My political compass

I found my political compass... I'm a social libertarian and on the economic left... again, no surprises!

Economic -3.75, Social -4.41

That puts me next to Gandhi, Mandela and the Dalai Lama. Good place to be in, I guess. Most world leaders, policy-wise, come out in the economic-right and social-authoritarian quadrant (that is, the opposite one from me). Interestingly, none of the "economic right" i.e. more neoliberal leaders are at all on the "social libertarian" side of the bar, though I suppose it could be a matter of where you put that bar.

I'd also be curious to know where world leaders stand personally, without political constraints...

Estonians vote

Estonia is electing a new Riigikogu (Parliament) tomorrow, March 4. One of the more interesting sections in the country's riveting Electoral Law is the following:

Section 38 (2) 3). Advance polls shall be held from the sixth day to the fourth
day before election day by electronic means. Voting opens on the sixth day
before the day of election at 9.00 a.m. and lasts on 24-hour basis until the
voting closes on the fourth day before the election day at 8.00 p.m.

Yep--e-voting. Now, one can also go in and cast an in-person advance vote on these days (though not 24 hours). Overall, 19.1 percent of electors have already voted, compared to 14.5 percent last time around (I don't think they had the online option in 2003).

Meanwhile, section 62 of the same law explains the distribution of seats, which is rather complicated. Really, what it comes down to is: an open-list d'Hondt system, with one vote per elector. I think. As follows:

• Mandates are given to any candidate meeting the simple quota in his/her constituency;
• Then, mandates are given to political parties that meet the national 5 percent threshold according to the simple quota divided by that party's total votes, with an extra 75 percent of the simple quota counting as enough for a seat or another seat, and factoring in that some candidates may have already won seats, and the seats go to the most-voted candidates;
• Then, mandates are distributed on a nationally compensatory basis between the same parties, according to d'Hondt (except that the multiplier is 2^0.9, 3^0.9 and so on). Candidates are given mandates on the order that they appear on the national list, if they got at least 5 percent of their simple quota (which shouldn't be horribly difficult). If not, the highest vote-getter gets that compensatory mandate.

And... I think that's it!

As for the actual parties...
Polls show the Center Party leading with the Estonian Reform Party in second. These are the two main parties in the current center-right (liberalish) government. Currently, Reform provides the prime minister, Andrus Ansip, despite being behind the Center Party in seats. The party which won the last election by a wide margin, Res Publica, is trailing despite a merger with another conservative party, Pro Patria. Finally, the Social Democrats, the new Green Party and possibly the conservative/agarian People's Union (the last party in the current coalition) should fill out the parliament.

Estonia is generally known for low taxes, an enterprising attitude, taking initiative online (as is clear with E-voting), and being irritating to Russia (as recently). None of this will likely change whenever the new government takes office.

Finland gears up for new elections

The current Finnish government, which includes the Finnish Center (KESK), the Social Democrats (SDP), and the Swedish People's Party (SFP), has served out a full four-year mandate, and faces elections on March 18. Currently, KESK and SDP are running neck-and-neck in the polls.

Finland uses an open-list constituency PR system; parties therefore take advantage of the drawing power of star candidates, but the system is proportional within the constituencies and generally fairly proportional overall. In Helsinki and the surrounding Uusimaa area, the conservative National Coalition (KOK) and the SDP run strong, while the north and center of the country are dominated first and foremost by the KESK, which still has strong ties to its roots as the Agrarian Party. The other principal parties are the Greens (VIHR) and the Left (VAS) or ex-communists.

One issue that seems to have arisen in this campaign is a guaranteed minimum income (possibly as a replacement to some of the various welfare provisions). The Greens have backed this and it appears that the Center has given this idea support as well; the SDP is opposing it.

In the end, it looks like PM Matti Vanhanen, the most popular leader, might pull out a victory (i.e. plurality) for KESK and enable himself to stay in the big chair. Otherwise, SDP's Eero Heinäluoma will take over. Either way, it looks like the KESK-SDP coalition will remain in power for another four years.

For profiles of the top candidates, there is an article at Virtual Finland.

My personal contributions are these pictures from Helsinki, 2004:

The National Coalition (KOK) campaign booth outside the department store Stockmann


The headquarters of the Social Democratic Party, Helsinki

The crazy optician

This guy (from Toronto) is just crazy. When the consumer advocate reporter comes to talk to him again, he... opens the door in his face, tries to punch him and throws snowballs at the cameraman, then barricades himself inside the store until the riot team arrives.

Apparently, he was:

• Making fake Oakleys and other brand-name glasses (when the reporter confronted him, blamed Oakley);
• Refusing to refund money for the above ("We don't do money back here");
• Performing eye exams, even though in Ontario, opticians are not permitted to do so ("Your eye doctor is probably going to say something like I'm not supposed to do this, but he's my competition").
  

Now he has reportedly changed the name of his business and tried to make it look like the neighboring one. The archive of old news videos about him is here.

Political typology

According to Pew's political typology, I am a "liberal." No surprise there...

It states that 17 percent of the public are liberals; 19 percent of registered voters are liberals.

Prodi's second fall, or the inane Italian electoral system

Romano Prodi has resigned today as prime minister of Italy, having narrowly lost a Senate vote on a nonbinding foreign policy resolution concerning Iraq (heh). Prodi needed 160 votes (a majority of members) to carry the day and got only 158.

While Prodi's Union coalition has a sizable majority in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate their majority is only two seats. This means that the Union has to rely on all its senators, including those from far left parties (the Communists and the Communist Refoundation). These parties often have very little in common with the centrist parties (such as the large, more centrist Margherita party or the smaller Italy of Values, among others). The Union coalition cannot cast these far-left parties aside, however, because the electoral system rewards relative majorities--to the extent that 55 percent of Chamber seats are guaranteed to the coalition or party that takes a relative majority. This electoral system was imposed by Berlusconi prior to the previous election in an attempt to manipulate the results.

However, the system is ridiculous. In addition to this 55 percent clause, seats are distributed proportionally to coalitions or parties in the provinces, to all coalitions receiving at least 10 percent nationwide and independent parties with at least 4 percent. Within coalitions, all parties receiving at least 2 percent are eligible, and the top party under 2 percent is also eligible. This is a recipe for allowing small parties to continue manipulating the larger ones--hardly a solution to one of the larger problems of the last electoral reform implemented in the early '90s.

Here's something radical: Why not an MMP or closed-list PR system with a 5% nationwide/3 SMD threshold (as in Germany)? Surviving parties would probably include the major parties of the center-left (Margherita as well as the Democrats of the Left, or a possible merger of those two), Berlusconi's Forza Italia, the rightist National Alliance, and the more centrist Union of Christian Democrats, plus possibly the Communist Refoundation and the regionalist Northern League. Yes, the smaller parties would be irritated, but given Italy's persistent instability, this solution is more than justified. [And yes, the Senate also needs to be reformed. In Italy's system where both chambers can hold the government to account, neither house should have an electoral law which disproportionately empowers small fringe parties.]

We may well see another electoral reform soon: President Georgio Napolitano, according to the NYT article, won't call elections until another reform has been enacted. Maybe this time it will finally be a logical one.

[The best overview of the history and intricacies of the system, so far as I am aware, is here.]

Ontario looks at MMP

Speaking of electoral reform... the Citizens' Assembly in Ontario has decided that mixed-member proportional (MMP) is its preferred alternative to the current first-past-the-post (FPP) system. See DemocraticSPACE (who also designed an MMP system for the purpose) and Idealistic Pragmatist.

Prince Edward Island's electoral reform attempt also would have implemented MMP. B.C.'s option, on the other hand, was for the single transferable vote (STV). [That option, for those who don't know, got 58 percent "yes" votes when it needed 60 percent, so wasn't adopted, but will be back on the ballot.]

This is one of the best aspects of federalism--different jurisdictions experimenting with policy; however, it does wind up being rather uncoordinated. It's certainly possible that we could see 10 different voting systems for 10 provinces, not that there's anything wrong with that. But the clamor is growing in Quebec, where there are three major parties and two growing alternatives, and New Brunswick just had a "second place winner" election in which the Liberals won despite losing the popular vote, so there are certainly other provinces that might be exploring other options.

If Ontario adopts MMP, there will definitely be a lot of pressure on the federal government to at least examine the idea of PR. (Note: the NDP introduced a motion for consideration of electoral reform, which will likely be ignored. But I always wonder why the NDP doesn't make electoral reform their #1 priority in any support deal. Yes, the short-term gains are uncertain, but one would think the long-term survival benefit is way, way bigger than in any other area. ATM fees, for instance... seriously?).

Taiwanese favor parliamentarism?

Interesting... according to a new poll, a strong majority of Taiwanese would prefer a parliamentary government to the current presidential system. This follows some scandals involving the presidency, and power struggles between legislature and president.

The question is whether this is a permanent feature of the Taiwanese system now or just reflects the unpopularity of President Chen Shui-bian. Unfortunately, there's not a lot more detail, so it's impossible to say from this survey.

II República: Portela quits, Azaña takes over

After the election, rumors circulated, according to Gil Robles, leader of the rightist CEDA, that he would retire from politics (see No fue posible la paz, 491-2); order began to break down in some areas as the President authorized Prime Minister Portela to declare a state of war; Calvo Sotelo and others suggested that a coup be carried out, but Franco and Portela declined; Gil Robles tried to talk Portela into staying in office until the second round was held and the Cortes met, but he refused.

Therefore, on February 19, 1936, as it became clear that the Popular Front had won the (last) elections in the Second Spanish Republic, Manuel Azaña, leader of the Izquierda Republicana, the most moderate of the Popular Front parties, was appointed prime minister by President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora. The government was comprised entirely of figures from Republican Left and the smaller Republican Union party, with no Socialist participation.

71 years to the day... the Popular Front

Yesterday (February 16) as I was being my usual absent-minded self, my thoughts drifted to the Spanish Civil War, and in particular to the understudied but very important period of the Spanish Second Republic. I knew there must be a reason for this, and I quickly thumbed through my well-worn copy of Hugh Thomas’ book (aptly titled The Spanish Civil War). And indeed: February 16, 2007, was the 71st anniversary of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 1936, won by the Popular Front, which began the acceleration of Spain’s descent into all-out war in July.

Today, Spain is a relatively stable democracy, and almost unique among European democracies, has essentially a two-party system, with government alternating between the currently ruling Socialists (PSOE) and opposition conservative People’s Party (PP). The Spanish Second Republic was entirely different, on the other hand. The main political parties and groups included:

• The Republican Left (IR), a center-left but doggedly anti-clerical group, led by Manuel Azaña Díaz, a literary figure who would serve as prime minister and president;
• The same Socialists (PSOE), but very leftist at the time, led by trade-union leader Francisco Largo Caballero;
• The Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) and National Council of Workers (CNT), a large anarchist group and the associated trade union;
• The Spanish Confederation of Independent Rightist Parties (CEDA), the best translation I can come up with for the unwieldy Spanish name Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, a federation of rightist, generally Christian-influenced parties led by lawyer José María Gil Robles;
• The Radical Republican Party (PRR), which while republican in orientation was more centrist/conservative in other policies and tended to be pragmatic to the point of sleaziness, led by veteran politician Alejandro Lerroux;
• Various regional parties, such as the Regionalist League (Lliga) of conservative Catalans, the Esquerra Republicana (ERC) of socialist Catalans, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).

This fragmentation occurred for several related reasons: (1) intense regionalism; (2) sharp disagreement on the nature of the regime, monarchist vs. republican, federal vs. unitary, secular vs. laic; (3) economic inequalities; (4) personal disagreements and opportunism among politicians, and a total lack of trust. Added to this, perhaps, should be the electoral system.

The Spanish electoral system in the Second Republic heavily favored provincial majorities. I believe the majority party or list in a constituency (almost always the same as a province) received 80 percent of the seats from that constituency, with minorities receiving the other 20 percent. Additionally, the system was open-list, weakening the party structure. The closest comparison today would be the Brazilian legislature, with open lists but only a single non-transferable vote for each elector, the difference being that in Spain there was a substantial prize for the largest list, further encouraging electoral pacts (but only on a provincial basis).

The result was heavy distortion of results (the winning list would receive a large majority in the unicameral Cortes), a fragmented legislature, and distribution of seats by party that was definitely not proportional. Some parties in lists benefited disproportionately, and losing parties (especially if they weren’t in alliances), lost greatly. For example, a disunited Left lost the election of 1933 badly, and the Republican Left in particular won fewer than 20 seats.

In 1936, the Popular Front was formed by the Republican Left, the Republican Union (a splinter of the Radicals), the Socialists, and the Communists (PCE). It competed against the more loosely organized National Front, headed by the CEDA and also including traditional monarchists in Spanish Renewal (RE) and Carlists in the Traditional Community (CT), though the fascist Falange remained outside. Again, however, given the provincial nature of the election, pacts were sometimes made with regional and centrist parties in various parts of the country, and alliances were not always consistent.

There are not any extremely detailed results of these elections readily available, though Tusell (1971) conducted a study which I don’t have access to. Hugh Thomas’ figures, adapted from Tusell, show the following:

34.3 percent for the Popular Front, and 263 seats

33.2 percent for the National Front, and 156 seats

5.4 percent for various centrists (Radicals, Basques, etc.), and 59 seats.

While one might surmise that the antipathy between today’s principal Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE) is the result of this longstanding feud—and it is true that today, older conflicts are reappearing—it is also the result of the fact that Spain today has this two-party system with little coalition-building. The Spanish electoral system technically has low thresholds, but uses the d’Hondt method to distribute seats in mainly very small constituencies. The principal differences from the Second Republic are: (1) a lower house ¾ of the size (350 seats today), meaning a lot of 3 to 5-seat constituencies that are not really “proportional”, and (2) closed party lists. One might surmise that, at least initially, those framing the Spanish Constitution were not horribly upset by the prospect of consolidation due to the fractious history of political parties; but at the same time, this was by no means an inevitable result, given that even at that time, principal political forces included the PSOE, the PP’s predecessor the Popular Alliance (AP), the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) of transitional PM Adolfo Suárez, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Communists (PCE). But the UCD disappeared, AP merged with other rightist parties to form PP, PSP merged quickly into PSOE, and the Communists are now part of the United Left, a coalition with little import.

At any rate, what has happened is a disproportional Spanish system that favors the big parties and the smaller, but regionally concentrated, parties such as the Catalan and Basque regionalists. This has lent the system a stability that it lacked in 1936, at the cost of choice along the ideological spectrum.

Meanwhile… immediately following the announcement of the 1936 results (a few days later), PM Manuel Portela Valladares resigned, and somewhat irregularly, Manuel Azaña was appointed prime minister for the second time before the new Cortes was inaugurated, heading a government composed almost entirely of his own Republican Left (with less than 100 seats in the 478-seat Cortes), in which the Socialists refused to participate. So began the descent into war.