Well, another Jewish Israeli "terrorist" has struck again, firing and killing four Palestinians in the northern West Bank. I put "terrorist" in quotes because the use of the term has become pointless given its various meanings and lack of meaning as the case may be. However, he is a "terrorist" in the same way that a Hamas or Islamic Jihad bomber is a terrorist, and the second in a week to come from the West Bank settlements. It does appear that the rabbis of the settlement areas are going to denounce the shooting and appeal against violence, which is a positive thing, as is the fact that the shooter was arrested and not arbitrarily killed (now we will see the outcome of the Israeli justice system).
I want to go back to what I said yesterday about the binational state and clarify a bit my opinions. It's clear that the binational state is not the first preference of either group--in numerous opinion polls this option is rejected in favor of the two-state solution. The problem is what type of two-state solution?
Palestinians want their own state; this means a state on 21 percent of mandatory Palestine that has territorial contiguity and includes East Jerusalem as the capital, as well as the rights of a state, that is, control of borders and its own security forces. Israelis reluctantly support a Palestinian state; that "Palestinian state" would not even be sovereign given the restrictions that would be imposed in the name of security. Israelis, or at least successive governments, don't take into account the fact that Israel would be clearly stronger than Palestine regardless of the restrictions or lack thereof placed on the new state. Meanwhile, Palestinians want at least a symbolic return of refugees to Israel, something the Jewish state may or may not be willing to accept.
The point of this whole thing is that nobody can agree on just what the two-state solution would look like, and until they do, the settlers (who have essentially been self-governing for years) will continue to expand their colonies in the West Bank to the point where they can't be uprooted and can't be disentangled from Palestinian population centers. Personally, I don't believe there will ever be agreement on what a two-state solution will look like, because Israeli leaders won't have the political ability to make the necessary concessions, and Palestinian leaders (a) can't make concessions either (though from my perspective they have already made the vast majority of those concessions), and (b) have less motivation to do so because the binational solution isn't perceived as negatively by them as it is by Israelis.
That's not to say that binationalism will be readily or happily accepted, and it might take more fighting (figuratively or literally) for equal rights for Palestinians before it is realized. That is if Israel opts for the "bantustan" solution. The other possibility Palestinians must be (and generally are) prepared to resist is expulsion/"involuntary transfer".
The only example we have of this type of binational settlement in practice is that of the Republic of South Africa, and the results are mixed; but South Africa also adopted a nonracial, noncommunitarian constitution, something which would likely be impossible even in the binational state; and Africans far outnumber whites in SA whereas in Israel/Palestine the numbers are closer to even (something which strikes me as a positive when it comes to creating compromise between communities).
Anyway, it is pointless to speculate on the possibilities for the binational state when it doesn't exist yet and may never exist for that matter, but it is interesting, especially for those looking at building institutions and conflict resolution.
Wednesday, August 17, 2005
Disengaging from reality
It's almost time for the IDF to start using force against those who remain in the Gaza settlements, and I want to comment a bit on some of the comments I've been seeing in Ha'aretz recently (not that they're any different than the norm).
First, those who feel bad for the settlers being "uprooted" from their homes. How does anyone actually feel bad about this? Pretty much none of them have lived there their full lives, and they are probably going to go live about 20 miles away, if they don't join their subsidized brethren in the West Bank stealing land from Palestinians there. They're being ridiculously compensated and lived in their old homes thanks only to the tax and defense burden that fell on ordinary Israel citizens and young conscripts.
Second, those who believe that Gaza somehow "belongs" to Israel. These people are either religious nuts or essentially religious nuts who hide behind a "war" excuse, that is, "Gaza was captured by war so Israel has the right to take over." Well, the religious idea is BS, and the war idea is pretty much the same. If you want to pursue the war idea, then annex Gaza and the West Bank and rule them under Israeli law and grant Israeli citizenship to residents. I don't think many Palestinians would quibble with such a plan.
Finally, I want to point out that the most violent resistance has been carried on by troublemakers from outside the Gaza settlements. They don't belong there and should be treated by the IDF with all the force used on Palestinians (not that they will be).
I sympathize with the Palestinian people and an glad that they will regain the entirety of Gaza's territory, despite those settlers who are destroying greenhouses and residences out of spite and hatred. The settler who whines about how Gaza could be a model for Jewish-Arab cooperation (hey, so could Palestine/Israel if you decided to make it so) just doesn't resonate with me.
I want to make a further point. Those who criticize the Palestinians for terror tactics ignore not only the plentiful state-sanctioned terror carried out by the IDF, but ignore the reality of the situation. In the current state of affairs, with loss of hope, poor living conditions and ongoing oppression (with no credible sponsor), for many Palestinians terror seems a decent option. What if it were the Jewish people who were "losing the war" rather than the Palestinian Arabs? Well, the results were seen in the late '30s-early '40s when Jewish forces felt it necessary to use extralegal means to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state. Forces such as Irgun and Lehi carried out atrocities such as the King David hotel bombing of the British administration and the Deir Yassin massacre of Palestinian civilians. The people committing these atrocities (against civilians) clearly felt they were justified; there was a segment of the population supporting them that would not engage in such action themselves; and there was a segment of the population that condemned the acts. And this in a situation where the Jewish community was much better off than the Palestinian Arabs are today.
My main point is that Jewish people are inherently no morally better or worse than Palestinian Arabs; we all have different conceptions of reality, different mental maps that define our options, but such maps are a result of the situation in which our society and we personally find ourselves. This conception of human action is central to my conception of social democracy: simply put, picture yourself in the other's shoes and think whether or not you might consider certain actions acceptable. That doesn't make actions acceptable in itself--but a key step to combating terror is finding out what will make people stop believing in it. The concept of envisioning the POV of others has universal applicability.
Finally, I will state here (as I have stated elsewhere before) that I believe the inevitable solution will be one binational state for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, not because either side wishes it that way, but because a compromise will not happen in time. As I continue my project to write organic law for a future Israeli/Palestinian state, I will summarize the major points of such a law here:
(1) A secular parliamentary democracy.
(2) Establishment of the two communities as the basis of the state (i.e., federalism based on the person and not geographically).
(3) A bicameral legislature, one chamber using proportional representation and the other representing the two communities.
(4) Division of posts in the security forces, the administration, the courts and the government on a community basis.
(5) As much community self-government as possible: community control over religion, education, culture, etc.
(6) Broad rights guarantees and nondiscrimination.
(7) Rectification of the economic disparities.
(8) A just resolution of property disputes.
(9) Recognition of the state as the homeland of two peoples and the guarantee of the right of "return" for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
A constitution incorporating all these features will be necessary for reconciliation in one binational state to occur, and we may as well examine (as some are) what such a structure will look like today, before the solution is forced upon the two sides without preparation.
First, those who feel bad for the settlers being "uprooted" from their homes. How does anyone actually feel bad about this? Pretty much none of them have lived there their full lives, and they are probably going to go live about 20 miles away, if they don't join their subsidized brethren in the West Bank stealing land from Palestinians there. They're being ridiculously compensated and lived in their old homes thanks only to the tax and defense burden that fell on ordinary Israel citizens and young conscripts.
Second, those who believe that Gaza somehow "belongs" to Israel. These people are either religious nuts or essentially religious nuts who hide behind a "war" excuse, that is, "Gaza was captured by war so Israel has the right to take over." Well, the religious idea is BS, and the war idea is pretty much the same. If you want to pursue the war idea, then annex Gaza and the West Bank and rule them under Israeli law and grant Israeli citizenship to residents. I don't think many Palestinians would quibble with such a plan.
Finally, I want to point out that the most violent resistance has been carried on by troublemakers from outside the Gaza settlements. They don't belong there and should be treated by the IDF with all the force used on Palestinians (not that they will be).
I sympathize with the Palestinian people and an glad that they will regain the entirety of Gaza's territory, despite those settlers who are destroying greenhouses and residences out of spite and hatred. The settler who whines about how Gaza could be a model for Jewish-Arab cooperation (hey, so could Palestine/Israel if you decided to make it so) just doesn't resonate with me.
I want to make a further point. Those who criticize the Palestinians for terror tactics ignore not only the plentiful state-sanctioned terror carried out by the IDF, but ignore the reality of the situation. In the current state of affairs, with loss of hope, poor living conditions and ongoing oppression (with no credible sponsor), for many Palestinians terror seems a decent option. What if it were the Jewish people who were "losing the war" rather than the Palestinian Arabs? Well, the results were seen in the late '30s-early '40s when Jewish forces felt it necessary to use extralegal means to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state. Forces such as Irgun and Lehi carried out atrocities such as the King David hotel bombing of the British administration and the Deir Yassin massacre of Palestinian civilians. The people committing these atrocities (against civilians) clearly felt they were justified; there was a segment of the population supporting them that would not engage in such action themselves; and there was a segment of the population that condemned the acts. And this in a situation where the Jewish community was much better off than the Palestinian Arabs are today.
My main point is that Jewish people are inherently no morally better or worse than Palestinian Arabs; we all have different conceptions of reality, different mental maps that define our options, but such maps are a result of the situation in which our society and we personally find ourselves. This conception of human action is central to my conception of social democracy: simply put, picture yourself in the other's shoes and think whether or not you might consider certain actions acceptable. That doesn't make actions acceptable in itself--but a key step to combating terror is finding out what will make people stop believing in it. The concept of envisioning the POV of others has universal applicability.
Finally, I will state here (as I have stated elsewhere before) that I believe the inevitable solution will be one binational state for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, not because either side wishes it that way, but because a compromise will not happen in time. As I continue my project to write organic law for a future Israeli/Palestinian state, I will summarize the major points of such a law here:
(1) A secular parliamentary democracy.
(2) Establishment of the two communities as the basis of the state (i.e., federalism based on the person and not geographically).
(3) A bicameral legislature, one chamber using proportional representation and the other representing the two communities.
(4) Division of posts in the security forces, the administration, the courts and the government on a community basis.
(5) As much community self-government as possible: community control over religion, education, culture, etc.
(6) Broad rights guarantees and nondiscrimination.
(7) Rectification of the economic disparities.
(8) A just resolution of property disputes.
(9) Recognition of the state as the homeland of two peoples and the guarantee of the right of "return" for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
A constitution incorporating all these features will be necessary for reconciliation in one binational state to occur, and we may as well examine (as some are) what such a structure will look like today, before the solution is forced upon the two sides without preparation.
Monday, August 15, 2005
Thinking constitutionally
The Iraqi draft constitution is set to be unveiled tomorrow and we know a few things about it... e.g. that the name of the country will continue to be "Republic of Iraq"... but there are some things still up in the air. The major questions are the division of oil monies, the nature of the vertical power structure and the rights of women and role of Islam.
According to Iraq the Model, the power structure will give the right to form federal states to any governorate or combination of those. That is to say, it will be like the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías" if this is true. To be honest, that is a novel and appropriate solution to the issue, and succeeds in postponing likely difficult negotiations over exactly what powers everyone will have. At the same time, the financial side of the equation would see oil revenues distributed by population as the Sunni factions would like.
Meanwhile, the role of Islam as a contributing and constraining yet not overriding factor in legislation seems the most likely solution. There is a question about the role of women in the new constitution, whether the rather broad civil rights they currently enjoy will be maintained and whether they will continue to have the guarantee of every third spot on the party lists. Maintaining these guarantees would be a plus for the new Iraqi state but we will see what the draft says; and if women's rights are impinged by the new document will that be enough for it to be rejected and risk further instability?
So we are on the U.S.-imposed deadline (exactly what it is) for the new constitution. Maybe that is not such a bad thing; Iraq needs stability and what more would be achieved in ten days? The tough negotiations might just have been pushed off to the end anyway. I'm not there, I can't say what else they might have done, but it is rather heavy-handed of the administration to exert such pressure on the drafting commission and then have Khalilzad talk about how the constitution should reflect a historic social compact, or whatever he said like that. Again, though, what more would have been done with a 15-day extension?
And a few hundred miles to the west disengagement from Gaza has begun and I will comment on the coming days on its progress... but it is certainly an exciting time for Gazans and for observers of the situation in Palestine/Israel.
According to Iraq the Model, the power structure will give the right to form federal states to any governorate or combination of those. That is to say, it will be like the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías" if this is true. To be honest, that is a novel and appropriate solution to the issue, and succeeds in postponing likely difficult negotiations over exactly what powers everyone will have. At the same time, the financial side of the equation would see oil revenues distributed by population as the Sunni factions would like.
Meanwhile, the role of Islam as a contributing and constraining yet not overriding factor in legislation seems the most likely solution. There is a question about the role of women in the new constitution, whether the rather broad civil rights they currently enjoy will be maintained and whether they will continue to have the guarantee of every third spot on the party lists. Maintaining these guarantees would be a plus for the new Iraqi state but we will see what the draft says; and if women's rights are impinged by the new document will that be enough for it to be rejected and risk further instability?
So we are on the U.S.-imposed deadline (exactly what it is) for the new constitution. Maybe that is not such a bad thing; Iraq needs stability and what more would be achieved in ten days? The tough negotiations might just have been pushed off to the end anyway. I'm not there, I can't say what else they might have done, but it is rather heavy-handed of the administration to exert such pressure on the drafting commission and then have Khalilzad talk about how the constitution should reflect a historic social compact, or whatever he said like that. Again, though, what more would have been done with a 15-day extension?
And a few hundred miles to the west disengagement from Gaza has begun and I will comment on the coming days on its progress... but it is certainly an exciting time for Gazans and for observers of the situation in Palestine/Israel.
Sunday, August 14, 2005
Recent developments
Well, what's gone on in the world lately? China abandoned the dollar peg a while ago and now has a "basket." It's a start. Niger finally got a little bit of attention. Guinea-Bissau had a presidential election and Nino Vieira will be president again which means that the country isn't going to emerge from its problems anytime soon.
Of course, everyone is paying attention to the disengagement right now; Bibi's quit and Arik is determined (even though Netanyahu's popularity is way above Sharon's in the Likud, of course, Bibi's always been an opportunist and will continue to be). But the Right isn't going to stop this from going through, which means the obvious question is how Hamas and Fatah will be able to work together in Gaza.
Palestinian legislative elections won't occur until January 2006 (the new date set by Abbas) so until then there will have to be some sort of collaboration in Gaza. But what sort of collaboration? Hamas has to know that it will only benefit the Palestinian people to have a smooth ride and feel a benefit from the disengagement. I can't see any motivation for Hamas to continue to create trouble against Israel in a pretty much unoccupied (obviously not "free") Gaza. The problem is the possible benefits Hamas could gain against Fatah knowing that Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PA don't want to see trouble in Gaza.
Hamas will have to weigh this desire to achieve political gains in Gaza against the public opinion of Gazans... but the ball would seem to be in their court.
On another note, I've heard a lot of ludicrous things (especially reading about Palestine/Israel), but check this out: http://www.twostarsforpeace.com/.
Finally, why does Mbeki have to bail out Mugabe? South Africa has enough problems without loaning money to a corrupt dictator to help him continue his reign of repression. Yet another reason why I stopped supporting the ANC... and why the Democratic Alliance should win (though it won't) in 2009.
Of course, everyone is paying attention to the disengagement right now; Bibi's quit and Arik is determined (even though Netanyahu's popularity is way above Sharon's in the Likud, of course, Bibi's always been an opportunist and will continue to be). But the Right isn't going to stop this from going through, which means the obvious question is how Hamas and Fatah will be able to work together in Gaza.
Palestinian legislative elections won't occur until January 2006 (the new date set by Abbas) so until then there will have to be some sort of collaboration in Gaza. But what sort of collaboration? Hamas has to know that it will only benefit the Palestinian people to have a smooth ride and feel a benefit from the disengagement. I can't see any motivation for Hamas to continue to create trouble against Israel in a pretty much unoccupied (obviously not "free") Gaza. The problem is the possible benefits Hamas could gain against Fatah knowing that Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PA don't want to see trouble in Gaza.
Hamas will have to weigh this desire to achieve political gains in Gaza against the public opinion of Gazans... but the ball would seem to be in their court.
On another note, I've heard a lot of ludicrous things (especially reading about Palestine/Israel), but check this out: http://www.twostarsforpeace.com/.
Finally, why does Mbeki have to bail out Mugabe? South Africa has enough problems without loaning money to a corrupt dictator to help him continue his reign of repression. Yet another reason why I stopped supporting the ANC... and why the Democratic Alliance should win (though it won't) in 2009.
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