Sunday, February 25, 2007

The crazy optician

This guy (from Toronto) is just crazy. When the consumer advocate reporter comes to talk to him again, he... opens the door in his face, tries to punch him and throws snowballs at the cameraman, then barricades himself inside the store until the riot team arrives.

Apparently, he was:
  • Making fake Oakleys and other brand-name glasses (when the reporter confronted him, blamed Oakley);
  • Refusing to refund money for the above ("We don't do money back here");
  • Performing eye exams, even though in Ontario, opticians are not permitted to do so ("Your eye doctor is probably going to say something like I'm not supposed to do this, but he's my competition").
Now he has reportedly changed the name of his business and tried to make it look like the neighboring one. The archive of old news videos about him is here.

Friday, February 23, 2007

Political typology

According to Pew's political typology, I am a "liberal." No surprise there...

It states that 17 percent of the public are liberals; 19 percent of registered voters are liberals.

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Prodi's second fall, or the inane Italian electoral system

Romano Prodi has resigned today as prime minister of Italy, having narrowly lost a Senate vote on a nonbinding foreign policy resolution concerning Iraq (heh). Prodi needed 160 votes (a majority of members) to carry the day and got only 158.

While Prodi's Union coalition has a sizable majority in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate their majority is only two seats. This means that the Union has to rely on all its senators, including those from far left parties (the Communists and the Communist Refoundation). These parties often have very little in common with the centrist parties (such as the large, more centrist Margherita party or the smaller Italy of Values, among others). The Union coalition cannot cast these far-left parties aside, however, because the electoral system rewards relative majorities--to the extent that 55 percent of Chamber seats are guaranteed to the coalition or party that takes a relative majority. This electoral system was imposed by Berlusconi prior to the previous election in an attempt to manipulate the results.

However, the system is ridiculous. In addition to this 55 percent clause, seats are distributed proportionally to coalitions or parties in the provinces, to all coalitions receiving at least 10 percent nationwide and independent parties with at least 4 percent. Within coalitions, all parties receiving at least 2 percent are eligible, and the top party under 2 percent is also eligible. This is a recipe for allowing small parties to continue manipulating the larger ones--hardly a solution to one of the larger problems of the last electoral reform implemented in the early '90s.

Here's something radical: Why not an MMP or closed-list PR system with a 5% nationwide/3 SMD threshold (as in Germany)? Surviving parties would probably include the major parties of the center-left (Margherita as well as the Democrats of the Left, or a possible merger of those two), Berlusconi's Forza Italia, the rightist National Alliance, and the more centrist Union of Christian Democrats, plus possibly the Communist Refoundation and the regionalist Northern League. Yes, the smaller parties would be irritated, but given Italy's persistent instability, this solution is more than justified. [And yes, the Senate also needs to be reformed. In Italy's system where both chambers can hold the government to account, neither house should have an electoral law which disproportionately empowers small fringe parties.]

We may well see another electoral reform soon: President Georgio Napolitano, according to the NYT article, won't call elections until another reform has been enacted. Maybe this time it will finally be a logical one.

[The best overview of the history and intricacies of the system, so far as I am aware, is here.]

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Ontario looks at MMP

Speaking of electoral reform... the Citizens' Assembly in Ontario has decided that mixed-member proportional (MMP) is its preferred alternative to the current first-past-the-post (FPP) system. See DemocraticSPACE (who also designed an MMP system for the purpose) and Idealistic Pragmatist.

Prince Edward Island's electoral reform attempt also would have implemented MMP. B.C.'s option, on the other hand, was for the single transferable vote (STV). [That option, for those who don't know, got 58 percent "yes" votes when it needed 60 percent, so wasn't adopted, but will be back on the ballot.]

This is one of the best aspects of federalism--different jurisdictions experimenting with policy; however, it does wind up being rather uncoordinated. It's certainly possible that we could see 10 different voting systems for 10 provinces, not that there's anything wrong with that. But the clamor is growing in Quebec, where there are three major parties and two growing alternatives, and New Brunswick just had a "second place winner" election in which the Liberals won despite losing the popular vote, so there are certainly other provinces that might be exploring other options.

If Ontario adopts MMP, there will definitely be a lot of pressure on the federal government to at least examine the idea of PR. (Note: the NDP introduced a motion for consideration of electoral reform, which will likely be ignored. But I always wonder why the NDP doesn't make electoral reform their #1 priority in any support deal. Yes, the short-term gains are uncertain, but one would think the long-term survival benefit is way, way bigger than in any other area. ATM fees, for instance... seriously?).

Taiwanese favor parliamentarism?

Interesting... according to a new poll, a strong majority of Taiwanese would prefer a parliamentary government to the current presidential system. This follows some scandals involving the presidency, and power struggles between legislature and president.

The question is whether this is a permanent feature of the Taiwanese system now or just reflects the unpopularity of President Chen Shui-bian. Unfortunately, there's not a lot more detail, so it's impossible to say from this survey.

II República: Portela quits, Azaña takes over

After the election, rumors circulated, according to Gil Robles, leader of the rightist CEDA, that he would retire from politics (see No fue posible la paz, 491-2); order began to break down in some areas as the President authorized Prime Minister Portela to declare a state of war; Calvo Sotelo and others suggested that a coup be carried out, but Franco and Portela declined; Gil Robles tried to talk Portela into staying in office until the second round was held and the Cortes met, but he refused.

Therefore, on February 19, 1936, as it became clear that the Popular Front had won the (last) elections in the Second Spanish Republic, Manuel Azaña, leader of the Izquierda Republicana, the most moderate of the Popular Front parties, was appointed prime minister by President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora. The government was comprised entirely of figures from Republican Left and the smaller Republican Union party, with no Socialist participation.

Saturday, February 17, 2007

71 years to the day... the Popular Front

Yesterday (February 16) as I was being my usual absent-minded self, my thoughts drifted to the Spanish Civil War, and in particular to the understudied but very important period of the Spanish Second Republic. I knew there must be a reason for this, and I quickly thumbed through my well-worn copy of Hugh Thomas’ book (aptly titled The Spanish Civil War). And indeed: February 16, 2007, was the 71st anniversary of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 1936, won by the Popular Front, which began the acceleration of Spain’s descent into all-out war in July.

Today, Spain is a relatively stable democracy, and almost unique among European democracies, has essentially a two-party system, with government alternating between the currently ruling Socialists (PSOE) and opposition conservative People’s Party (PP). The Spanish Second Republic was entirely different, on the other hand. The main political parties and groups included:

• The Republican Left (IR), a center-left but doggedly anti-clerical group, led by Manuel Azaña Díaz, a literary figure who would serve as prime minister and president;
• The same Socialists (PSOE), but very leftist at the time, led by trade-union leader Francisco Largo Caballero;
• The Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) and National Council of Workers (CNT), a large anarchist group and the associated trade union;
• The Spanish Confederation of Independent Rightist Parties (CEDA), the best translation I can come up with for the unwieldy Spanish name Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, a federation of rightist, generally Christian-influenced parties led by lawyer José María Gil Robles;
• The Radical Republican Party (PRR), which while republican in orientation was more centrist/conservative in other policies and tended to be pragmatic to the point of sleaziness, led by veteran politician Alejandro Lerroux;
• Various regional parties, such as the Regionalist League (Lliga) of conservative Catalans, the Esquerra Republicana (ERC) of socialist Catalans, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).

This fragmentation occurred for several related reasons: (1) intense regionalism; (2) sharp disagreement on the nature of the regime, monarchist vs. republican, federal vs. unitary, secular vs. laic; (3) economic inequalities; (4) personal disagreements and opportunism among politicians, and a total lack of trust. Added to this, perhaps, should be the electoral system.

The Spanish electoral system in the Second Republic heavily favored provincial majorities. I believe the majority party or list in a constituency (almost always the same as a province) received 80 percent of the seats from that constituency, with minorities receiving the other 20 percent. Additionally, the system was open-list, weakening the party structure. The closest comparison today would be the Brazilian legislature, with open lists but only a single non-transferable vote for each elector, the difference being that in Spain there was a substantial prize for the largest list, further encouraging electoral pacts (but only on a provincial basis).

The result was heavy distortion of results (the winning list would receive a large majority in the unicameral Cortes), a fragmented legislature, and distribution of seats by party that was definitely not proportional. Some parties in lists benefited disproportionately, and losing parties (especially if they weren’t in alliances), lost greatly. For example, a disunited Left lost the election of 1933 badly, and the Republican Left in particular won fewer than 20 seats.

In 1936, the Popular Front was formed by the Republican Left, the Republican Union (a splinter of the Radicals), the Socialists, and the Communists (PCE). It competed against the more loosely organized National Front, headed by the CEDA and also including traditional monarchists in Spanish Renewal (RE) and Carlists in the Traditional Community (CT), though the fascist Falange remained outside. Again, however, given the provincial nature of the election, pacts were sometimes made with regional and centrist parties in various parts of the country, and alliances were not always consistent.

There are not any extremely detailed results of these elections readily available, though Tusell (1971) conducted a study which I don’t have access to. Hugh Thomas’ figures, adapted from Tusell, show the following:

34.3 percent for the Popular Front, and 263 seats

33.2 percent for the National Front, and 156 seats

5.4 percent for various centrists (Radicals, Basques, etc.), and 59 seats.

While one might surmise that the antipathy between today’s principal Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE) is the result of this longstanding feud—and it is true that today, older conflicts are reappearing—it is also the result of the fact that Spain today has this two-party system with little coalition-building. The Spanish electoral system technically has low thresholds, but uses the d’Hondt method to distribute seats in mainly very small constituencies. The principal differences from the Second Republic are: (1) a lower house ¾ of the size (350 seats today), meaning a lot of 3 to 5-seat constituencies that are not really “proportional”, and (2) closed party lists. One might surmise that, at least initially, those framing the Spanish Constitution were not horribly upset by the prospect of consolidation due to the fractious history of political parties; but at the same time, this was by no means an inevitable result, given that even at that time, principal political forces included the PSOE, the PP’s predecessor the Popular Alliance (AP), the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) of transitional PM Adolfo Suárez, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Communists (PCE). But the UCD disappeared, AP merged with other rightist parties to form PP, PSP merged quickly into PSOE, and the Communists are now part of the United Left, a coalition with little import.

At any rate, what has happened is a disproportional Spanish system that favors the big parties and the smaller, but regionally concentrated, parties such as the Catalan and Basque regionalists. This has lent the system a stability that it lacked in 1936, at the cost of choice along the ideological spectrum.

Meanwhile… immediately following the announcement of the 1936 results (a few days later), PM Manuel Portela Valladares resigned, and somewhat irregularly, Manuel Azaña was appointed prime minister for the second time before the new Cortes was inaugurated, heading a government composed almost entirely of his own Republican Left (with less than 100 seats in the 478-seat Cortes), in which the Socialists refused to participate. So began the descent into war.

Wednesday, February 14, 2007

Family planning in Rwanda

Interesting proposal out of Africa, meanwhile. Apparently, Rwanda's government wants to take solid family planning steps. There hasn't been a lot of progress in Africa on this issue, anywhere, but if progress will be made anywhere, Rwanda seems a good case.

Rwanda and its neighbor Burundi are two of the world's most densely populated countries, and farms are increasingly small as families divide them up each generation. Meanwhile, Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, is a ruthless modernizer who reminds me somewhat of a hardcore corporate CEO--no dissent, modernization, progress; for example, an embrace of modern business methods and Internet technology. The Church will apparently not oppose the plan, lacking moral standing as many of the clergy collaborated in the 1994 genocide.

The plan seems to involve free distribution of birth control (including Norplant) and mandating family planning counseling whenever anyone goes to a hospital (though I can see the pep talk getting old pretty quick). The BBC reports that the country wants to require three children or less, but I don't see that echoed elsewhere.

Attractive new homes in central Palestine

Ha'aretz reports on the plan of Palestinian entrepreneurs to build a new city--in the middle of the West Bank:
According to sources who were at the Herzliya event, the idea was received with enthusiasm by the attendees, including Defense Minister Amir Peretz. The Palestinian Authority has already allocated land for the new city. ...

They see the new community as comprising several thousand housing units containing 140 to 200 square meters of floor space apiece. It will be meant mainly for young, middle-class families.
The new city is supposed to be built between Ramallah and Nablus, that is to say, north-center West Bank. Forgive me for being skeptical, but... note the following rule has generally held for anything built in the Palestinian territories:

(1) It gets destroyed.

Like, for instance, pretty much everything built during the days of "peace" in the late '90s that was funded by international aid money. [To be fair, Gaza had it much worse, but is the West Bank that good of an investment right now, even for charity capital infusions?]

Who is going to pay for these construction workers? They are hoping for international support. "Small businesses" are supposed to be part of the economy... well, that requires a few roadblocks to actually be removed (that is, the IDF doesn't lie about them) so that inter-city transportation can occur. I mean, the idea is fine--if there's a peace agreement. Until then, it's throwing money down a hole.

Here's an interesting quote:

"It's not any of Israel's business if the Palestinians want to build a city on their territory," said one [of the Defense Ministry officials].

Hmm. Really? Well then, why are you at this meeting? Oh, right... "their territory" doesn't really exist. According to the Oslo accords--the entire basis for Area A--there is Palestinian "jurisdiction over territory," but there's no sovereignty, of course. And then there's the matter of actually getting all the construction materials to the little island of territory that this "city" will be built on.

So, the Israelis are all there (a pretty good list in the article) to approve plans for a Palestinian city. Funny how Oslo has created the autonomy for the Arabs that Begin wanted, and how the five-year PA has achieved permanence. And how easily it was predicted by some. But... that's a matter for another posting.

Update: Speaking of cities, though not the same one: The Head Heeb, an extremely well-spoken and well-informed blogger, has a great post on a proposed new Arab city in Israel, as well as the continued battle for integration of previously Jewish-only communities, and the dynamic of racial separation within Israel proper.

Anyone know something about monetary policy?

Okay, so I'm a former econ major (albeit not a very attentive one), and I'm confused. The NYT has an article on the issuing of dollar coins, and the fact that they won't be successful until the dollar bill is withdrawn. The article includes this (to me) confusing note:
A banknote, since it is redeemable, counts as a government liability, and the Federal Reserve has to back it by buying securities, which earn interest. According to the Fed, there are now about eight billion dollar bills in circulation, so that interest income is considerable. Coins do not yield such income.
Huh? I always thought the purchase of securities (e.g. Treasury bonds) was just the Fed's vehicle to increase the quantity of money. From that perspective, whether you're issuing coins or bills is irrelevant. And what, exactly, is a banknote "redeemable" for? The USD is fiat money, i.e. "legal tender because we said so." Am I missing something here?