Tomorrow marks Bolivia's elections, the first time Bolivia has elected prefectos (the heads of the provinces) in addition to the national congress and president. The presidential election itself pits two diametrically opposed candidates against each other: Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga of the right-leaning Podemos (Democratic and Social Power) party, and Evo Morales of the MAS (Movement toward Socialism). There could hardly be a bigger contrast between Quiroga, who is Harvard-educated, has an American wife and was vice-president for the conservative president and ex-military leader Hugo Bánzer, and Morales, an indigenous anti-U.S. leader who advocates liberalization of coca growing and is backed by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.
This is a tough election for me in terms of who to sympathize with. Quiroga and Morales are clearly the two leading candidates, and one of them will be chosen president by the new congress, since neither will take 50% of the vote. This means the results of the congressional elections are also important. Despite my sympathies with the Left and the alienation of the indigenous population, I am going to prove myself to be one of the right-leaning social democrats and endorse Tuto Quiroga, who I believe has the expertise necessary to lead Bolivia to a more cohesive development strategy and constitutional reform with the constituent assembly in 2006. I am unimpressed by Morales' rhetoric, his refusal to debate other candidates and the lack of clarity in the MAS platform.
In Chile, as was expected, the Concertación candidate Michelle Bachelet was unable to reach 50% of the vote and the election will go to a runoff between Bachelet and the moderate-right wealthy businessman Sebastián Piñera. This election is not as divisive, and it is easy for me to come out for Michelle Bachelet, although I am unhappy that Bachelet and the coalition have decided to press electoral reform at this moment, when it seems like little more than a means to divide the opposition Alianza. The Bachelet slogan is "más" ... more of the Concertación, which has governed Chile for 16 years. But under Chile's two-bloc system, the Left remains the best choice.
Later, comments on Canada's prime ministerial debate, and more...
Sunday, December 18, 2005
Thursday, December 15, 2005
Counting the ballots...
It's a sign of my obsession that I'm here writing this (hopefully short) blog entry instead of studying for my 2:30 final in Latin American Political Economy, although to be fair I've spent a number of hours thus far on the material.
The polls are closed in Iraq and no major incidents have been reported. It's an emotional day for everyone, as I've said I admire all the Iraqis who went out to vote today and the fact that they truly believe in the governance of their country by themselves. It is definitely a strong counterpoint to the cynicism we face here in the United States and all other democracies face from time to time, and though there are surely deficiencies in the system (especially in the American system from my POV) it is still democracy and we are still infinitely better off than most of the world.
I browsed Iraq the Model and the BBC today and found Omar and Mohammed generally optimistic (as always) and the BBC a bit more balanced although the BBC was also optimistic and reported the huge numbers of Iraqis turning out to vote and their enthusiasm for the process. They even quoted election officials as saying Anbar was relatively calm. One of the problems the BBC brought up was a female candidate from Basra who campaigned against the influence of the Islamist militia down there and pointed out how difficult the situation has become in the south for those who oppose the theocracy, and quite honestly that might be one of the biggest problems for a new government--how to avoid the partition of Iraq into different self governing states within a state as a "compromise" rather than creating a united and secular and liberal Iraq that many Iraqis (and we of course here in the U.S.) want to see.
Hopefully we will see a quicker ballot count this time around as last time it seemed to take forever to get some results. Admittedly, the most important thing is getting the count right, but in that regard a quicker count generally diminishes the possibility of fraud. The new Council of Representatives is due to be sworn in by year's end and the government formed rather quickly after that. Only after the results are out can there be any educated speculation about the composition and programme of a new government.
This was one of my favorite pictures, it is an Iraqi voter born in 1900 going to the polls today... the picture is from Iraq the Model and they have a lot of really great pictures of election day at the site, I encourage anyone reading this to check out their accounts from across the country. I am just going to link to it so nobody gets mad at me for breaking someone's rights...
http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/uploaded_images/oo184-783457.jpg
And now back to the books for the last couple hours!
The polls are closed in Iraq and no major incidents have been reported. It's an emotional day for everyone, as I've said I admire all the Iraqis who went out to vote today and the fact that they truly believe in the governance of their country by themselves. It is definitely a strong counterpoint to the cynicism we face here in the United States and all other democracies face from time to time, and though there are surely deficiencies in the system (especially in the American system from my POV) it is still democracy and we are still infinitely better off than most of the world.
I browsed Iraq the Model and the BBC today and found Omar and Mohammed generally optimistic (as always) and the BBC a bit more balanced although the BBC was also optimistic and reported the huge numbers of Iraqis turning out to vote and their enthusiasm for the process. They even quoted election officials as saying Anbar was relatively calm. One of the problems the BBC brought up was a female candidate from Basra who campaigned against the influence of the Islamist militia down there and pointed out how difficult the situation has become in the south for those who oppose the theocracy, and quite honestly that might be one of the biggest problems for a new government--how to avoid the partition of Iraq into different self governing states within a state as a "compromise" rather than creating a united and secular and liberal Iraq that many Iraqis (and we of course here in the U.S.) want to see.
Hopefully we will see a quicker ballot count this time around as last time it seemed to take forever to get some results. Admittedly, the most important thing is getting the count right, but in that regard a quicker count generally diminishes the possibility of fraud. The new Council of Representatives is due to be sworn in by year's end and the government formed rather quickly after that. Only after the results are out can there be any educated speculation about the composition and programme of a new government.
This was one of my favorite pictures, it is an Iraqi voter born in 1900 going to the polls today... the picture is from Iraq the Model and they have a lot of really great pictures of election day at the site, I encourage anyone reading this to check out their accounts from across the country. I am just going to link to it so nobody gets mad at me for breaking someone's rights...
http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/uploaded_images/oo184-783457.jpg
And now back to the books for the last couple hours!
Tuesday, December 13, 2005
Iraq is voting again!
The first voters in Iraq's parliamentary election are heading to the polls as the military, people in hospitals and prisons have voted and Iraqis abroad are voting as well. As before the major contenders are the Shia-religious UIA list, Allawi's secular list and the Kurdish united list, joined now by the National Accord Front of the Sunni.
The electoral system for this election is different as well, with most of the seats allocated on a provincial level by the d'Hondt system. This will ensure that all groups have representation regionally regardless of how many people turn out in the region. There is also a pool of national compensatory seats which will probably help out smaller parties which might have been left out due to the smaller constituency size, as well as make the overall result proportional.
It would probably be correct to anticipate the UIA triumph but it will certainly be of a smaller proportion than in the last election, with the addition of the Sunni and increasing popularity of secular national lists such as Allawi's and the others led by al-Kubba and Chalabi.
All that is necessary for a government under the new constitution is an absolute majority of the House of Representatives (and not two-thirds as under the TAL) so the Shia-Kurdish coalition might be able to continue governing, but whether that coalition will survive or whether the Kurds will leave to work with someone like Allawi and other secular lists is open to question.
At any rate, it is exciting to see the Iraqis voting again with enthusiasm for the permanent government and to see the constitution implemented and in action. And while I may have disagreed with the reasoning for the war in the first place I can't help but be excited for the people who have the right to choose their government for the first time and be happy with the enthusiasm and alacrity they have clearly displayed over the past months in embracing the democratic process.
The electoral system for this election is different as well, with most of the seats allocated on a provincial level by the d'Hondt system. This will ensure that all groups have representation regionally regardless of how many people turn out in the region. There is also a pool of national compensatory seats which will probably help out smaller parties which might have been left out due to the smaller constituency size, as well as make the overall result proportional.
It would probably be correct to anticipate the UIA triumph but it will certainly be of a smaller proportion than in the last election, with the addition of the Sunni and increasing popularity of secular national lists such as Allawi's and the others led by al-Kubba and Chalabi.
All that is necessary for a government under the new constitution is an absolute majority of the House of Representatives (and not two-thirds as under the TAL) so the Shia-Kurdish coalition might be able to continue governing, but whether that coalition will survive or whether the Kurds will leave to work with someone like Allawi and other secular lists is open to question.
At any rate, it is exciting to see the Iraqis voting again with enthusiasm for the permanent government and to see the constitution implemented and in action. And while I may have disagreed with the reasoning for the war in the first place I can't help but be excited for the people who have the right to choose their government for the first time and be happy with the enthusiasm and alacrity they have clearly displayed over the past months in embracing the democratic process.
Monday, December 12, 2005
Four more years... six more years?
After a brisk day of voting in Chile the ruling Concertación has taken a majority in the Congress of Deputies for another four-year term, controlling the lower house for 20 years (since the 1989 elections returned democracy). The opposition right-wing Alliance could not duplicate its best performance, from four years ago, and dropped to around 39% of the vote. Despite that, the Alliance remains overrepresented with 54 of the 120 seats, and the Concertación took 65 on 51-52% of the vote. The coalition of Communists and Humanists failed to win a single seat thanks to the two-seat Chilean constituencies.
Congress of Deputies results since 1989
*with 97% counted
The Alianza lost almost no seats (only 2.5%) despite a 5-6% drop in votes due to the electoral system. Now that this system is no longer constitutionally mandated, it would seem logical that the next government would do away with the system, replacing it perhaps with a regional MMP system (a measure I would not support).
The presidential elections
The failure of the Alliance to unite behind a single presidential candidate may have hurt its chances in the legislative race, but it did not affect the outcome of the election for the presidency. The leading candidate, Renovación Nacional's Sebastián Piñera, came out with just over 25% of the vote. The UDI's Joaquín Lavín, Alliance flag-bearer in 1999, took 23%, while the Concertación candidate Michelle Bachelet wound up with about 45% of the vote, meaning a runoff between her and Piñera (who likely stole many Christian Democrat votes).
The smart money is still on Bachelet to extend the Concertación to 22 years in the presidency, and be Chile's first female president, but the results indicate that it will be a tough race, much like the hard-fought 1999 contest.
Congress of Deputies results since 1989
| 1989 | % | 1993 | % | 1997 | % | 2001 | % | |
| Concertación | 69 | 51,49% | 70 | 55,40% | 69 | 50,51% | 62 | 47,90% |
| Alianza | 48 | 34,18% | 50 | 36,68% | 47 | 36,26% | 57 | 44,27% |
| list | 2005 | %* |
| Concertación | 65 | 51,8% |
| Alianza | 54 | 38,7% |
The Alianza lost almost no seats (only 2.5%) despite a 5-6% drop in votes due to the electoral system. Now that this system is no longer constitutionally mandated, it would seem logical that the next government would do away with the system, replacing it perhaps with a regional MMP system (a measure I would not support).
The presidential elections
The failure of the Alliance to unite behind a single presidential candidate may have hurt its chances in the legislative race, but it did not affect the outcome of the election for the presidency. The leading candidate, Renovación Nacional's Sebastián Piñera, came out with just over 25% of the vote. The UDI's Joaquín Lavín, Alliance flag-bearer in 1999, took 23%, while the Concertación candidate Michelle Bachelet wound up with about 45% of the vote, meaning a runoff between her and Piñera (who likely stole many Christian Democrat votes).
The smart money is still on Bachelet to extend the Concertación to 22 years in the presidency, and be Chile's first female president, but the results indicate that it will be a tough race, much like the hard-fought 1999 contest.
Tuesday, November 29, 2005
Two months, two big elections
As an election nerd one of my biggest thrills comes when a government falls from a motion of no confidence, as we saw today in Canada, where as expected, Paul Martin lost a vote in the Commons and will face a ballot at some point in mid-January. I took time during one of my classes to sketch out the basic alignment of the Commons and what we can expect from these polls:
The Liberals have a minority government but are the only party capable of winning seats everywhere in Canada. The NDP and Conservatives can't win in Quebec, and the Conservatives are weak in Ontario and the Maritimes. Of course, the NDP is pretty much third everywhere and therefore receives only scattered seats.
This means that the Liberals are the only party that even has potential to form a government, unless the Conservatives moderate themselves and wind up... well, essentially where the old Tories were, and enough to win a plurality in Ontario, which will not happen according to current polls. However, it appears unlikely that the Liberals will win much in the West, and they'll likely get hammered by the Bloc in Quebec. Many of the 21 ridings (of 75) the Liberals took in Quebec the last time around were lopsided, but in 6, the Bloc came within 5%.
So, what can happen? Well, the Conservatives can come up with a moderate platform and take enough Ontario and Maritime seats to take the government; but they'd need to improve immensely. They already hold 68 of 92 Western ridings; further improvement will have to come from Ontario where they won only 24 of 106 ridings with 31.5% of the vote (to 42% for the Liberals). Taking another 10 Western ridings and even half the Ontario ridings (53) puts the Conservatives up 39 seats, still only 137 seats, 18 short of a majority. And the Conservatives lack a potential coalition partner, even supply partner, in the Commons.
The essential problem is that Canada's FPP system has become regionalized, and individual parties are maintaining strong grips on each area. The Conservative success in loosening the Liberal hold on Ontario and the Maritimes has just meant that nobody can form a government; the Bloc is overrepresented thanks to FPP (17.5 percent of seats on 12.5 percent of the vote) but is not a potential coalition partner for anyone due to disagreements on the essence of the Canadian state.
What can the parties do about this? The Conservatives can become more moderate and try to appeal to Quebec voters; this will probably happen with time, but not by January. The Liberals can try many things: moving even further right, thereby opening space to the NDP (especially in the West) but perhaps recapturing some Conservative ridings in Ontario; moving back left, reducing NDP votes in marginal constituencies in the West and perhaps recapturing them from Conservatives, but at the same time perhaps losing ground in Ontario and other Western constituencies if the Conservatives present a more moderate platform; and finally, actually allying with the NDP to present only one center-left candidate in marginal Western constituencies.
Each strategy has its weak points, and an actual alliance with the NDP seems out of the question. In the end, the likely outcome of this election is exactly what we got out of the last election--a weak minority government. Anti-incumbent sentiment will continue to build against the Liberals, counterbalanced by those who want stable government and know only the Liberals have any chance of reaching a majority. Meanwhile, there might be more strategic voting, especially in three-party Western constituencies, where many ridings were lost to Conservatives by Liberal/NDP vote splitting (see B.C.: 22 of 36 ridings to the Conservatives with only 36% of the vote). If the center and left can win a few more seats, a formal Liberal/NDP coalition or at least somewhat more formal support arrangement might result.
When I have more time I'll discuss the upcoming presidential and legislative elections in Chile as the Concertacion will continue in office for another six years...
addendum: Number of Liberal seats in Ontario with 5% or less margin over Conservatives: 7 of 75
The Liberals have a minority government but are the only party capable of winning seats everywhere in Canada. The NDP and Conservatives can't win in Quebec, and the Conservatives are weak in Ontario and the Maritimes. Of course, the NDP is pretty much third everywhere and therefore receives only scattered seats.
This means that the Liberals are the only party that even has potential to form a government, unless the Conservatives moderate themselves and wind up... well, essentially where the old Tories were, and enough to win a plurality in Ontario, which will not happen according to current polls. However, it appears unlikely that the Liberals will win much in the West, and they'll likely get hammered by the Bloc in Quebec. Many of the 21 ridings (of 75) the Liberals took in Quebec the last time around were lopsided, but in 6, the Bloc came within 5%.
So, what can happen? Well, the Conservatives can come up with a moderate platform and take enough Ontario and Maritime seats to take the government; but they'd need to improve immensely. They already hold 68 of 92 Western ridings; further improvement will have to come from Ontario where they won only 24 of 106 ridings with 31.5% of the vote (to 42% for the Liberals). Taking another 10 Western ridings and even half the Ontario ridings (53) puts the Conservatives up 39 seats, still only 137 seats, 18 short of a majority. And the Conservatives lack a potential coalition partner, even supply partner, in the Commons.
The essential problem is that Canada's FPP system has become regionalized, and individual parties are maintaining strong grips on each area. The Conservative success in loosening the Liberal hold on Ontario and the Maritimes has just meant that nobody can form a government; the Bloc is overrepresented thanks to FPP (17.5 percent of seats on 12.5 percent of the vote) but is not a potential coalition partner for anyone due to disagreements on the essence of the Canadian state.
What can the parties do about this? The Conservatives can become more moderate and try to appeal to Quebec voters; this will probably happen with time, but not by January. The Liberals can try many things: moving even further right, thereby opening space to the NDP (especially in the West) but perhaps recapturing some Conservative ridings in Ontario; moving back left, reducing NDP votes in marginal constituencies in the West and perhaps recapturing them from Conservatives, but at the same time perhaps losing ground in Ontario and other Western constituencies if the Conservatives present a more moderate platform; and finally, actually allying with the NDP to present only one center-left candidate in marginal Western constituencies.
Each strategy has its weak points, and an actual alliance with the NDP seems out of the question. In the end, the likely outcome of this election is exactly what we got out of the last election--a weak minority government. Anti-incumbent sentiment will continue to build against the Liberals, counterbalanced by those who want stable government and know only the Liberals have any chance of reaching a majority. Meanwhile, there might be more strategic voting, especially in three-party Western constituencies, where many ridings were lost to Conservatives by Liberal/NDP vote splitting (see B.C.: 22 of 36 ridings to the Conservatives with only 36% of the vote). If the center and left can win a few more seats, a formal Liberal/NDP coalition or at least somewhat more formal support arrangement might result.
When I have more time I'll discuss the upcoming presidential and legislative elections in Chile as the Concertacion will continue in office for another six years...
addendum: Number of Liberal seats in Ontario with 5% or less margin over Conservatives: 7 of 75
Sunday, November 20, 2005
Sharon will leave the Likud!
Israeli PM Ariel Sharon is to leave Likud and start his own "centrist party" campaigning mainly for the continuity of Sharon's diplomatic policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians and mitigated free-market economics.
This departure changes the face of Israeli politics in the short-term although as Ha'aretz pointed out, it is clearly a one-term party and many people who are currently high in government are reluctant to leave high spots on their lists to join the Sharon list. Not only would they be potentially sacrificing longer term gains but spot #3 on a different list is well better than spot #8 or 9 on Sharon's.
The question is just how well the new party will do. Labor is rejuvenated under Amir Peretz as a real party of opposition and likely will perform well. Likud will attract the secular-hard-right voters but just how many of those there are is open to question. Sharon will get most of the pragmatists. The losers, by the same token, are the parties of the secular hard right (National Union), Shinui which will likely see votes stolen by Sharon, and Yahad which will see its votes taken by Peretz's Labor.
The consequences of Sharon's move will be seen over the next few weeks and months, but it seems as though there will be an at least somewhat more moderate government to begin the next Knesset.
This departure changes the face of Israeli politics in the short-term although as Ha'aretz pointed out, it is clearly a one-term party and many people who are currently high in government are reluctant to leave high spots on their lists to join the Sharon list. Not only would they be potentially sacrificing longer term gains but spot #3 on a different list is well better than spot #8 or 9 on Sharon's.
The question is just how well the new party will do. Labor is rejuvenated under Amir Peretz as a real party of opposition and likely will perform well. Likud will attract the secular-hard-right voters but just how many of those there are is open to question. Sharon will get most of the pragmatists. The losers, by the same token, are the parties of the secular hard right (National Union), Shinui which will likely see votes stolen by Sharon, and Yahad which will see its votes taken by Peretz's Labor.
The consequences of Sharon's move will be seen over the next few weeks and months, but it seems as though there will be an at least somewhat more moderate government to begin the next Knesset.
Tuesday, November 15, 2005
Keeping an eye on Africa
Well, to nobody's surprise Compaore has won his "hard-fought campaign" to be "reelected" to the presidency of Burkina Faso... the last few months have seen a lot of reversals for democracy in Africa. To point out just a few: the persecution of opponents in Senegal, Nino Vieira's return in Guinea-Bissau, the failure of conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire, Faure's perhaps fraudulent win in Togo, the apparent split of Zimbabwe's MDC, Meles' repression in Ethiopia, the amended new constitution in Kenya...
In between these negatives there are some lights... Burundi held elections and the ex rebels are now a majority in Parliament, and Nkurunziza their leader has become president. Of course, they still confront the rebels from FNL. In Liberia democratic elections were held and a woman president elected, but there is trouble as George Weah will not accept the results (exactly what the country does not need right now is a dispute and everyone should hope that Weah will realize that soon). Mauritania is ambiguous as the new military group has so far taken the right steps, but must be watched closely.
In between all of this, Somaliland remains one of the success stories. In a neighborhood where nobody else has successfully democratized, the Somalilanders have held peaceful municipal, presidential and parliamentary elections. Of course the government in Hargeysa still sits without international recognition and little aid, though the EU and U.S. try to help as they can. But the country weathered a very close and contentious presidential election without violence, and the parliamentary polls gave none of the three permitted parties a majority, meaning they will have to work together. It's too bad that politics have prohibited anyone from recognizing this government because it's one of the few on the continent that has had any success.
By the same token, perhaps it is that same lack of recognition and much more scruitinizing international eye that has facilitated Somaliland's democratization. Leaders of the fledgling state know that they must be accountable if they are to have hope of gaining recongition, and any aid at all. Meanwhile there are fewer aid scraps and patronage positions to fight about; government is not a flowing spigot of aid, because there is little aid and much must be channeled through other organizations.
As much as Africa is in dire need of economic renewal, the current model is not working. This has been recognized, of course, and steps taken, but the latest of them, NEPAD, is a joke. Perhaps what is needed is much more stringent standards and the end of any aid directly to African governments, as this aid seems to just create flawed incentive structures and encourage rent-seeking.
Or, perhaps not... I don't pretend to know the issue thoroughly enough, yet.
A note on tuition
So I ranted about tuition the other day and explained that I favor a higher-tuition model. Here's something else to take into account that I hadn't put together, even though I really should have (heard it in a class today):
What is our state's tax structure like? Regressive and favoring the wealthy (to the tune of, lowest brackets $30k and below pay 4 times as much percentage-wise as higher brackets $130k-plus).
Who is more likely to get into my university? People in the upper and middle classes.
Who does a low-tuition model really favor?
In between these negatives there are some lights... Burundi held elections and the ex rebels are now a majority in Parliament, and Nkurunziza their leader has become president. Of course, they still confront the rebels from FNL. In Liberia democratic elections were held and a woman president elected, but there is trouble as George Weah will not accept the results (exactly what the country does not need right now is a dispute and everyone should hope that Weah will realize that soon). Mauritania is ambiguous as the new military group has so far taken the right steps, but must be watched closely.
In between all of this, Somaliland remains one of the success stories. In a neighborhood where nobody else has successfully democratized, the Somalilanders have held peaceful municipal, presidential and parliamentary elections. Of course the government in Hargeysa still sits without international recognition and little aid, though the EU and U.S. try to help as they can. But the country weathered a very close and contentious presidential election without violence, and the parliamentary polls gave none of the three permitted parties a majority, meaning they will have to work together. It's too bad that politics have prohibited anyone from recognizing this government because it's one of the few on the continent that has had any success.
By the same token, perhaps it is that same lack of recognition and much more scruitinizing international eye that has facilitated Somaliland's democratization. Leaders of the fledgling state know that they must be accountable if they are to have hope of gaining recongition, and any aid at all. Meanwhile there are fewer aid scraps and patronage positions to fight about; government is not a flowing spigot of aid, because there is little aid and much must be channeled through other organizations.
As much as Africa is in dire need of economic renewal, the current model is not working. This has been recognized, of course, and steps taken, but the latest of them, NEPAD, is a joke. Perhaps what is needed is much more stringent standards and the end of any aid directly to African governments, as this aid seems to just create flawed incentive structures and encourage rent-seeking.
Or, perhaps not... I don't pretend to know the issue thoroughly enough, yet.
A note on tuition
So I ranted about tuition the other day and explained that I favor a higher-tuition model. Here's something else to take into account that I hadn't put together, even though I really should have (heard it in a class today):
What is our state's tax structure like? Regressive and favoring the wealthy (to the tune of, lowest brackets $30k and below pay 4 times as much percentage-wise as higher brackets $130k-plus).
Who is more likely to get into my university? People in the upper and middle classes.
Who does a low-tuition model really favor?
Monday, November 14, 2005
Motivations of a suicide bomber
Today I went to see the Palestinian movie Paradise Now. I try to take the opportunity to see movies from Palestine when I can, because there aren't that many of them, and they're inevitably influenced by the occupation, so it's interesting to see the political angle. Moreover, I just like seeing the scenery and shots from Palestine and Israel.
This particular movie takes place mostly in Nablus but with scenes in other areas and Tel Aviv as well. The main characters, Said and Khaled, are best friends and have asked to be selected as suicide bombers. Whichever militant group they are involved with decides that it is time, and selects them to go on a mission to Tel Aviv.
Paradise Now isn't asking us to pardon suicide bombers; it's asking us to understand why they do what they do. I actually think it could do a better job of that--Americans in general don't understand very well the living conditions in the territories and, while the characters talk a lot about how they live in prison (and it's true), I don't think we see enough in Paradise Now to justify the talk. We do, however, see that suicide bombers are people, and they do what they do for a reason, however unjustifiable their acts are.
This particular movie takes place mostly in Nablus but with scenes in other areas and Tel Aviv as well. The main characters, Said and Khaled, are best friends and have asked to be selected as suicide bombers. Whichever militant group they are involved with decides that it is time, and selects them to go on a mission to Tel Aviv.
Paradise Now isn't asking us to pardon suicide bombers; it's asking us to understand why they do what they do. I actually think it could do a better job of that--Americans in general don't understand very well the living conditions in the territories and, while the characters talk a lot about how they live in prison (and it's true), I don't think we see enough in Paradise Now to justify the talk. We do, however, see that suicide bombers are people, and they do what they do for a reason, however unjustifiable their acts are.
Wednesday, November 09, 2005
Ah, rational choice
Well, there's certainly a lot going on in the world these days, and it's been a long time since I've been blogging. It's election day today in the States, meaning that for once, local politics is on my mind.
Today the student government body I serve in started discussing our student union's legislative program, that is, what guides our lobbyist. I can't help but reflect on the fact that most of the issues we'd like to see addressed in the coming months and years will not be, as a result of the fact that our state Legislature is so constrained by citizen initiatives and the general hatred of taxation that has evolved in this state despite our social liberality. We can't retain top faculty and remain in the first tier without either more state funding, a radically altered tuition model or both.
That said, I'd be happy to make the pitch for a different tuition model. There's a lot of sentiment against what people are calling the "Robin Hood" model, i.e. an explicitly different level of tuition depending on income, the "sliding scale." I don't advocate that, but I do advocate a moderately higher level of tuition in keeping with other institutions of our caliber across the country, and a corresponding increase in grants and scholarships (and secondarily, loans) in order to allow lower-income students to continue attending the university. I'm also pro-affirmative action (on a primarily economic basis) and, though racial affirmative action is prohibited in our state, I agree with race being a factor in admissions.
Opposing the low-tuition model is unpopular, but realistically is the only way to go. In addition to the revenues, higher tuition levels create a greater incentive to graduate earlier, further relieving the pressure on our University's limited resources. It's worth noting too that there's greater incentive to do well, the more you're paying for an education.
Citizen initiatives are stupid
This brings me to the "citizen initiatives are stupid" opinion I've held for a long time. Simply put, information costs mean that most citizens don't consider all aspects of an issue. A guy I live with today commented to me something along the lines of "we should elect people to read about these issues for us and vote on them." I noted that, theoretically, such people are referred to in our state constitution as the Legislature.
Now, there could certainly be changes to the Legislature; but honestly, I believe the problems with the state legislature are problems common in the American system across the country, and I seriously doubt a switch to a proportional-representation parliamentary system is at hand. (I do, however, advocate radically reducing the number of elected positions in order to minimize information costs and allow citizens to focus on gathering information for major races.)
But the major point I'm getting at here is that citizen initiatives (and citizen-initiated referendums) are ridiculous. Whoever can afford to bankroll an initiative can get it on the ballot, and great sums of money are spent on convincing the public of some point they can only consider in isolation. When considering a new tax, the public doesn't have the scope of the entire state budget to look at and realize what rejecting the tax will do, in terms of further tying the Legislature's hands and leading to painful cuts in social spending (and no new transportation projects that are desperately needed). It's worth noting that California's crisis was worsened by the fact that about two-thirds of their state budget is specifically dedicated from individual taxes, and cannot be changed by the state Legislature.
The Legislature are the ones who know what the hell is going on. Let them do their jobs.
Please.
World events
There's plenty going on today, as always; the Mar del Plata summit ended in disaccord as everyone knew it would; Liberia is electing its (hopefully) postconflict president; France is dealing with an eleventh night of civil unrest; Martin's government in Canada is facing a possible downfall in a few days.
Now the French are hypocrites and also in denial, and (of course) discriminate against their minorities (but who doesn't?). One might note, however, that the anger of minorities against the French government might suggest that pretending that cultural differences don't exist might not be a particularly sane strategy.
In Israel, meanwhile, both parties are in turmoil; Channel One reported that Arik has decided to definitively break from Likud, though that's being denied; meanwhile Labor is due to elect a new leader, choosing between Peres and Amir Peretz. Honestly, it seems like Labor is choosing between being Yachad (Social Democratic Israel) and being Shinui.
At this point, Ha'avoda brings nothing new to the table. But should this be surprising? In the first decades of the Jewish state, Mapai was the party that represented the state, in general, winning ridiculous majorities (which were fated to end as immigration continued, and more cleavages opened in society). Splinter groups continued to break from Mapai, until nothing was left except that core which still tried to reach the "consensus." But there was and is no more consensus, all the ideological groups have split from Labor, and the remaining core is a little group which, under Peres, tries to satisfy everyone and pleases nobody.
Honestly it probably doesn't matter who wins this election. In the short term, Labor's best chance for electoral success probably lies with Amir Peretz. At least he's not guaranteed to bring Labor even further down, though he very well might. But then, what would be the difference between Labor and Beilin's party?
Today the student government body I serve in started discussing our student union's legislative program, that is, what guides our lobbyist. I can't help but reflect on the fact that most of the issues we'd like to see addressed in the coming months and years will not be, as a result of the fact that our state Legislature is so constrained by citizen initiatives and the general hatred of taxation that has evolved in this state despite our social liberality. We can't retain top faculty and remain in the first tier without either more state funding, a radically altered tuition model or both.
That said, I'd be happy to make the pitch for a different tuition model. There's a lot of sentiment against what people are calling the "Robin Hood" model, i.e. an explicitly different level of tuition depending on income, the "sliding scale." I don't advocate that, but I do advocate a moderately higher level of tuition in keeping with other institutions of our caliber across the country, and a corresponding increase in grants and scholarships (and secondarily, loans) in order to allow lower-income students to continue attending the university. I'm also pro-affirmative action (on a primarily economic basis) and, though racial affirmative action is prohibited in our state, I agree with race being a factor in admissions.
Opposing the low-tuition model is unpopular, but realistically is the only way to go. In addition to the revenues, higher tuition levels create a greater incentive to graduate earlier, further relieving the pressure on our University's limited resources. It's worth noting too that there's greater incentive to do well, the more you're paying for an education.
Citizen initiatives are stupid
This brings me to the "citizen initiatives are stupid" opinion I've held for a long time. Simply put, information costs mean that most citizens don't consider all aspects of an issue. A guy I live with today commented to me something along the lines of "we should elect people to read about these issues for us and vote on them." I noted that, theoretically, such people are referred to in our state constitution as the Legislature.
Now, there could certainly be changes to the Legislature; but honestly, I believe the problems with the state legislature are problems common in the American system across the country, and I seriously doubt a switch to a proportional-representation parliamentary system is at hand. (I do, however, advocate radically reducing the number of elected positions in order to minimize information costs and allow citizens to focus on gathering information for major races.)
But the major point I'm getting at here is that citizen initiatives (and citizen-initiated referendums) are ridiculous. Whoever can afford to bankroll an initiative can get it on the ballot, and great sums of money are spent on convincing the public of some point they can only consider in isolation. When considering a new tax, the public doesn't have the scope of the entire state budget to look at and realize what rejecting the tax will do, in terms of further tying the Legislature's hands and leading to painful cuts in social spending (and no new transportation projects that are desperately needed). It's worth noting that California's crisis was worsened by the fact that about two-thirds of their state budget is specifically dedicated from individual taxes, and cannot be changed by the state Legislature.
The Legislature are the ones who know what the hell is going on. Let them do their jobs.
Please.
World events
There's plenty going on today, as always; the Mar del Plata summit ended in disaccord as everyone knew it would; Liberia is electing its (hopefully) postconflict president; France is dealing with an eleventh night of civil unrest; Martin's government in Canada is facing a possible downfall in a few days.
Now the French are hypocrites and also in denial, and (of course) discriminate against their minorities (but who doesn't?). One might note, however, that the anger of minorities against the French government might suggest that pretending that cultural differences don't exist might not be a particularly sane strategy.
In Israel, meanwhile, both parties are in turmoil; Channel One reported that Arik has decided to definitively break from Likud, though that's being denied; meanwhile Labor is due to elect a new leader, choosing between Peres and Amir Peretz. Honestly, it seems like Labor is choosing between being Yachad (Social Democratic Israel) and being Shinui.
At this point, Ha'avoda brings nothing new to the table. But should this be surprising? In the first decades of the Jewish state, Mapai was the party that represented the state, in general, winning ridiculous majorities (which were fated to end as immigration continued, and more cleavages opened in society). Splinter groups continued to break from Mapai, until nothing was left except that core which still tried to reach the "consensus." But there was and is no more consensus, all the ideological groups have split from Labor, and the remaining core is a little group which, under Peres, tries to satisfy everyone and pleases nobody.
Honestly it probably doesn't matter who wins this election. In the short term, Labor's best chance for electoral success probably lies with Amir Peretz. At least he's not guaranteed to bring Labor even further down, though he very well might. But then, what would be the difference between Labor and Beilin's party?
Tuesday, October 04, 2005
Worries about the Iraq referendum
I've been busy lately and don't have much time now, either, but I wanted to say a quick word about the developments in Iraq.
How can the Shi'a and Kurdish blocs with a straight face define "voter" in two different ways? Changing the interpretation of the referendum law is a horrible decision. If before we were saying either way, at least the Sunni will participate, this is a way to tell them that their votes don't matter (let alone all the Shi'a and Kurds who might happen to not agree with the constitution). Two-thirds of registered voters is going to be pretty tough especially considering that many might not even turn out in some of the more violent provinces (even though we all agree turnout will go up, it probably won't go up that much).
To explain for those who do not know, what the National Assembly decided is that a majority of voters who actually vote (nationwide) is all that is necessary to ratify the constitution; while two-thirds of registered voters in three provinces are needed to reject it.
So basically this is a blatant attempt by the dominant factions to prevent the constitution from being rejected at all costs. This decision undercuts the political efforts to integrate opposition, particularly Sunni opposition. Fortunately the UN has rejected the idea outright and the bloggers at Iraq the Model were good enough to be quite worried about it as well, though I haven't heard anything from the U.S. government as yet (admittedly I may have missed it).
The most important thing above all, is that everyone feels the October referendum means something. If it doesn't, the best opportunity has been lost.
How can the Shi'a and Kurdish blocs with a straight face define "voter" in two different ways? Changing the interpretation of the referendum law is a horrible decision. If before we were saying either way, at least the Sunni will participate, this is a way to tell them that their votes don't matter (let alone all the Shi'a and Kurds who might happen to not agree with the constitution). Two-thirds of registered voters is going to be pretty tough especially considering that many might not even turn out in some of the more violent provinces (even though we all agree turnout will go up, it probably won't go up that much).
To explain for those who do not know, what the National Assembly decided is that a majority of voters who actually vote (nationwide) is all that is necessary to ratify the constitution; while two-thirds of registered voters in three provinces are needed to reject it.
So basically this is a blatant attempt by the dominant factions to prevent the constitution from being rejected at all costs. This decision undercuts the political efforts to integrate opposition, particularly Sunni opposition. Fortunately the UN has rejected the idea outright and the bloggers at Iraq the Model were good enough to be quite worried about it as well, though I haven't heard anything from the U.S. government as yet (admittedly I may have missed it).
The most important thing above all, is that everyone feels the October referendum means something. If it doesn't, the best opportunity has been lost.
Saturday, September 17, 2005
Clark scrapes by, or so it seems
Well, I'm up late disregarding the advice of my sleep doctor, because I'm a nerd, and I want to see the New Zealand election returns come on. And quite honestly it's been a hell of a race. As the first returns were trickling in, National (out of power since 1999) had taken an 8 to 10 point lead; now, it's within 0.25 percent between National and Labour and it looks like the result's going to be a hung parliament, if you add up all the other parties. Labour plus the Greens, the new Maori party and Anderton's Progressives have 61 of 122; National plus NZ First, United Future, and ACT are at 61. If I had to hazard a guess i'd say United Future (which I believe currently supports the Clark government) will support another Labour government and give them 64 seats, but it's still a pretty thin margin.
Results are coming in as we speak; in my latest refresh the margin was 999 votes nationwide, National over Labour.
And Israel has finally disengaged from Gaza, though the failure of Palestinian police to prevent looting of settlements and the streaming over the Egyptian border was both sad and inevitable. Honestly, if you are the Palestinian police, is it really worth the effort? When it would cost you so much in terms of public image? Probably not. Sharon's speech at the UN, meanwhile, was a bunch of rhetoric that really means nothing, because everyone still knows he's not going to concede the Palestinians the state they need in order to end this conflict. Well, it's not fair to say it means nothing; as many Israeli commentators are suggesting it means a domestic Israeli political realignment. But in terms of the peace process it will not get Sharon anywhere unless there are concrete proposals for 100% of the occupied territory or its equivalent to return to Palestine, and that includes East Jerusalem.
Labour has taken the lead for the first time tonight, although ironically the additional seat was stolen from the Progressives, meaning the left-center bloc is still at exactly half the seats overall.
Coming up in the next few weeks I'll have more to say about a lot of issues, including domestic American security, the Middle East (of course), and issues more directly affecting college students, as well as my advocacy of proportional representation and my dislike of hippies. For now, it's back to the NZ electoral site and then back to sleep.
Results are coming in as we speak; in my latest refresh the margin was 999 votes nationwide, National over Labour.
And Israel has finally disengaged from Gaza, though the failure of Palestinian police to prevent looting of settlements and the streaming over the Egyptian border was both sad and inevitable. Honestly, if you are the Palestinian police, is it really worth the effort? When it would cost you so much in terms of public image? Probably not. Sharon's speech at the UN, meanwhile, was a bunch of rhetoric that really means nothing, because everyone still knows he's not going to concede the Palestinians the state they need in order to end this conflict. Well, it's not fair to say it means nothing; as many Israeli commentators are suggesting it means a domestic Israeli political realignment. But in terms of the peace process it will not get Sharon anywhere unless there are concrete proposals for 100% of the occupied territory or its equivalent to return to Palestine, and that includes East Jerusalem.
Labour has taken the lead for the first time tonight, although ironically the additional seat was stolen from the Progressives, meaning the left-center bloc is still at exactly half the seats overall.
Coming up in the next few weeks I'll have more to say about a lot of issues, including domestic American security, the Middle East (of course), and issues more directly affecting college students, as well as my advocacy of proportional representation and my dislike of hippies. For now, it's back to the NZ electoral site and then back to sleep.
Thursday, September 01, 2005
Taking a look at today's news
First, everything going on in the Middle East today is overshadowed by the events on the U.S. Gulf Coast... this is a true humanitarian situation and my thoughts are with all of those who have been affected by or have family affected by Hurricane Katrina and the aftermath (my prayers would be with them too were I not agnostic). I wish the best to all those affected and we can only hope for a speedy recovery although that does not seem too likely at the present time. Honestly at this point, who really cares about looting (except for the firearms, that's a problem)... the priority should be to rescue everyone who for some reason stayed in New Orleans.
All right, so now to the world news of the day...
The assets of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the U.S. have been frozen by a federal court. Relatives of some people killed by Hamas in the West Bank in 2000 sued Hamas and the PNA in U.S. civil courts and got a ruling in their favor. Let me kindly say with all due respect that this is a bunch of bullshit; not necessarily the court decision, which is made according to existing law, but first of all the lawsuit, and second of all the fact that the administration has not acted to give the PNA immunity from paralyzing acts. The Palestinian mission in Washington has been unable to pay its employees for three months.
First, the PNA mission deserves basically the same status as the Israeli embassy, in the interests of peace and because the PNA is essentially a nascent state that is engaged in the peace process with full U.S. recognition as the representative of the sovereign Palestinian people. Second, if the PNA is responsible for the actions of Hamas, so too is the Israeli government, which supported the formation of Hamas, and worked so hard to undercut the ability of the PNA to combat terrorism or, indeed, do anything else (I understand that the events in 2000 happened before the massive destruction inflicted by the IDF during the al-Aqsa Intifada).
But if we continue the train of logic here, isn't the U.S. government responsible for every criminal act committed on U.S. territory? After all, the U.S. government and more directly the state governments are responsible for security, and "provided an environment" for the actions of criminal elements. Perhaps closer to the point, I'd like to see the result of a lawsuit in Israel against the Israel Defense Forces or the Israeli government, by the families of the Israeli-Palestinian victims of the bus shooting in Shfaram, seeking compensation because they failed to recognize the destructive capability of the IDF deserter who carried out the action (and used an IDF weapon, I believe). It is true that the Sharon government is offering a payment to the families of the deceased, but it certainly isn't going to take any share of the blame, and it's probably safe to bet that the payment offered by Sharon isn't anywhere near what the U.S. lawsuit sought for its plaintiffs. It's also true that the Sharon government shelters the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories, or in the most kind interpretation, fails to rein in the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories (e.g. in Hebron).
To bridge this conversation into another topic, with regard to the shootings in Shfaram, Israeli law provides compensation to the families of victims of terrorist acts only when the terrorist group is hostile to Israel. This certainly seems a bit out of whack. To the credit (!) of the Sharon government, there is talk about reforming the law so that persons such as the families of the Israeli-Palestinians killed in Shfaram could be compensated...
What are we coming to when Ariel Sharon is regarded as a moderate? Well, he had always been quite good at knowing which way the wind is blowing, and it seems that he wants to secure for himself the legacy of defining Israel's final borders. Perhaps he will be successful yet.
Developments in Iraq
So in Iraq the Sunni leaders have called for rejection of the new constitution. Either way there is a positive result insofar as the Sunni will have to participate in the referendum on the constitution to reject it, so this is a silver lining to an otherwise rather gray cloud (and how would you tell apart the gray and the silver especially if the sun is not out to reflect the metal... hmm...).
I guess time will tell if I was correct in my gut feeling that the Bush administration was dead wrong in pressuring the different factions to come to a compromise by the target date, or correct when I tried to argue on the administration's behalf that perhaps this would just hasten the inevitable result that the Sunni would be pissed off regardless and having the referendum early (no matter what the result) is the better outcome.
I think the constitution in itself is okay, though some aspects of it aren't quite defined as well as one might like. I still think it should be changed to state that only three or four governorates can join to form a federal entity, which would end fears of a Shia superstate within a state, yet still allow substantial devolution to larger areas. I also have qualms about the court, which is ill-defined, and quarrels can be foreseen about Shari'a since the Islamic law is within the constitution to some extent (no law can be passed which comes into conflict), so whose Islamic law will it be? Well probably the Shia, which could present substantial problems...
Just another day in the wonderful world of the Middle East.
All right, so now to the world news of the day...
The assets of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the U.S. have been frozen by a federal court. Relatives of some people killed by Hamas in the West Bank in 2000 sued Hamas and the PNA in U.S. civil courts and got a ruling in their favor. Let me kindly say with all due respect that this is a bunch of bullshit; not necessarily the court decision, which is made according to existing law, but first of all the lawsuit, and second of all the fact that the administration has not acted to give the PNA immunity from paralyzing acts. The Palestinian mission in Washington has been unable to pay its employees for three months.
First, the PNA mission deserves basically the same status as the Israeli embassy, in the interests of peace and because the PNA is essentially a nascent state that is engaged in the peace process with full U.S. recognition as the representative of the sovereign Palestinian people. Second, if the PNA is responsible for the actions of Hamas, so too is the Israeli government, which supported the formation of Hamas, and worked so hard to undercut the ability of the PNA to combat terrorism or, indeed, do anything else (I understand that the events in 2000 happened before the massive destruction inflicted by the IDF during the al-Aqsa Intifada).
But if we continue the train of logic here, isn't the U.S. government responsible for every criminal act committed on U.S. territory? After all, the U.S. government and more directly the state governments are responsible for security, and "provided an environment" for the actions of criminal elements. Perhaps closer to the point, I'd like to see the result of a lawsuit in Israel against the Israel Defense Forces or the Israeli government, by the families of the Israeli-Palestinian victims of the bus shooting in Shfaram, seeking compensation because they failed to recognize the destructive capability of the IDF deserter who carried out the action (and used an IDF weapon, I believe). It is true that the Sharon government is offering a payment to the families of the deceased, but it certainly isn't going to take any share of the blame, and it's probably safe to bet that the payment offered by Sharon isn't anywhere near what the U.S. lawsuit sought for its plaintiffs. It's also true that the Sharon government shelters the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories, or in the most kind interpretation, fails to rein in the actions of those who terrorize Palestinians in the territories (e.g. in Hebron).
To bridge this conversation into another topic, with regard to the shootings in Shfaram, Israeli law provides compensation to the families of victims of terrorist acts only when the terrorist group is hostile to Israel. This certainly seems a bit out of whack. To the credit (!) of the Sharon government, there is talk about reforming the law so that persons such as the families of the Israeli-Palestinians killed in Shfaram could be compensated...
What are we coming to when Ariel Sharon is regarded as a moderate? Well, he had always been quite good at knowing which way the wind is blowing, and it seems that he wants to secure for himself the legacy of defining Israel's final borders. Perhaps he will be successful yet.
Developments in Iraq
So in Iraq the Sunni leaders have called for rejection of the new constitution. Either way there is a positive result insofar as the Sunni will have to participate in the referendum on the constitution to reject it, so this is a silver lining to an otherwise rather gray cloud (and how would you tell apart the gray and the silver especially if the sun is not out to reflect the metal... hmm...).
I guess time will tell if I was correct in my gut feeling that the Bush administration was dead wrong in pressuring the different factions to come to a compromise by the target date, or correct when I tried to argue on the administration's behalf that perhaps this would just hasten the inevitable result that the Sunni would be pissed off regardless and having the referendum early (no matter what the result) is the better outcome.
I think the constitution in itself is okay, though some aspects of it aren't quite defined as well as one might like. I still think it should be changed to state that only three or four governorates can join to form a federal entity, which would end fears of a Shia superstate within a state, yet still allow substantial devolution to larger areas. I also have qualms about the court, which is ill-defined, and quarrels can be foreseen about Shari'a since the Islamic law is within the constitution to some extent (no law can be passed which comes into conflict), so whose Islamic law will it be? Well probably the Shia, which could present substantial problems...
Just another day in the wonderful world of the Middle East.
Friday, August 26, 2005
Still working in Iraq
Hey, how about limiting federal regions in Iraq to three provinces or less? Yes? Okay.
Seriously, that would take care of Sunni objections to a Shia "super-region" while still allowing the formation of federal states in different regions of the country. The Kurds would still be OK in the north... basically everybody is happy...
But there is no point to this constitution if it is passed without the Sunni assent. The provinces will then reject the document by more than two-thirds and we will be back to square one; or, even if the constitution squeaks by, insurgents will not be convinced to lay down their arms as they will still enjoy a fair share of support.
"Pat Robertson is an idiot"
Need I say more? These comments are pretty high on the idiocy scale (not quite with those about 9/11, but calling to assassinate Chávez--a democratically elected foreign leader if not particularly democratic--gives Chávez more ammunition to use in railing against the U.S. Not that he's entirely wrong.
Cindy Sheehan--what's up with that?
Yeah... Cindy Sheehan... anti-war protestor wants to meet with Bush because her kid got killed in Iraq... unfortunately that's life. Somebody has to die in war. Taking advantage of Sheehan's rage is a misguided political play by some leftist factions. Bad idea.
Seriously, that would take care of Sunni objections to a Shia "super-region" while still allowing the formation of federal states in different regions of the country. The Kurds would still be OK in the north... basically everybody is happy...
But there is no point to this constitution if it is passed without the Sunni assent. The provinces will then reject the document by more than two-thirds and we will be back to square one; or, even if the constitution squeaks by, insurgents will not be convinced to lay down their arms as they will still enjoy a fair share of support.
"Pat Robertson is an idiot"
Need I say more? These comments are pretty high on the idiocy scale (not quite with those about 9/11, but calling to assassinate Chávez--a democratically elected foreign leader if not particularly democratic--gives Chávez more ammunition to use in railing against the U.S. Not that he's entirely wrong.
Cindy Sheehan--what's up with that?
Yeah... Cindy Sheehan... anti-war protestor wants to meet with Bush because her kid got killed in Iraq... unfortunately that's life. Somebody has to die in war. Taking advantage of Sheehan's rage is a misguided political play by some leftist factions. Bad idea.
Wednesday, August 17, 2005
Binational security
Well, another Jewish Israeli "terrorist" has struck again, firing and killing four Palestinians in the northern West Bank. I put "terrorist" in quotes because the use of the term has become pointless given its various meanings and lack of meaning as the case may be. However, he is a "terrorist" in the same way that a Hamas or Islamic Jihad bomber is a terrorist, and the second in a week to come from the West Bank settlements. It does appear that the rabbis of the settlement areas are going to denounce the shooting and appeal against violence, which is a positive thing, as is the fact that the shooter was arrested and not arbitrarily killed (now we will see the outcome of the Israeli justice system).
I want to go back to what I said yesterday about the binational state and clarify a bit my opinions. It's clear that the binational state is not the first preference of either group--in numerous opinion polls this option is rejected in favor of the two-state solution. The problem is what type of two-state solution?
Palestinians want their own state; this means a state on 21 percent of mandatory Palestine that has territorial contiguity and includes East Jerusalem as the capital, as well as the rights of a state, that is, control of borders and its own security forces. Israelis reluctantly support a Palestinian state; that "Palestinian state" would not even be sovereign given the restrictions that would be imposed in the name of security. Israelis, or at least successive governments, don't take into account the fact that Israel would be clearly stronger than Palestine regardless of the restrictions or lack thereof placed on the new state. Meanwhile, Palestinians want at least a symbolic return of refugees to Israel, something the Jewish state may or may not be willing to accept.
The point of this whole thing is that nobody can agree on just what the two-state solution would look like, and until they do, the settlers (who have essentially been self-governing for years) will continue to expand their colonies in the West Bank to the point where they can't be uprooted and can't be disentangled from Palestinian population centers. Personally, I don't believe there will ever be agreement on what a two-state solution will look like, because Israeli leaders won't have the political ability to make the necessary concessions, and Palestinian leaders (a) can't make concessions either (though from my perspective they have already made the vast majority of those concessions), and (b) have less motivation to do so because the binational solution isn't perceived as negatively by them as it is by Israelis.
That's not to say that binationalism will be readily or happily accepted, and it might take more fighting (figuratively or literally) for equal rights for Palestinians before it is realized. That is if Israel opts for the "bantustan" solution. The other possibility Palestinians must be (and generally are) prepared to resist is expulsion/"involuntary transfer".
The only example we have of this type of binational settlement in practice is that of the Republic of South Africa, and the results are mixed; but South Africa also adopted a nonracial, noncommunitarian constitution, something which would likely be impossible even in the binational state; and Africans far outnumber whites in SA whereas in Israel/Palestine the numbers are closer to even (something which strikes me as a positive when it comes to creating compromise between communities).
Anyway, it is pointless to speculate on the possibilities for the binational state when it doesn't exist yet and may never exist for that matter, but it is interesting, especially for those looking at building institutions and conflict resolution.
I want to go back to what I said yesterday about the binational state and clarify a bit my opinions. It's clear that the binational state is not the first preference of either group--in numerous opinion polls this option is rejected in favor of the two-state solution. The problem is what type of two-state solution?
Palestinians want their own state; this means a state on 21 percent of mandatory Palestine that has territorial contiguity and includes East Jerusalem as the capital, as well as the rights of a state, that is, control of borders and its own security forces. Israelis reluctantly support a Palestinian state; that "Palestinian state" would not even be sovereign given the restrictions that would be imposed in the name of security. Israelis, or at least successive governments, don't take into account the fact that Israel would be clearly stronger than Palestine regardless of the restrictions or lack thereof placed on the new state. Meanwhile, Palestinians want at least a symbolic return of refugees to Israel, something the Jewish state may or may not be willing to accept.
The point of this whole thing is that nobody can agree on just what the two-state solution would look like, and until they do, the settlers (who have essentially been self-governing for years) will continue to expand their colonies in the West Bank to the point where they can't be uprooted and can't be disentangled from Palestinian population centers. Personally, I don't believe there will ever be agreement on what a two-state solution will look like, because Israeli leaders won't have the political ability to make the necessary concessions, and Palestinian leaders (a) can't make concessions either (though from my perspective they have already made the vast majority of those concessions), and (b) have less motivation to do so because the binational solution isn't perceived as negatively by them as it is by Israelis.
That's not to say that binationalism will be readily or happily accepted, and it might take more fighting (figuratively or literally) for equal rights for Palestinians before it is realized. That is if Israel opts for the "bantustan" solution. The other possibility Palestinians must be (and generally are) prepared to resist is expulsion/"involuntary transfer".
The only example we have of this type of binational settlement in practice is that of the Republic of South Africa, and the results are mixed; but South Africa also adopted a nonracial, noncommunitarian constitution, something which would likely be impossible even in the binational state; and Africans far outnumber whites in SA whereas in Israel/Palestine the numbers are closer to even (something which strikes me as a positive when it comes to creating compromise between communities).
Anyway, it is pointless to speculate on the possibilities for the binational state when it doesn't exist yet and may never exist for that matter, but it is interesting, especially for those looking at building institutions and conflict resolution.
Disengaging from reality
It's almost time for the IDF to start using force against those who remain in the Gaza settlements, and I want to comment a bit on some of the comments I've been seeing in Ha'aretz recently (not that they're any different than the norm).
First, those who feel bad for the settlers being "uprooted" from their homes. How does anyone actually feel bad about this? Pretty much none of them have lived there their full lives, and they are probably going to go live about 20 miles away, if they don't join their subsidized brethren in the West Bank stealing land from Palestinians there. They're being ridiculously compensated and lived in their old homes thanks only to the tax and defense burden that fell on ordinary Israel citizens and young conscripts.
Second, those who believe that Gaza somehow "belongs" to Israel. These people are either religious nuts or essentially religious nuts who hide behind a "war" excuse, that is, "Gaza was captured by war so Israel has the right to take over." Well, the religious idea is BS, and the war idea is pretty much the same. If you want to pursue the war idea, then annex Gaza and the West Bank and rule them under Israeli law and grant Israeli citizenship to residents. I don't think many Palestinians would quibble with such a plan.
Finally, I want to point out that the most violent resistance has been carried on by troublemakers from outside the Gaza settlements. They don't belong there and should be treated by the IDF with all the force used on Palestinians (not that they will be).
I sympathize with the Palestinian people and an glad that they will regain the entirety of Gaza's territory, despite those settlers who are destroying greenhouses and residences out of spite and hatred. The settler who whines about how Gaza could be a model for Jewish-Arab cooperation (hey, so could Palestine/Israel if you decided to make it so) just doesn't resonate with me.
I want to make a further point. Those who criticize the Palestinians for terror tactics ignore not only the plentiful state-sanctioned terror carried out by the IDF, but ignore the reality of the situation. In the current state of affairs, with loss of hope, poor living conditions and ongoing oppression (with no credible sponsor), for many Palestinians terror seems a decent option. What if it were the Jewish people who were "losing the war" rather than the Palestinian Arabs? Well, the results were seen in the late '30s-early '40s when Jewish forces felt it necessary to use extralegal means to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state. Forces such as Irgun and Lehi carried out atrocities such as the King David hotel bombing of the British administration and the Deir Yassin massacre of Palestinian civilians. The people committing these atrocities (against civilians) clearly felt they were justified; there was a segment of the population supporting them that would not engage in such action themselves; and there was a segment of the population that condemned the acts. And this in a situation where the Jewish community was much better off than the Palestinian Arabs are today.
My main point is that Jewish people are inherently no morally better or worse than Palestinian Arabs; we all have different conceptions of reality, different mental maps that define our options, but such maps are a result of the situation in which our society and we personally find ourselves. This conception of human action is central to my conception of social democracy: simply put, picture yourself in the other's shoes and think whether or not you might consider certain actions acceptable. That doesn't make actions acceptable in itself--but a key step to combating terror is finding out what will make people stop believing in it. The concept of envisioning the POV of others has universal applicability.
Finally, I will state here (as I have stated elsewhere before) that I believe the inevitable solution will be one binational state for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, not because either side wishes it that way, but because a compromise will not happen in time. As I continue my project to write organic law for a future Israeli/Palestinian state, I will summarize the major points of such a law here:
(1) A secular parliamentary democracy.
(2) Establishment of the two communities as the basis of the state (i.e., federalism based on the person and not geographically).
(3) A bicameral legislature, one chamber using proportional representation and the other representing the two communities.
(4) Division of posts in the security forces, the administration, the courts and the government on a community basis.
(5) As much community self-government as possible: community control over religion, education, culture, etc.
(6) Broad rights guarantees and nondiscrimination.
(7) Rectification of the economic disparities.
(8) A just resolution of property disputes.
(9) Recognition of the state as the homeland of two peoples and the guarantee of the right of "return" for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
A constitution incorporating all these features will be necessary for reconciliation in one binational state to occur, and we may as well examine (as some are) what such a structure will look like today, before the solution is forced upon the two sides without preparation.
First, those who feel bad for the settlers being "uprooted" from their homes. How does anyone actually feel bad about this? Pretty much none of them have lived there their full lives, and they are probably going to go live about 20 miles away, if they don't join their subsidized brethren in the West Bank stealing land from Palestinians there. They're being ridiculously compensated and lived in their old homes thanks only to the tax and defense burden that fell on ordinary Israel citizens and young conscripts.
Second, those who believe that Gaza somehow "belongs" to Israel. These people are either religious nuts or essentially religious nuts who hide behind a "war" excuse, that is, "Gaza was captured by war so Israel has the right to take over." Well, the religious idea is BS, and the war idea is pretty much the same. If you want to pursue the war idea, then annex Gaza and the West Bank and rule them under Israeli law and grant Israeli citizenship to residents. I don't think many Palestinians would quibble with such a plan.
Finally, I want to point out that the most violent resistance has been carried on by troublemakers from outside the Gaza settlements. They don't belong there and should be treated by the IDF with all the force used on Palestinians (not that they will be).
I sympathize with the Palestinian people and an glad that they will regain the entirety of Gaza's territory, despite those settlers who are destroying greenhouses and residences out of spite and hatred. The settler who whines about how Gaza could be a model for Jewish-Arab cooperation (hey, so could Palestine/Israel if you decided to make it so) just doesn't resonate with me.
I want to make a further point. Those who criticize the Palestinians for terror tactics ignore not only the plentiful state-sanctioned terror carried out by the IDF, but ignore the reality of the situation. In the current state of affairs, with loss of hope, poor living conditions and ongoing oppression (with no credible sponsor), for many Palestinians terror seems a decent option. What if it were the Jewish people who were "losing the war" rather than the Palestinian Arabs? Well, the results were seen in the late '30s-early '40s when Jewish forces felt it necessary to use extralegal means to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state. Forces such as Irgun and Lehi carried out atrocities such as the King David hotel bombing of the British administration and the Deir Yassin massacre of Palestinian civilians. The people committing these atrocities (against civilians) clearly felt they were justified; there was a segment of the population supporting them that would not engage in such action themselves; and there was a segment of the population that condemned the acts. And this in a situation where the Jewish community was much better off than the Palestinian Arabs are today.
My main point is that Jewish people are inherently no morally better or worse than Palestinian Arabs; we all have different conceptions of reality, different mental maps that define our options, but such maps are a result of the situation in which our society and we personally find ourselves. This conception of human action is central to my conception of social democracy: simply put, picture yourself in the other's shoes and think whether or not you might consider certain actions acceptable. That doesn't make actions acceptable in itself--but a key step to combating terror is finding out what will make people stop believing in it. The concept of envisioning the POV of others has universal applicability.
Finally, I will state here (as I have stated elsewhere before) that I believe the inevitable solution will be one binational state for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, not because either side wishes it that way, but because a compromise will not happen in time. As I continue my project to write organic law for a future Israeli/Palestinian state, I will summarize the major points of such a law here:
(1) A secular parliamentary democracy.
(2) Establishment of the two communities as the basis of the state (i.e., federalism based on the person and not geographically).
(3) A bicameral legislature, one chamber using proportional representation and the other representing the two communities.
(4) Division of posts in the security forces, the administration, the courts and the government on a community basis.
(5) As much community self-government as possible: community control over religion, education, culture, etc.
(6) Broad rights guarantees and nondiscrimination.
(7) Rectification of the economic disparities.
(8) A just resolution of property disputes.
(9) Recognition of the state as the homeland of two peoples and the guarantee of the right of "return" for both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.
A constitution incorporating all these features will be necessary for reconciliation in one binational state to occur, and we may as well examine (as some are) what such a structure will look like today, before the solution is forced upon the two sides without preparation.
Monday, August 15, 2005
Thinking constitutionally
The Iraqi draft constitution is set to be unveiled tomorrow and we know a few things about it... e.g. that the name of the country will continue to be "Republic of Iraq"... but there are some things still up in the air. The major questions are the division of oil monies, the nature of the vertical power structure and the rights of women and role of Islam.
According to Iraq the Model, the power structure will give the right to form federal states to any governorate or combination of those. That is to say, it will be like the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías" if this is true. To be honest, that is a novel and appropriate solution to the issue, and succeeds in postponing likely difficult negotiations over exactly what powers everyone will have. At the same time, the financial side of the equation would see oil revenues distributed by population as the Sunni factions would like.
Meanwhile, the role of Islam as a contributing and constraining yet not overriding factor in legislation seems the most likely solution. There is a question about the role of women in the new constitution, whether the rather broad civil rights they currently enjoy will be maintained and whether they will continue to have the guarantee of every third spot on the party lists. Maintaining these guarantees would be a plus for the new Iraqi state but we will see what the draft says; and if women's rights are impinged by the new document will that be enough for it to be rejected and risk further instability?
So we are on the U.S.-imposed deadline (exactly what it is) for the new constitution. Maybe that is not such a bad thing; Iraq needs stability and what more would be achieved in ten days? The tough negotiations might just have been pushed off to the end anyway. I'm not there, I can't say what else they might have done, but it is rather heavy-handed of the administration to exert such pressure on the drafting commission and then have Khalilzad talk about how the constitution should reflect a historic social compact, or whatever he said like that. Again, though, what more would have been done with a 15-day extension?
And a few hundred miles to the west disengagement from Gaza has begun and I will comment on the coming days on its progress... but it is certainly an exciting time for Gazans and for observers of the situation in Palestine/Israel.
According to Iraq the Model, the power structure will give the right to form federal states to any governorate or combination of those. That is to say, it will be like the Spanish "Estado de las Autonomías" if this is true. To be honest, that is a novel and appropriate solution to the issue, and succeeds in postponing likely difficult negotiations over exactly what powers everyone will have. At the same time, the financial side of the equation would see oil revenues distributed by population as the Sunni factions would like.
Meanwhile, the role of Islam as a contributing and constraining yet not overriding factor in legislation seems the most likely solution. There is a question about the role of women in the new constitution, whether the rather broad civil rights they currently enjoy will be maintained and whether they will continue to have the guarantee of every third spot on the party lists. Maintaining these guarantees would be a plus for the new Iraqi state but we will see what the draft says; and if women's rights are impinged by the new document will that be enough for it to be rejected and risk further instability?
So we are on the U.S.-imposed deadline (exactly what it is) for the new constitution. Maybe that is not such a bad thing; Iraq needs stability and what more would be achieved in ten days? The tough negotiations might just have been pushed off to the end anyway. I'm not there, I can't say what else they might have done, but it is rather heavy-handed of the administration to exert such pressure on the drafting commission and then have Khalilzad talk about how the constitution should reflect a historic social compact, or whatever he said like that. Again, though, what more would have been done with a 15-day extension?
And a few hundred miles to the west disengagement from Gaza has begun and I will comment on the coming days on its progress... but it is certainly an exciting time for Gazans and for observers of the situation in Palestine/Israel.
Sunday, August 14, 2005
Recent developments
Well, what's gone on in the world lately? China abandoned the dollar peg a while ago and now has a "basket." It's a start. Niger finally got a little bit of attention. Guinea-Bissau had a presidential election and Nino Vieira will be president again which means that the country isn't going to emerge from its problems anytime soon.
Of course, everyone is paying attention to the disengagement right now; Bibi's quit and Arik is determined (even though Netanyahu's popularity is way above Sharon's in the Likud, of course, Bibi's always been an opportunist and will continue to be). But the Right isn't going to stop this from going through, which means the obvious question is how Hamas and Fatah will be able to work together in Gaza.
Palestinian legislative elections won't occur until January 2006 (the new date set by Abbas) so until then there will have to be some sort of collaboration in Gaza. But what sort of collaboration? Hamas has to know that it will only benefit the Palestinian people to have a smooth ride and feel a benefit from the disengagement. I can't see any motivation for Hamas to continue to create trouble against Israel in a pretty much unoccupied (obviously not "free") Gaza. The problem is the possible benefits Hamas could gain against Fatah knowing that Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PA don't want to see trouble in Gaza.
Hamas will have to weigh this desire to achieve political gains in Gaza against the public opinion of Gazans... but the ball would seem to be in their court.
On another note, I've heard a lot of ludicrous things (especially reading about Palestine/Israel), but check this out: http://www.twostarsforpeace.com/.
Finally, why does Mbeki have to bail out Mugabe? South Africa has enough problems without loaning money to a corrupt dictator to help him continue his reign of repression. Yet another reason why I stopped supporting the ANC... and why the Democratic Alliance should win (though it won't) in 2009.
Of course, everyone is paying attention to the disengagement right now; Bibi's quit and Arik is determined (even though Netanyahu's popularity is way above Sharon's in the Likud, of course, Bibi's always been an opportunist and will continue to be). But the Right isn't going to stop this from going through, which means the obvious question is how Hamas and Fatah will be able to work together in Gaza.
Palestinian legislative elections won't occur until January 2006 (the new date set by Abbas) so until then there will have to be some sort of collaboration in Gaza. But what sort of collaboration? Hamas has to know that it will only benefit the Palestinian people to have a smooth ride and feel a benefit from the disengagement. I can't see any motivation for Hamas to continue to create trouble against Israel in a pretty much unoccupied (obviously not "free") Gaza. The problem is the possible benefits Hamas could gain against Fatah knowing that Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PA don't want to see trouble in Gaza.
Hamas will have to weigh this desire to achieve political gains in Gaza against the public opinion of Gazans... but the ball would seem to be in their court.
On another note, I've heard a lot of ludicrous things (especially reading about Palestine/Israel), but check this out: http://www.twostarsforpeace.com/.
Finally, why does Mbeki have to bail out Mugabe? South Africa has enough problems without loaning money to a corrupt dictator to help him continue his reign of repression. Yet another reason why I stopped supporting the ANC... and why the Democratic Alliance should win (though it won't) in 2009.
Tuesday, June 14, 2005
Europe stumbles forward?
The French and the Dutch have rejected the European Constitution; they have sent a clear message--but the content of the message isn't necessarily clear. Most would agree that the people were uncomfortable approving a document whose consequences they were unsure of and that they were reacting against the actions of elites, who they saw as too detached from the reality and from popular opinion.
In retrospect, this European Constitution was not the right one; it might have fulfilled the functions of consolidating treaties, but it failed to bring the Union and its institutions closer to the people. How could that have been done? First, by actions of the Union which showed that it truly respects the principle of subsidiarity; the Union institutions have been far too willing to usurp powers better left to individual states and their governments. Second, elections would be necessary--elections for a powerful body capable of, at the least, monitoring the EU bureaucracy and ensuring that it follows the priorities of the "European public" (if such a thing exists). Now, if there is no European public, can there really be a body that reflects its views? If any body is going to reflect the views of the European people as a whole, it must be a more powerful Parliament with pan-European political parties, fighting elections on a basis of European platforms and within a framework of clearly identified and less flexible powers (that cannot be continually enlarged without popular consultation).
So how should this Constitution have been ratified? National governments must ratify the treaty, as it is still an international treaty; but a document of such importance that it can rightfully be called a "constitution" should be ratified by the people, and should have been done by simultaneous vote in all 25 member states. If such a step was not possible with the document as written, it should have been amended, and indeed, that is now the least that will happen.
A new Constitution should attempt to more greatly define the powers of the Union and the relationship between the Union, the national governments, and the people, not relying solely on those national governments as the liaison between the Union and the people. A new Constitution should fix the Union's powers, not enabling it to continually aggrandize its scope and claim new authority without the approval of the people, who do not vote for political parties in domestic elections on the basis of Europe. And a new Constitution should not be adopted for the sake of adoption; it should be adopted only when there is a fundamental agreement on the type of Europe being adopted, and not a repetition of the same compromise, fudged to look like something new.
When there is a Constitution that all 25 member states are confident of putting to their people, on the same day, to create a true debate about Europe--and such a Constitution can be approved--then it is the right document for Europe.
In retrospect, this European Constitution was not the right one; it might have fulfilled the functions of consolidating treaties, but it failed to bring the Union and its institutions closer to the people. How could that have been done? First, by actions of the Union which showed that it truly respects the principle of subsidiarity; the Union institutions have been far too willing to usurp powers better left to individual states and their governments. Second, elections would be necessary--elections for a powerful body capable of, at the least, monitoring the EU bureaucracy and ensuring that it follows the priorities of the "European public" (if such a thing exists). Now, if there is no European public, can there really be a body that reflects its views? If any body is going to reflect the views of the European people as a whole, it must be a more powerful Parliament with pan-European political parties, fighting elections on a basis of European platforms and within a framework of clearly identified and less flexible powers (that cannot be continually enlarged without popular consultation).
So how should this Constitution have been ratified? National governments must ratify the treaty, as it is still an international treaty; but a document of such importance that it can rightfully be called a "constitution" should be ratified by the people, and should have been done by simultaneous vote in all 25 member states. If such a step was not possible with the document as written, it should have been amended, and indeed, that is now the least that will happen.
A new Constitution should attempt to more greatly define the powers of the Union and the relationship between the Union, the national governments, and the people, not relying solely on those national governments as the liaison between the Union and the people. A new Constitution should fix the Union's powers, not enabling it to continually aggrandize its scope and claim new authority without the approval of the people, who do not vote for political parties in domestic elections on the basis of Europe. And a new Constitution should not be adopted for the sake of adoption; it should be adopted only when there is a fundamental agreement on the type of Europe being adopted, and not a repetition of the same compromise, fudged to look like something new.
When there is a Constitution that all 25 member states are confident of putting to their people, on the same day, to create a true debate about Europe--and such a Constitution can be approved--then it is the right document for Europe.
Friday, May 06, 2005
Labour's victory?
The results are in, and everything went pretty much as expected, the major surprise being the slim majority of Labour: the party now has 355 seats, 31 over the 324 needed for a simple majority in the House of Commons. What does this mean for the UK and for British domestic and foreign policy?
It means that Blair will have to go one of two roads: he will either take measures to gain the support of the more leftist Labour backbench, or work on forming more ad hoc alliances with the Tories on some issues such as public service reform. The second option seems extremely unlikely, given Britain’s traditionally good party discipline, and the disagreement between Conservatives and Labour on the best methods to reform public service (Labour wanting more money and limited privatization, Conservatives basically wanting privatization). Therefore Blair will push ahead with topics such as his African agenda, which appeal to the more socially conscious Left within Labour yet don’t alienate his middle ground. Reform of the House of Lords would seem to be another topic for which he could gain more broad cross-party support.
As for that third party, the Liberal Democrats saw about a 4 percent rise in their share of the vote, winning an extra 10 seats, though they did not do well against the Conservatives, losing more seats than they picked up. The Lib Dem gains came at Labour’s expense alone. The question is what now for the Lib Dems: their policies are a strange mix of personal freedom, high taxation and policies that redistribute from the rich to the middle class, and their foreign policy appeals mostly to the moderate left (joining the euro, more integration, no intervention). Despite this Charles Kennedy has claimed that his party is an option in the middle. Lib Dems gained due to the protest vote, but their challenge now is to consolidate these gains while simultaneously generating a coherent set of policies that could actually guide a governing party. I had, as I said before, hoped that the Lib Dems would pull off a total surprise and, together with the Conservatives, force a hung parliament, but that having not happened, I must admit that Labour was and still is the best governing option at present.
Smaller parties that had hoped to gain seats did not; the only one to pick up a seat was ex-Labour MP George Galloway’s Respect, winning a London seat heavily populated by Muslims. The Euroskeptic UKIP and the nationalist BNP failed to pick up seats. The SDLP did not sustain the heavy losses predicted, maintaining three seats in Northern Ireland, although it lost one seat to Sinn Féin and picked up another due to Unionist divisions. It was the Ulster Unionist Party that was basically wiped out, as former First Minister David Trimble lost his seat and the party was reduced to one MP. The DUP meanwhile took nine seats at Westminster. NI Alliance failed to win any seats—the “middle of the road” is not a productive political strategy at present, especially in a single-member-district system.
As Blair heads into his third and final term, his agenda remains alive and well. His legacy of leading Labour to the political center is certainly mixed in people’s opinions, but succeeded grandly in bringing the party out of the political wilderness. The next question is whether either opposition party can formulate a better agenda for Britain. The Conservatives must redefine their core principles, as has been said several times before, and not try to be “Labour, just slightly differently”; the Lib Dems must discover what would tie all of their proposals together and reformulate them to make them more practical and coherent. The party to succeed first in doing this might well be the one that shares the political arena with Labour in the future. Whatever results, it will definitely be an interesting process of evolution.
Wednesday, May 04, 2005
An English parliament? Not anytime soon...
Quick note: the Republicans want to disqualify votes cast by felons in the Washington governor's race using the proportion of all votes cast in the constituency--at least according to statistical evidence they are presenting. Of course, figuring out exactly how many votes were cast by felons opens up its own can of worms... but given that the margin of this election was statistically insignificant, it doesn't seem particularly wise to rely on statistical probabilities to try to alter the result.
Another interesting question--why can't felons vote? I'll save that argument for later.
-------------------------------
Following the British devolution in the late 1990s (the establishment of the Welsh Assembly and, particularly, the Holyrood parliament), a lot of authority has been delegated to this regional bodies, including some fiscal policy in the Scottish case. England, on the other hand, has had proposals for regional assemblies rejected, but has no all-English body, and no referendum on estabilshing such a body. Therefore the decent question stands: why is there no English Parliament to deal with devolved affairs in England alone? Why do Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Westminster MPs vote on matters concerning England?
The simple answer to this question is the nature of the United Kingdom. The UK has, first off, always been an England-centered state. England forms the geographic heart of the country; the ruling dynasty, though originally Scottish, ruled from London; and the vast majority of Britain's population lives in England. Delegating Westminster's power to an elected body representing the whole of England would severely undermine the Union Parliament. Essentially, this would be a first step toward confederation (which is exactly what many advocates of an English Parliament hope for).
No federal or quasi-federal state has such a large "primary" unit as England without at least one other to counterbalance it, for this very reason. This is why regional assemblies in England would not pose a threat to Westminster and to British unity, but an English parliament would clearly do so. A confederal structure to the United Kingdom, on the other hand, would clearly entail a change in attitude on the part of elites, who at this point would not accept such an arrangement; it is not advocated or supported by any of the three main parties.
For that reason, this discussion is mostly academic, at least for the present time; but it might be worthwhile for Britons to ponder exactly what kind of UK they want, especially if all its parts are to be integrated into an ever closer Europe anyway.
Another interesting question--why can't felons vote? I'll save that argument for later.
-------------------------------
Following the British devolution in the late 1990s (the establishment of the Welsh Assembly and, particularly, the Holyrood parliament), a lot of authority has been delegated to this regional bodies, including some fiscal policy in the Scottish case. England, on the other hand, has had proposals for regional assemblies rejected, but has no all-English body, and no referendum on estabilshing such a body. Therefore the decent question stands: why is there no English Parliament to deal with devolved affairs in England alone? Why do Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Westminster MPs vote on matters concerning England?
The simple answer to this question is the nature of the United Kingdom. The UK has, first off, always been an England-centered state. England forms the geographic heart of the country; the ruling dynasty, though originally Scottish, ruled from London; and the vast majority of Britain's population lives in England. Delegating Westminster's power to an elected body representing the whole of England would severely undermine the Union Parliament. Essentially, this would be a first step toward confederation (which is exactly what many advocates of an English Parliament hope for).
No federal or quasi-federal state has such a large "primary" unit as England without at least one other to counterbalance it, for this very reason. This is why regional assemblies in England would not pose a threat to Westminster and to British unity, but an English parliament would clearly do so. A confederal structure to the United Kingdom, on the other hand, would clearly entail a change in attitude on the part of elites, who at this point would not accept such an arrangement; it is not advocated or supported by any of the three main parties.
For that reason, this discussion is mostly academic, at least for the present time; but it might be worthwhile for Britons to ponder exactly what kind of UK they want, especially if all its parts are to be integrated into an ever closer Europe anyway.
Monday, May 02, 2005
Supporting Jafaari
"Tony Blair, for all his flaws, remains the best centre-right option there is." --The Economist in its British election endorsement
I stand by my call to vote Lib Dem.
The new Jafaari government in Iraq certainly has its hands full, not least in finding appropriate Sunni members to represent that community. What Jafaari must do is combat corruption, ensure that all groups are represented and feel included in government, fight the insurrection militarily as well as psychologically, and write a new constitution (theoretically within six months). Easily done.
How can you not back the democratization process in Iraq? I understand that you may disagree with the way this process was begun--after initially being undecided, I wound up basically opposing the war in 2003, and I think this stance was justified by the lack of WMD. I don't think "regime change" was a good enough reason to invade Iraq. If we are going to start invading countries to change their regimes, we are biting off more than we can chew, and Iraq shouldn't necessarily have been our first stop.
That said, the Iraqi people today are enjoying the benefits of the "liberal" freedoms, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and so forth, and I think that we should fully support them as they exercise those freedoms for the first time in decades and not try to undercut it by supporting an illiberal, foreign-backed insurgency that opposes the U.S. solely because it is the U.S. and for no logical reason, certainly not for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Failure in Iraq today could have devastating consequences. Luckily, President Bush is in no mood to countenance such failure (I suppose that broadly I would agree with him on that). Really, though, I see no way in which any U.S. president (say, a President Kerry) could withdraw our troops before the "job is done"--the geopolitical consequences of such a move would be far worse than the casualties our troops are taking.
So the Iraqi government will struggle on, and it deserves our full (but not unquestioning) support. In fact, the major questions we should pose to the government are those of liberality: human rights and basic freedoms should be maintained in Iraq, and we should keep up the pressure. For if the regime is allowed to deteriorate into authoritarianism, of any type (Islamist or not), what then was fought for at all?
At least until oil prices get back below $30 a barrel. Then it doesn't matter.
I stand by my call to vote Lib Dem.
The new Jafaari government in Iraq certainly has its hands full, not least in finding appropriate Sunni members to represent that community. What Jafaari must do is combat corruption, ensure that all groups are represented and feel included in government, fight the insurrection militarily as well as psychologically, and write a new constitution (theoretically within six months). Easily done.
How can you not back the democratization process in Iraq? I understand that you may disagree with the way this process was begun--after initially being undecided, I wound up basically opposing the war in 2003, and I think this stance was justified by the lack of WMD. I don't think "regime change" was a good enough reason to invade Iraq. If we are going to start invading countries to change their regimes, we are biting off more than we can chew, and Iraq shouldn't necessarily have been our first stop.
That said, the Iraqi people today are enjoying the benefits of the "liberal" freedoms, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and so forth, and I think that we should fully support them as they exercise those freedoms for the first time in decades and not try to undercut it by supporting an illiberal, foreign-backed insurgency that opposes the U.S. solely because it is the U.S. and for no logical reason, certainly not for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Failure in Iraq today could have devastating consequences. Luckily, President Bush is in no mood to countenance such failure (I suppose that broadly I would agree with him on that). Really, though, I see no way in which any U.S. president (say, a President Kerry) could withdraw our troops before the "job is done"--the geopolitical consequences of such a move would be far worse than the casualties our troops are taking.
So the Iraqi government will struggle on, and it deserves our full (but not unquestioning) support. In fact, the major questions we should pose to the government are those of liberality: human rights and basic freedoms should be maintained in Iraq, and we should keep up the pressure. For if the regime is allowed to deteriorate into authoritarianism, of any type (Islamist or not), what then was fought for at all?
At least until oil prices get back below $30 a barrel. Then it doesn't matter.
Sunday, May 01, 2005
Brits: Vote Lib Dem on May 5
The general election in Britain approaches on May 5 this year, and we can legitimately say for the first time in decades that it is a true three-party contest, with the Liberal Democrats putting up a good fight (they have been hovering around 20 percent in the polls, up to 23 percent in a new poll from today). And whatever you think about immigration, whatever you think about top-up fees, whatever you think about Iraq, there is one major reason to vote Lib Dem: electoral reform.
I will not rehash the entire argument for proportional representation here. We all know, I think, that Charles Kennedy will not be at 10 Downing St after the next election. But if the Lib Dems can be given the balance in a hung parliament, they can use electoral reform in their negotiations with Labour to support legislation; and the Lib Dems have a powerful incentive to maintain their commitment to electoral reform, unless they make the mistake of believing they are about to supplant Labour, which would be a risky gamble indeed.
Voting Lib Dem, once, for electoral reform; after that, voting your conscience, being able to vote for a party that truly represents your beliefs.
And no, I don't feel bad about telling British people who to vote for. After all, the Guardian did the same when it had readers send letters to voters in Ohio. And nobody's obliged to listen to me.
I will not rehash the entire argument for proportional representation here. We all know, I think, that Charles Kennedy will not be at 10 Downing St after the next election. But if the Lib Dems can be given the balance in a hung parliament, they can use electoral reform in their negotiations with Labour to support legislation; and the Lib Dems have a powerful incentive to maintain their commitment to electoral reform, unless they make the mistake of believing they are about to supplant Labour, which would be a risky gamble indeed.
Voting Lib Dem, once, for electoral reform; after that, voting your conscience, being able to vote for a party that truly represents your beliefs.
And no, I don't feel bad about telling British people who to vote for. After all, the Guardian did the same when it had readers send letters to voters in Ohio. And nobody's obliged to listen to me.
Here I am...
All right, I decided it was time to move on from livejournal to something a bit more sophisticated, yet something that still did not require me to do the whole bit myself. So hello blogspot. Let's see if I can keep up my motivation to write in this bad boy.
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