71 years to the day... the Popular Front

Yesterday (February 16) as I was being my usual absent-minded self, my thoughts drifted to the Spanish Civil War, and in particular to the understudied but very important period of the Spanish Second Republic. I knew there must be a reason for this, and I quickly thumbed through my well-worn copy of Hugh Thomas’ book (aptly titled The Spanish Civil War). And indeed: February 16, 2007, was the 71st anniversary of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 1936, won by the Popular Front, which began the acceleration of Spain’s descent into all-out war in July.

Today, Spain is a relatively stable democracy, and almost unique among European democracies, has essentially a two-party system, with government alternating between the currently ruling Socialists (PSOE) and opposition conservative People’s Party (PP). The Spanish Second Republic was entirely different, on the other hand. The main political parties and groups included:

• The Republican Left (IR), a center-left but doggedly anti-clerical group, led by Manuel Azaña Díaz, a literary figure who would serve as prime minister and president;
• The same Socialists (PSOE), but very leftist at the time, led by trade-union leader Francisco Largo Caballero;
• The Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) and National Council of Workers (CNT), a large anarchist group and the associated trade union;
• The Spanish Confederation of Independent Rightist Parties (CEDA), the best translation I can come up with for the unwieldy Spanish name Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, a federation of rightist, generally Christian-influenced parties led by lawyer José María Gil Robles;
• The Radical Republican Party (PRR), which while republican in orientation was more centrist/conservative in other policies and tended to be pragmatic to the point of sleaziness, led by veteran politician Alejandro Lerroux;
• Various regional parties, such as the Regionalist League (Lliga) of conservative Catalans, the Esquerra Republicana (ERC) of socialist Catalans, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).

This fragmentation occurred for several related reasons: (1) intense regionalism; (2) sharp disagreement on the nature of the regime, monarchist vs. republican, federal vs. unitary, secular vs. laic; (3) economic inequalities; (4) personal disagreements and opportunism among politicians, and a total lack of trust. Added to this, perhaps, should be the electoral system.

The Spanish electoral system in the Second Republic heavily favored provincial majorities. I believe the majority party or list in a constituency (almost always the same as a province) received 80 percent of the seats from that constituency, with minorities receiving the other 20 percent. Additionally, the system was open-list, weakening the party structure. The closest comparison today would be the Brazilian legislature, with open lists but only a single non-transferable vote for each elector, the difference being that in Spain there was a substantial prize for the largest list, further encouraging electoral pacts (but only on a provincial basis).

The result was heavy distortion of results (the winning list would receive a large majority in the unicameral Cortes), a fragmented legislature, and distribution of seats by party that was definitely not proportional. Some parties in lists benefited disproportionately, and losing parties (especially if they weren’t in alliances), lost greatly. For example, a disunited Left lost the election of 1933 badly, and the Republican Left in particular won fewer than 20 seats.

In 1936, the Popular Front was formed by the Republican Left, the Republican Union (a splinter of the Radicals), the Socialists, and the Communists (PCE). It competed against the more loosely organized National Front, headed by the CEDA and also including traditional monarchists in Spanish Renewal (RE) and Carlists in the Traditional Community (CT), though the fascist Falange remained outside. Again, however, given the provincial nature of the election, pacts were sometimes made with regional and centrist parties in various parts of the country, and alliances were not always consistent.

There are not any extremely detailed results of these elections readily available, though Tusell (1971) conducted a study which I don’t have access to. Hugh Thomas’ figures, adapted from Tusell, show the following:

34.3 percent for the Popular Front, and 263 seats

33.2 percent for the National Front, and 156 seats

5.4 percent for various centrists (Radicals, Basques, etc.), and 59 seats.

While one might surmise that the antipathy between today’s principal Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE) is the result of this longstanding feud—and it is true that today, older conflicts are reappearing—it is also the result of the fact that Spain today has this two-party system with little coalition-building. The Spanish electoral system technically has low thresholds, but uses the d’Hondt method to distribute seats in mainly very small constituencies. The principal differences from the Second Republic are: (1) a lower house ¾ of the size (350 seats today), meaning a lot of 3 to 5-seat constituencies that are not really “proportional”, and (2) closed party lists. One might surmise that, at least initially, those framing the Spanish Constitution were not horribly upset by the prospect of consolidation due to the fractious history of political parties; but at the same time, this was by no means an inevitable result, given that even at that time, principal political forces included the PSOE, the PP’s predecessor the Popular Alliance (AP), the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) of transitional PM Adolfo Suárez, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Communists (PCE). But the UCD disappeared, AP merged with other rightist parties to form PP, PSP merged quickly into PSOE, and the Communists are now part of the United Left, a coalition with little import.

At any rate, what has happened is a disproportional Spanish system that favors the big parties and the smaller, but regionally concentrated, parties such as the Catalan and Basque regionalists. This has lent the system a stability that it lacked in 1936, at the cost of choice along the ideological spectrum.

Meanwhile… immediately following the announcement of the 1936 results (a few days later), PM Manuel Portela Valladares resigned, and somewhat irregularly, Manuel Azaña was appointed prime minister for the second time before the new Cortes was inaugurated, heading a government composed almost entirely of his own Republican Left (with less than 100 seats in the 478-seat Cortes), in which the Socialists refused to participate. So began the descent into war.

Family planning in Rwanda

Interesting proposal out of Africa, meanwhile. Apparently, Rwanda's government wants to take solid family planning steps. There hasn't been a lot of progress in Africa on this issue, anywhere, but if progress will be made anywhere, Rwanda seems a good case.

Rwanda and its neighbor Burundi are two of the world's most densely populated countries, and farms are increasingly small as families divide them up each generation. Meanwhile, Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, is a ruthless modernizer who reminds me somewhat of a hardcore corporate CEO--no dissent, modernization, progress; for example, an embrace of modern business methods and Internet technology. The Church will apparently not oppose the plan, lacking moral standing as many of the clergy collaborated in the 1994 genocide.

The plan seems to involve free distribution of birth control (including Norplant) and mandating family planning counseling whenever anyone goes to a hospital (though I can see the pep talk getting old pretty quick). The BBC reports that the country wants to require three children or less, but I don't see that echoed elsewhere.

Attractive new homes in central Palestine

Ha'aretz reports on the plan of Palestinian entrepreneurs to build a new city--in the middle of the West Bank:

According to sources who were at the Herzliya event, the idea was received with enthusiasm by the attendees, including Defense Minister Amir Peretz. The Palestinian Authority has already allocated land for the new city. ...

They see the new community as comprising several thousand housing units containing 140 to 200 square meters of floor space apiece. It will be meant mainly for young, middle-class families.

The new city is supposed to be built between Ramallah and Nablus, that is to say, north-center West Bank. Forgive me for being skeptical, but... note the following rule has generally held for anything built in the Palestinian territories:

(1) It gets destroyed.

Like, for instance, pretty much everything built during the days of "peace" in the late '90s that was funded by international aid money. [To be fair, Gaza had it much worse, but is the West Bank that good of an investment right now, even for charity capital infusions?]

Who is going to pay for these construction workers? They are hoping for international support. "Small businesses" are supposed to be part of the economy... well, that requires a few roadblocks to actually be removed (that is, the IDF doesn't lie about them) so that inter-city transportation can occur. I mean, the idea is fine--if there's a peace agreement. Until then, it's throwing money down a hole.

Here's an interesting quote:

"It's not any of Israel's business if the Palestinians want to build a city on their territory," said one [of the Defense Ministry officials].

Hmm. Really? Well then, why are you at this meeting? Oh, right... "their territory" doesn't really exist. According to the Oslo accords--the entire basis for Area A--there is Palestinian "jurisdiction over territory," but there's no sovereignty, of course. And then there's the matter of actually getting all the construction materials to the little island of territory that this "city" will be built on.

So, the Israelis are all there (a pretty good list in the article) to approve plans for a Palestinian city. Funny how Oslo has created the autonomy for the Arabs that Begin wanted, and how the five-year PA has achieved permanence. And how easily it was predicted by some. But... that's a matter for another posting.

Update: Speaking of cities, though not the same one: The Head Heeb, an extremely well-spoken and well-informed blogger, has a great post on a proposed new Arab city in Israel, as well as the continued battle for integration of previously Jewish-only communities, and the dynamic of racial separation within Israel proper.

Anyone know something about monetary policy?

Okay, so I'm a former econ major (albeit not a very attentive one), and I'm confused. The NYT has an article on the issuing of dollar coins, and the fact that they won't be successful until the dollar bill is withdrawn. The article includes this (to me) confusing note:

A banknote, since it is redeemable, counts as a government liability, and the Federal Reserve has to back it by buying securities, which earn interest. According to the Fed, there are now about eight billion dollar bills in circulation, so that interest income is considerable. Coins do not yield such income.

Huh? I always thought the purchase of securities (e.g. Treasury bonds) was just the Fed's vehicle to increase the quantity of money. From that perspective, whether you're issuing coins or bills is irrelevant. And what, exactly, is a banknote "redeemable" for? The USD is fiat money, i.e. "legal tender because we said so." Am I missing something here?