Taiwanese favor parliamentarism?

Interesting... according to a new poll, a strong majority of Taiwanese would prefer a parliamentary government to the current presidential system. This follows some scandals involving the presidency, and power struggles between legislature and president.

The question is whether this is a permanent feature of the Taiwanese system now or just reflects the unpopularity of President Chen Shui-bian. Unfortunately, there's not a lot more detail, so it's impossible to say from this survey.

II República: Portela quits, Azaña takes over

After the election, rumors circulated, according to Gil Robles, leader of the rightist CEDA, that he would retire from politics (see No fue posible la paz, 491-2); order began to break down in some areas as the President authorized Prime Minister Portela to declare a state of war; Calvo Sotelo and others suggested that a coup be carried out, but Franco and Portela declined; Gil Robles tried to talk Portela into staying in office until the second round was held and the Cortes met, but he refused.

Therefore, on February 19, 1936, as it became clear that the Popular Front had won the (last) elections in the Second Spanish Republic, Manuel Azaña, leader of the Izquierda Republicana, the most moderate of the Popular Front parties, was appointed prime minister by President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora. The government was comprised entirely of figures from Republican Left and the smaller Republican Union party, with no Socialist participation.

71 years to the day... the Popular Front

Yesterday (February 16) as I was being my usual absent-minded self, my thoughts drifted to the Spanish Civil War, and in particular to the understudied but very important period of the Spanish Second Republic. I knew there must be a reason for this, and I quickly thumbed through my well-worn copy of Hugh Thomas’ book (aptly titled The Spanish Civil War). And indeed: February 16, 2007, was the 71st anniversary of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 1936, won by the Popular Front, which began the acceleration of Spain’s descent into all-out war in July.

Today, Spain is a relatively stable democracy, and almost unique among European democracies, has essentially a two-party system, with government alternating between the currently ruling Socialists (PSOE) and opposition conservative People’s Party (PP). The Spanish Second Republic was entirely different, on the other hand. The main political parties and groups included:

• The Republican Left (IR), a center-left but doggedly anti-clerical group, led by Manuel Azaña Díaz, a literary figure who would serve as prime minister and president;
• The same Socialists (PSOE), but very leftist at the time, led by trade-union leader Francisco Largo Caballero;
• The Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) and National Council of Workers (CNT), a large anarchist group and the associated trade union;
• The Spanish Confederation of Independent Rightist Parties (CEDA), the best translation I can come up with for the unwieldy Spanish name Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, a federation of rightist, generally Christian-influenced parties led by lawyer José María Gil Robles;
• The Radical Republican Party (PRR), which while republican in orientation was more centrist/conservative in other policies and tended to be pragmatic to the point of sleaziness, led by veteran politician Alejandro Lerroux;
• Various regional parties, such as the Regionalist League (Lliga) of conservative Catalans, the Esquerra Republicana (ERC) of socialist Catalans, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).

This fragmentation occurred for several related reasons: (1) intense regionalism; (2) sharp disagreement on the nature of the regime, monarchist vs. republican, federal vs. unitary, secular vs. laic; (3) economic inequalities; (4) personal disagreements and opportunism among politicians, and a total lack of trust. Added to this, perhaps, should be the electoral system.

The Spanish electoral system in the Second Republic heavily favored provincial majorities. I believe the majority party or list in a constituency (almost always the same as a province) received 80 percent of the seats from that constituency, with minorities receiving the other 20 percent. Additionally, the system was open-list, weakening the party structure. The closest comparison today would be the Brazilian legislature, with open lists but only a single non-transferable vote for each elector, the difference being that in Spain there was a substantial prize for the largest list, further encouraging electoral pacts (but only on a provincial basis).

The result was heavy distortion of results (the winning list would receive a large majority in the unicameral Cortes), a fragmented legislature, and distribution of seats by party that was definitely not proportional. Some parties in lists benefited disproportionately, and losing parties (especially if they weren’t in alliances), lost greatly. For example, a disunited Left lost the election of 1933 badly, and the Republican Left in particular won fewer than 20 seats.

In 1936, the Popular Front was formed by the Republican Left, the Republican Union (a splinter of the Radicals), the Socialists, and the Communists (PCE). It competed against the more loosely organized National Front, headed by the CEDA and also including traditional monarchists in Spanish Renewal (RE) and Carlists in the Traditional Community (CT), though the fascist Falange remained outside. Again, however, given the provincial nature of the election, pacts were sometimes made with regional and centrist parties in various parts of the country, and alliances were not always consistent.

There are not any extremely detailed results of these elections readily available, though Tusell (1971) conducted a study which I don’t have access to. Hugh Thomas’ figures, adapted from Tusell, show the following:

34.3 percent for the Popular Front, and 263 seats

33.2 percent for the National Front, and 156 seats

5.4 percent for various centrists (Radicals, Basques, etc.), and 59 seats.

While one might surmise that the antipathy between today’s principal Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE) is the result of this longstanding feud—and it is true that today, older conflicts are reappearing—it is also the result of the fact that Spain today has this two-party system with little coalition-building. The Spanish electoral system technically has low thresholds, but uses the d’Hondt method to distribute seats in mainly very small constituencies. The principal differences from the Second Republic are: (1) a lower house ¾ of the size (350 seats today), meaning a lot of 3 to 5-seat constituencies that are not really “proportional”, and (2) closed party lists. One might surmise that, at least initially, those framing the Spanish Constitution were not horribly upset by the prospect of consolidation due to the fractious history of political parties; but at the same time, this was by no means an inevitable result, given that even at that time, principal political forces included the PSOE, the PP’s predecessor the Popular Alliance (AP), the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) of transitional PM Adolfo Suárez, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Communists (PCE). But the UCD disappeared, AP merged with other rightist parties to form PP, PSP merged quickly into PSOE, and the Communists are now part of the United Left, a coalition with little import.

At any rate, what has happened is a disproportional Spanish system that favors the big parties and the smaller, but regionally concentrated, parties such as the Catalan and Basque regionalists. This has lent the system a stability that it lacked in 1936, at the cost of choice along the ideological spectrum.

Meanwhile… immediately following the announcement of the 1936 results (a few days later), PM Manuel Portela Valladares resigned, and somewhat irregularly, Manuel Azaña was appointed prime minister for the second time before the new Cortes was inaugurated, heading a government composed almost entirely of his own Republican Left (with less than 100 seats in the 478-seat Cortes), in which the Socialists refused to participate. So began the descent into war.

Family planning in Rwanda

Interesting proposal out of Africa, meanwhile. Apparently, Rwanda's government wants to take solid family planning steps. There hasn't been a lot of progress in Africa on this issue, anywhere, but if progress will be made anywhere, Rwanda seems a good case.

Rwanda and its neighbor Burundi are two of the world's most densely populated countries, and farms are increasingly small as families divide them up each generation. Meanwhile, Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, is a ruthless modernizer who reminds me somewhat of a hardcore corporate CEO--no dissent, modernization, progress; for example, an embrace of modern business methods and Internet technology. The Church will apparently not oppose the plan, lacking moral standing as many of the clergy collaborated in the 1994 genocide.

The plan seems to involve free distribution of birth control (including Norplant) and mandating family planning counseling whenever anyone goes to a hospital (though I can see the pep talk getting old pretty quick). The BBC reports that the country wants to require three children or less, but I don't see that echoed elsewhere.

Attractive new homes in central Palestine

Ha'aretz reports on the plan of Palestinian entrepreneurs to build a new city--in the middle of the West Bank:

According to sources who were at the Herzliya event, the idea was received with enthusiasm by the attendees, including Defense Minister Amir Peretz. The Palestinian Authority has already allocated land for the new city. ...

They see the new community as comprising several thousand housing units containing 140 to 200 square meters of floor space apiece. It will be meant mainly for young, middle-class families.

The new city is supposed to be built between Ramallah and Nablus, that is to say, north-center West Bank. Forgive me for being skeptical, but... note the following rule has generally held for anything built in the Palestinian territories:

(1) It gets destroyed.

Like, for instance, pretty much everything built during the days of "peace" in the late '90s that was funded by international aid money. [To be fair, Gaza had it much worse, but is the West Bank that good of an investment right now, even for charity capital infusions?]

Who is going to pay for these construction workers? They are hoping for international support. "Small businesses" are supposed to be part of the economy... well, that requires a few roadblocks to actually be removed (that is, the IDF doesn't lie about them) so that inter-city transportation can occur. I mean, the idea is fine--if there's a peace agreement. Until then, it's throwing money down a hole.

Here's an interesting quote:

"It's not any of Israel's business if the Palestinians want to build a city on their territory," said one [of the Defense Ministry officials].

Hmm. Really? Well then, why are you at this meeting? Oh, right... "their territory" doesn't really exist. According to the Oslo accords--the entire basis for Area A--there is Palestinian "jurisdiction over territory," but there's no sovereignty, of course. And then there's the matter of actually getting all the construction materials to the little island of territory that this "city" will be built on.

So, the Israelis are all there (a pretty good list in the article) to approve plans for a Palestinian city. Funny how Oslo has created the autonomy for the Arabs that Begin wanted, and how the five-year PA has achieved permanence. And how easily it was predicted by some. But... that's a matter for another posting.

Update: Speaking of cities, though not the same one: The Head Heeb, an extremely well-spoken and well-informed blogger, has a great post on a proposed new Arab city in Israel, as well as the continued battle for integration of previously Jewish-only communities, and the dynamic of racial separation within Israel proper.

Anyone know something about monetary policy?

Okay, so I'm a former econ major (albeit not a very attentive one), and I'm confused. The NYT has an article on the issuing of dollar coins, and the fact that they won't be successful until the dollar bill is withdrawn. The article includes this (to me) confusing note:

A banknote, since it is redeemable, counts as a government liability, and the Federal Reserve has to back it by buying securities, which earn interest. According to the Fed, there are now about eight billion dollar bills in circulation, so that interest income is considerable. Coins do not yield such income.

Huh? I always thought the purchase of securities (e.g. Treasury bonds) was just the Fed's vehicle to increase the quantity of money. From that perspective, whether you're issuing coins or bills is irrelevant. And what, exactly, is a banknote "redeemable" for? The USD is fiat money, i.e. "legal tender because we said so." Am I missing something here?

The new year in European elections

According to the calendar at the reference site Parties and Elections in Europe, following the Serbian election of last month, we've got a lull coming until March.

In March, Finland and Estonia, the twin Finnic nations (is that a legitimate adjective?), will head to the polls a couple of weeks apart. Estonia is first, and having been governed by various center-right coalitions since regaining independence, seems set to continue that trend. The country has grown extremely quickly and has gained a reputation for its innovation in e-government service provision. The interesting party to watch in the elections may be the recently founded Greens, who are apparently polling above 5 percent already with many undecided.

When Finland goes to the polls they figure to reelect the present coalition of the Finnish Center, the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish People's Party. Despite the occasional flare-up between the Center and Social Democrats, they are frequently in coalition together. In the polls, Center leader and current PM Matti Vanhanen is consistently well ahead of anyone else as a PM choice, but the SDP seems to be leading the party race, which could hand the post to SDP's Eero Heinäluoma. (SDP's Paavo Lipponen was prime minister 1995-2003). Either way, the clear public preference is a continuance of the coalition, which keeps the opposition conservative National Coalition party in the cold.

The other question to watch is whether Northern Ireland will hold an Assembly election in March. We should know soon whether or not this will go ahead. If so, expect the extremist parties (Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionists) to win pluralities on either side.

The British Isles will then see an active month of May. Wales and Scotland will elect their regional assemblies. While Scotland's SNP is ahead in the polls, they would need to form a coalition to have a majority at Holyrood, which might be tough with almost all other parties being unionist. That said, the current Labour-Lib Dem government might not win a majority either. This creates a possibly interesting role for the Lib Dems as SNP coalition partners.

Also voting in May will be Iceland, which apparently has been having some controversy lately about some environmentally questionable development projects backed by the center-right government. Spanish autonomous communities--except for the big ones like the Basques, Catalonia and Galicia--then vote at the end of May.

June is the end of this modest run, with the French holding legislative elections and the two-round presidential ballot. It doesn't seem prudent to make predictions, but all signs right now point to a Royal-Sarkozy showdown being won by the rightist Sarkozy. But hey, Le Pen made it into the runoff five years ago, so who knows?

As far as the overall European picture goes, the main story will be the French, since nothing will really change in Finland or Estonia.

He's cured!

I'm sure other people will comment on this with much more wit than I could ever hope to attain:

Ousted Pastor 'Completely Heterosexual'

Forced by a gay sex scandal to resign as president of the National Association of Evangelicals, the Rev. Ted Haggard now feels that after three weeks of intensive counseling, he is “completely heterosexual,” says an overseer of the megachurch Mr. Haggard once led.

If we could just get all those deniers who persist in their homosexual ways into therapy! Then they'd be cured for sure! Only question: would we be saved as a nation yet, or would we still have to bring back school prayer?

Eight months with the (ex-) in front

At the other home, I reflect on the last 240 days or so.

Celebrating 100 posts!

Well, this is my 100th post as a blogger. I started this whole thing up when I was a junior in college because I saw someone else do it and wanted to try it for myself. I'd been doing the whole "personal journal" thing but I wanted to move on and share my opinions with anyone interested.

On May 1, 2005 (almost two years ago now!) I put up my first posts, explaining my support for the Liberal Democrats in the British parliamentary election. Since then my views on some things have changed a bit; I continue to get more moderate as I grow, as is to be expected, I suppose. I've gone from being a big fan of socialism (in its ideal type) in high school to a rather loose type of social liberalism (in the European sense). That is to say that I still support rather more social programs than we see here in the States, but not in every case.

I still identify generally with the Party of European Socialists, which brings together all the social-democratic parties from the member states, but with a strong secondary liberal ("European liberal", that is to say more laissez-faire, not "American liberal") identification. It all depends on context, as I think the Swedish welfare state is a great thing in its context.

In Canada, I've gone from being an NDP sympathizer to more in the Liberal column, and while I liked Gerard Kennedy as a candidate, I had a strong feeling as the convention approached that Dion was going to take it. For the U.S. I hope that Canada continues its environmental emphasis and that actions from up north put more pressure on our government down here.

On the other hand, my views on some things are the same. I still think the German mixed-member proportional system is the best electoral system in most contexts. I still hope that someday American electoral reform will happen and I'm encouraged by events in Canada. And I'm still not a conservative. A few years back I challenged friends to name one issue on which I have conservative leanings. Nobody has succeeded yet, though I certainly can be classified as "moderate" in some areas.

As a commentator, I can only hope my opinions are becoming more coherent and justified. I've had less personal time yet, paradoxically, have blogged more since graduating from UW, probably because I've gone full bore into the news as my form of recreation. My baseball watching has continued to diminish, to my philosophical regret, but practical inaction; and of course, I have plenty to say now about the practical experiences of teaching, over at my other home.

So, there it is. How much longer will I keep it up? No idea. As long as it's personally fulfilling, I'll be here. And that's what it comes down to: as many or as few people as may read my writing, in the end, it's what I want to write about and share.