. The next question is whether either opposition party can formulate a better agenda for Britain. The Conservatives must redefine their core principles, as has been said several times before, and not try to be “Labour, just slightly differently”; the Lib Dems must discover what would tie all of their proposals together and reformulate them to make them more practical and coherent. The party to succeed first in doing this might well be the one that shares the political arena with Labour in the future. Whatever results, it will definitely be an interesting process of evolution.
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