Escribo hoy de Washington, D.C., donde estoy para unas entrevistas...
Una cuestión de perspectiva
Siempre encuentro interesante cuestiones de perspectiva cuando uno se habla de otros. Bueno, pues, alguien que conozco muy bien el otro día me dijo (sobre “los hispanos”) algo como:
--Los hispanos tienen valores muy buenos y la familia es importante para ellos. Cuando llegué al paradero de autobuses unos jóvenes hispanos estaban allí y el líder dijo a los otros que se levantaran para que pudiera sentarme. No creo que unos americanos lo hubieran hecho.
¿Hay cierta problema con esto? Para ser más directo, ¿de dónde viene esta identificación de ser «americano» con ser blanco? Bueno, es muy de acuerdo con lo que aprendemos en mi clase de la sociedad y el estado, de la ciudadanía «republicana» que otorga privilegios a ciertos grupos. Si no consideramos los negros una parte integral de la sociedad, y ellos llegaron a la Costa Este al mismo tiempo que los blancos, ¿qué podemos creer de otro grupo de lo que la mayoría es más reciente y tiene problemas con la inmigración ilegal?
Y otra cosa:
Yo fui el martes al partido de béisbol en Washington (para ver los Nacionales y Rojos). Cuando compré una cerveza, la chica me pidió la identificación (soy joven, yo lo sé…). Sabéis (espero) que soy del estado de Washington, y ella ojeó la tarjeta y dijo que «Siempre tengo problemas con estas IDs del Distrito.»
Hay mucha gente que confunden el Distrito de Colombia con el Estado de Washington. Pero ¿qué significa que la vendadora de cerveza en un evento en el Distrito no sabía que mi identificación no fuera del Distrito? (¡Hay una gran montaña en la tarjeta!) No sé… quizá no puso mucho atento, o quizá a los que residan en el Distrito no les alcanza el dinero para asistir a los partidos… o por lo menos comprar la cerveza…
La República Española y Latinoamérica
Un tésis que propongo es que hay mucho que ganar de estudiar la Segunda República Española, un período de gran inestabilidad en España, y la época inmediatamente antes, para saber mucho también de Latinoamérica. Las instituciones españoles, por supuesto, influyeron en el desarrollo de las instituciones en Latinoamérica, y las dos regiones tuvieron que enfrentarse con problemas semejantes.
Sólo lo quería mencionar hoy, pero tengo mucho que quiero discutir y investigar sobre esta tema y espero encontrar unos libros muy provechosos.
Thursday, April 27, 2006
Friday, April 07, 2006
A sorely needed update
There's a lot going on around the world, and it's been a while since I've stepped into the blogging world, so I have a lot of random comments to make...
First, the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko can proudly point to the fact that these elections were basically free and fair. The results were also to be expected: the pro-Russian opposition was basically united behind Yanukovich, while the more European-leaning Orange factions were split. The big surprise, as has been noted, was the performance of Yulia Tymoshenko as opposed to Yushchenko. A tripartite Orange government is clearly the eventual solution; what will have to be resolved is the distribution of government posts and the government's overall goals. Yushchenko has failed to revive Ukraine's economy; this is the clear priority.
There was also an election in Israel, of course. In the Palestinian territories, the trend is clearly towards moderation within Hamas; reports coming out today suggest that Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas are preparing to talk about Hamas' acceptance of a two-state solution. The question is what empirical effects this has on the behavior of the organization, and what the long-term goals of Hamas are. International pressure has clearly been beneficial to the point and must be maintained even if Hamas accepts negotiations and recognizes Israel--but the pressure should be redirected toward creating more openness in the Palestinian political space.
The Israeli election was a severe rebuke to Binyamin Netanyahu, who is probably seeing his political career at an end, at least for the moment. He is facing an open revolt within his party led by former foreign minister Silvan Shalom. Of course, we've seen Netanyahu rebound before. The upcoming coalition will clearly be centered on Kadima and Avoda. Ha'aretz has indicated that Amir Peretz will take the defense portfolio in exchange for getting some veto rights on the budget and guarantees of social spending, and leave finance to Kadima. This is probably the politically smartest move as well. One of the biggest questions right now is whether Yisrael Beitenu will sit in the cabinet, and if so, whether they will remain in when Ehud Olmert's "convergence" begins.
The next major upcoming poll will be seen in Peru, where nationalist Ollanta Humala leads the polls but will have to face a second round. It's tough for me to lend support to anyone in this race, given that (1) Humala's commitment to democracy is very questionable, (2) Lourdes Flores is right-wing and very pro-business and (3) Alan García has a horrible track record from the late 1980s. Given that, I will support (passively, as always) whoever runs against Humala in the second round, as both Flores and García have indicated they will support the other. President Alejandro Toledo has been positive in this race, and has stressed ensuring a free and fair election--perhaps he hopes a smooth transition will be one of the few legacies he passes on, given his exceedingly low popularity ratings.
I'll be back shortly with more in-depth commentary on Evo Morales in Bolivia, the effects of proportional representation in Latin America, a look forward at the Mexican presidential election, the question of the Israeli electoral system, and comments on Vladimir Putin.
First, the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko can proudly point to the fact that these elections were basically free and fair. The results were also to be expected: the pro-Russian opposition was basically united behind Yanukovich, while the more European-leaning Orange factions were split. The big surprise, as has been noted, was the performance of Yulia Tymoshenko as opposed to Yushchenko. A tripartite Orange government is clearly the eventual solution; what will have to be resolved is the distribution of government posts and the government's overall goals. Yushchenko has failed to revive Ukraine's economy; this is the clear priority.
There was also an election in Israel, of course. In the Palestinian territories, the trend is clearly towards moderation within Hamas; reports coming out today suggest that Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas are preparing to talk about Hamas' acceptance of a two-state solution. The question is what empirical effects this has on the behavior of the organization, and what the long-term goals of Hamas are. International pressure has clearly been beneficial to the point and must be maintained even if Hamas accepts negotiations and recognizes Israel--but the pressure should be redirected toward creating more openness in the Palestinian political space.
The Israeli election was a severe rebuke to Binyamin Netanyahu, who is probably seeing his political career at an end, at least for the moment. He is facing an open revolt within his party led by former foreign minister Silvan Shalom. Of course, we've seen Netanyahu rebound before. The upcoming coalition will clearly be centered on Kadima and Avoda. Ha'aretz has indicated that Amir Peretz will take the defense portfolio in exchange for getting some veto rights on the budget and guarantees of social spending, and leave finance to Kadima. This is probably the politically smartest move as well. One of the biggest questions right now is whether Yisrael Beitenu will sit in the cabinet, and if so, whether they will remain in when Ehud Olmert's "convergence" begins.
The next major upcoming poll will be seen in Peru, where nationalist Ollanta Humala leads the polls but will have to face a second round. It's tough for me to lend support to anyone in this race, given that (1) Humala's commitment to democracy is very questionable, (2) Lourdes Flores is right-wing and very pro-business and (3) Alan García has a horrible track record from the late 1980s. Given that, I will support (passively, as always) whoever runs against Humala in the second round, as both Flores and García have indicated they will support the other. President Alejandro Toledo has been positive in this race, and has stressed ensuring a free and fair election--perhaps he hopes a smooth transition will be one of the few legacies he passes on, given his exceedingly low popularity ratings.
I'll be back shortly with more in-depth commentary on Evo Morales in Bolivia, the effects of proportional representation in Latin America, a look forward at the Mexican presidential election, the question of the Israeli electoral system, and comments on Vladimir Putin.
Monday, February 20, 2006
A rare digression to domestic politics
I am going to take a brief respite from my commentary about foreign politics to comment on the situation here in the United States, something which has never quite interested me as much in its minutiae but is, of course, of unquestionably greater relevance to my life personally.
With one party essentially in control of all the branches of government, we are seeing it fall to battles between various factions that make up its "coalition." The president, in his attempts to placate these groups, has failed to come with a coherent synthesis, and moreover, his installation of figures personally known to him have been ill-advised and corrupt (it's not the Harding administration, but a comparison with the 1920s isn't far off, especially in regard to our burgeoning inequality).
What we need is a government that works, not a government full of figures who engage in ideological posing. Unfortunately the system of governance that we have, because of its (1) lack of regulation [due to the framers' belief that the federal government would be very small] and (2) winner-take-all system results in unresponsive government.
It is time to create a group of centrist figures, capable of carrying out significant change. Such a change can be recognized as incorporating the following:
(1) A foreign policy aimed at supporting democracy (and realizing that it will not always go the way we want) while refraining from using American military power unless absolutely necessary;
(2) Maintaining a presence in Iraq until that country's government is stable or requests our withdrawal;
(3) Supporting significant reform in health care that incorporates the role of private enterprise while expanding guarantees of health care to the working poor, and lessening the burden on businesses;
(4) Repeal of the worst tax cuts (especially restoration of the estate tax), but not full reversion to the previous tax system; simplification of the tax code and elimination of many deductions;
(5) Continued educational reform and encouragement of experimentation to improve failing public schools, including greater teacher pay and accountability, without further promoting mass exit from the public system;
(6) Increasing the tax deductible amounts that can be invested in retirement plans, leveling of Social Security benefits, and increase in the amount that is subject to Social Security tax;
(7) Refusal to incorporate any group-specific clause as a constitutional amendment (i.e. no gay marriage amendment), while recognizing each state's right to decide the issue;
(8) Campaign finance reform that incorporates significant free advertising time for candidates;
(9) Government commitment to a national childcare benefit, one that does not rely on tax deductions which do not help the poor.
Clearly there is more that could be included, but these points form a solid base.
With one party essentially in control of all the branches of government, we are seeing it fall to battles between various factions that make up its "coalition." The president, in his attempts to placate these groups, has failed to come with a coherent synthesis, and moreover, his installation of figures personally known to him have been ill-advised and corrupt (it's not the Harding administration, but a comparison with the 1920s isn't far off, especially in regard to our burgeoning inequality).
What we need is a government that works, not a government full of figures who engage in ideological posing. Unfortunately the system of governance that we have, because of its (1) lack of regulation [due to the framers' belief that the federal government would be very small] and (2) winner-take-all system results in unresponsive government.
It is time to create a group of centrist figures, capable of carrying out significant change. Such a change can be recognized as incorporating the following:
(1) A foreign policy aimed at supporting democracy (and realizing that it will not always go the way we want) while refraining from using American military power unless absolutely necessary;
(2) Maintaining a presence in Iraq until that country's government is stable or requests our withdrawal;
(3) Supporting significant reform in health care that incorporates the role of private enterprise while expanding guarantees of health care to the working poor, and lessening the burden on businesses;
(4) Repeal of the worst tax cuts (especially restoration of the estate tax), but not full reversion to the previous tax system; simplification of the tax code and elimination of many deductions;
(5) Continued educational reform and encouragement of experimentation to improve failing public schools, including greater teacher pay and accountability, without further promoting mass exit from the public system;
(6) Increasing the tax deductible amounts that can be invested in retirement plans, leveling of Social Security benefits, and increase in the amount that is subject to Social Security tax;
(7) Refusal to incorporate any group-specific clause as a constitutional amendment (i.e. no gay marriage amendment), while recognizing each state's right to decide the issue;
(8) Campaign finance reform that incorporates significant free advertising time for candidates;
(9) Government commitment to a national childcare benefit, one that does not rely on tax deductions which do not help the poor.
Clearly there is more that could be included, but these points form a solid base.
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
We didn't mean to take democracy seriously
The New York Times yesterday reported that the Israeli and American governments were discussing something along the lines of "making life tougher for Palestinians", essentially as a punishment for electing Hamas. Sounds like a good plan, as always grounded in a solid perception of the Palestinian mindset.
[I would like to note that stories like this are frequently inaccurate or reflect the opinion of a certain segment, and don't end up influencing policy. I actually don't expect this as reported to fully become policy--generally the administration has been smarter than that. That's not to say that it won't become partly true.]
Let's see... Palestinians elected Hamas because they are irritated that Fatah was not able to make any progress and their living conditions are deteriorating as a result of Israeli action... so let's screw them over some more so that they reelect Fatah, who we would rather work with, thereby invalidating democracy, instead of doing anything to help Palestinians, boost civil society and increase the sway of alternative liberal and moderate left-nationalist groups that support democracy. Makes sense, in the whole picture of things.
But really, this is the same dilemma which continues to bite the U.S. The key is to strike the necessary bargain with Islamist groups, recognizing their authority and allowing them their turn, as long as they agree to participate in a democratic system. (The Palestinian territories present a more complicated situation, of course, given the lack of sovereignty coupled with mutual violence). Doing this incrementally, and increasing assistance as an Islamic party proves its commitment, is the best way to go.
Of course, as widely noted, this problem is the result of our past support for secular dictators, Saddam, the emirs, King Hussein, Mubarak, and so forth... and the strategy of cracking down on the secular pro-democracy opposition is a failed one. The question is whether American foreign policy will finally realize, as it should have at the beginning of the process, that democratization will lead to Islamist victories and act accordingly to encourage the maintenance of a intrasocietal dialogue and consensual institution building.
Doesn't really need a comment, but of course, Putin's invitation to Hamas is purely opportunistic and an attempt to reinsert himself in the process. Yep, Hamas is a terrorist group that won a democratic election. So are the Chechen rebels, who aren't worse than Hamas (and neither is the Israeli army particularly worse than the Russian army in terms of behavior). And the French backing for Putin was, of course, realpolitik as well. Not that anyone really acts differently, all talk of liberalism aside.
So what will actually happen with Hamas? Well, as I previously commented, little dialogue was occurring between the PA and Israel anyway. Any progress will wait until the new Knesset is in place and the composition of the Israeli government determined. At that point... well, there will still probably not be progress, although we will probably continue to see backchannel communication.
[I would like to note that stories like this are frequently inaccurate or reflect the opinion of a certain segment, and don't end up influencing policy. I actually don't expect this as reported to fully become policy--generally the administration has been smarter than that. That's not to say that it won't become partly true.]
Let's see... Palestinians elected Hamas because they are irritated that Fatah was not able to make any progress and their living conditions are deteriorating as a result of Israeli action... so let's screw them over some more so that they reelect Fatah, who we would rather work with, thereby invalidating democracy, instead of doing anything to help Palestinians, boost civil society and increase the sway of alternative liberal and moderate left-nationalist groups that support democracy. Makes sense, in the whole picture of things.
But really, this is the same dilemma which continues to bite the U.S. The key is to strike the necessary bargain with Islamist groups, recognizing their authority and allowing them their turn, as long as they agree to participate in a democratic system. (The Palestinian territories present a more complicated situation, of course, given the lack of sovereignty coupled with mutual violence). Doing this incrementally, and increasing assistance as an Islamic party proves its commitment, is the best way to go.
Of course, as widely noted, this problem is the result of our past support for secular dictators, Saddam, the emirs, King Hussein, Mubarak, and so forth... and the strategy of cracking down on the secular pro-democracy opposition is a failed one. The question is whether American foreign policy will finally realize, as it should have at the beginning of the process, that democratization will lead to Islamist victories and act accordingly to encourage the maintenance of a intrasocietal dialogue and consensual institution building.
Doesn't really need a comment, but of course, Putin's invitation to Hamas is purely opportunistic and an attempt to reinsert himself in the process. Yep, Hamas is a terrorist group that won a democratic election. So are the Chechen rebels, who aren't worse than Hamas (and neither is the Israeli army particularly worse than the Russian army in terms of behavior). And the French backing for Putin was, of course, realpolitik as well. Not that anyone really acts differently, all talk of liberalism aside.
So what will actually happen with Hamas? Well, as I previously commented, little dialogue was occurring between the PA and Israel anyway. Any progress will wait until the new Knesset is in place and the composition of the Israeli government determined. At that point... well, there will still probably not be progress, although we will probably continue to see backchannel communication.
Tuesday, January 31, 2006
"A change of government, not a change of country"
As the Canadian results were coming in I was watching CBC, and saw Martin, then Layton, then Harper speak. The new PM, Stephen Harper, will have a tough time in Ottawa, if only because the only practical party for him to work with is the secessionist Bloc Québécois. It is easy to see the BQ and CPC agreeing for a few months on devolution and more provincial authority, but hard to see agreement on any more substantial issues.
The CPC victory was in large part made possible by the refound ability of the Conservatives to win votes in Quebec. As late as six weeks ago I felt it might be a good idea for the CPC to have an "affiliate party" in Quebec and thought the CPC might never win votes there. Now we have a CPC which won 10 seats and a solid 25% of the vote in Quebec.
Meanwhile, this election is a big loss for the Bloc, which fell only to 51 seats, but took only 42% of the vote and was outvoted by the two big federalist parties (Lib + Con), who combined took 45%. Gilles Duceppe began the campaign hoping to convince the general public that a majority vote for the Bloc--much of which would have been a protest vote against the Liberals--would mean some sort of implied majority for secession. By the end, the Bloc had lost seats, as Québécois finally have another national option, and they realize that continually sitting in Opposition is not particularly productive for Quebec or Canada.
Ironically, the long-term best option for the Bloc might be to endorse a change to proportional representation. This would allow the Bloc to possibly hold the balance of power in coalition governments. On the other hand, if the current FPP system is maintained, the likelihood is that the Bloc will be squeezed out by the two big national parties, although they admittedly will have to make some concessions to public opinion in Quebec.
It seems likely the Harper government won't last two years; there is too much working against it. The Liberals will have no reason to cooperate with Harper and will instead constitute a revitalized opposition. The NDP does not hold the balance of power, unless Bloc deputies defect to the Conservatives (or Stronach crosses in reverse), and anyway is ideologically millions of miles from the Tories. The Bloc is not a stable partner for the CPC. Therefore, Harper's government will last until the point when Parliament breaks down and everyone feels the public will accept another early election without too much grumbling. Maybe another 18 months?
The CPC victory was in large part made possible by the refound ability of the Conservatives to win votes in Quebec. As late as six weeks ago I felt it might be a good idea for the CPC to have an "affiliate party" in Quebec and thought the CPC might never win votes there. Now we have a CPC which won 10 seats and a solid 25% of the vote in Quebec.
Meanwhile, this election is a big loss for the Bloc, which fell only to 51 seats, but took only 42% of the vote and was outvoted by the two big federalist parties (Lib + Con), who combined took 45%. Gilles Duceppe began the campaign hoping to convince the general public that a majority vote for the Bloc--much of which would have been a protest vote against the Liberals--would mean some sort of implied majority for secession. By the end, the Bloc had lost seats, as Québécois finally have another national option, and they realize that continually sitting in Opposition is not particularly productive for Quebec or Canada.
Ironically, the long-term best option for the Bloc might be to endorse a change to proportional representation. This would allow the Bloc to possibly hold the balance of power in coalition governments. On the other hand, if the current FPP system is maintained, the likelihood is that the Bloc will be squeezed out by the two big national parties, although they admittedly will have to make some concessions to public opinion in Quebec.
It seems likely the Harper government won't last two years; there is too much working against it. The Liberals will have no reason to cooperate with Harper and will instead constitute a revitalized opposition. The NDP does not hold the balance of power, unless Bloc deputies defect to the Conservatives (or Stronach crosses in reverse), and anyway is ideologically millions of miles from the Tories. The Bloc is not a stable partner for the CPC. Therefore, Harper's government will last until the point when Parliament breaks down and everyone feels the public will accept another early election without too much grumbling. Maybe another 18 months?
Anders Fogh has it right...
It's not common practice for me to defend the actions of a figure of the center-right, but this is a situation where I will go out and do so. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen is absolutely right to refuse to make any sort of apology for the cartoons appearing in Jyllands-Posten that have, apparently, offended Muslims worldwide.
Of course this is entirely a political issue, with Islamic governments playing the "pity card." I say Islamic governments because I certainly don't blame all Muslims for this issue... it's part of governments' search for backing among the religious citizenry. So Libya and the Saudis will withdraw their ambassadors from Copenhagen... fine. So what? It's not the job of the Danish government to apologize. What happens when "offensive" caricatures appear in Saudi or other Arab or Muslim-world newspapers? I certainly don't see a lot of apologies from Arab/Muslim governments... check out Alhamedi's Religious Policeman blog for some examples of wonderful drawings from KSA.
Social democracy includes the value of freedom of speech. If you're offended by it, tough... showing Mohammed depicted as a terrorist is not a threat to anyone, and there's no reason why any rational person should get anything more than momentarily upset. Of course it's against the tenets of Islam. But there are plenty of things that occur everywhere, every day, that violate the tenets of something, and if everyone got angry about them, then where would we be? (probably in a strict Islamic country, or possibly in Israel/Palestine, or in a PETA meeting, or the Republican National Convention).
Finally, the actions of al-Aqsa Brigades in storming the EU mission to Gaza are totally uncalled for. The EU has been nothing but helpful to the Palestinian cause of late, and while the Europeans certainly could be more assertive, armed threats don't seem to be the proper response. It's a good illustration of the total lack of control in the Territories that, just maybe, Hamas will start to do something about now.
The worthless apology
I think it's briefly worth mentioning that the antithesis of the Danish approach is taken by Pat Robertson, who goes out of his way to offend pretty much anyone and get in the news with statements such as: we deserved Hurricane Katrina; Ariel Sharon got his stroke for leaving Gaza; the U.S. should assassinate Hugo Chavez; and so forth. And then he apologizes. And then he makes another comment.
Does this help anyone? Maybe Pat Robertson, who stays in the news a bit longer due to his apology...
But it certainly is not Anders Fogh's job to apologize for having a free press, and he deserves credit for, so far at least, standing at its defense.
Of course this is entirely a political issue, with Islamic governments playing the "pity card." I say Islamic governments because I certainly don't blame all Muslims for this issue... it's part of governments' search for backing among the religious citizenry. So Libya and the Saudis will withdraw their ambassadors from Copenhagen... fine. So what? It's not the job of the Danish government to apologize. What happens when "offensive" caricatures appear in Saudi or other Arab or Muslim-world newspapers? I certainly don't see a lot of apologies from Arab/Muslim governments... check out Alhamedi's Religious Policeman blog for some examples of wonderful drawings from KSA.
Social democracy includes the value of freedom of speech. If you're offended by it, tough... showing Mohammed depicted as a terrorist is not a threat to anyone, and there's no reason why any rational person should get anything more than momentarily upset. Of course it's against the tenets of Islam. But there are plenty of things that occur everywhere, every day, that violate the tenets of something, and if everyone got angry about them, then where would we be? (probably in a strict Islamic country, or possibly in Israel/Palestine, or in a PETA meeting, or the Republican National Convention).
Finally, the actions of al-Aqsa Brigades in storming the EU mission to Gaza are totally uncalled for. The EU has been nothing but helpful to the Palestinian cause of late, and while the Europeans certainly could be more assertive, armed threats don't seem to be the proper response. It's a good illustration of the total lack of control in the Territories that, just maybe, Hamas will start to do something about now.
The worthless apology
I think it's briefly worth mentioning that the antithesis of the Danish approach is taken by Pat Robertson, who goes out of his way to offend pretty much anyone and get in the news with statements such as: we deserved Hurricane Katrina; Ariel Sharon got his stroke for leaving Gaza; the U.S. should assassinate Hugo Chavez; and so forth. And then he apologizes. And then he makes another comment.
Does this help anyone? Maybe Pat Robertson, who stays in the news a bit longer due to his apology...
But it certainly is not Anders Fogh's job to apologize for having a free press, and he deserves credit for, so far at least, standing at its defense.
Friday, January 27, 2006
It's not as dramatic as you think it is...
Of course, everyone who followed the Palestinian elections is erupting about Hamas this and Hamas that and how the Hamas victory changes everything and kills the peace process, or how it exposes the true Palestinian desire to destroy Israel, or just how it was so stunning and overwhelming.
It's really not any of those things, though it's easy to think that way.
Here's the breakdown:
(1) Hamas won so big because of the PA electoral system, not because it actually won big. The method of election to the PLC involved 66 constituency seats and 66 proportional representation list seats. The constituency seats were divided into multi-member districts, from a size of one (Jericho, Tubas, Salfit) to nine (Hebron); the PR seats were divided based on an overall ballot.
This system was a major improvement on the previous system, which used only the constituency method; however, it still was meant to favor Fatah, the governing party. Since each voter had as many constituency votes as seats, most voters wound up (predictably) voting for all the members of a single slate. The top vote getters were elected, irrespective of percentage obtained. Therefore, this system functions in many respects like a first-past-the-post majoritarian system.
Fatah had, of course, intended that it would receive a narrow majority. Unexpectedly, the opposite occurred, resulting in the following results in the constituencies: [these are preliminary results]
Change and Reform [Hamas], 46 seats (but only 42.9% of the party list vote)
Fatah, 16 seats (but received 39.8% of the party list vote)
independents, 4 seats
The proportional seats, divided according to the party list vote, were much closer, and several small leftist/secular trends won seats: Mustafa Barghouthi's Independent Palestine, the Third Way of Hanan Ashrawi and Salam Fayyad, and the leftist PPP/DFLP/etc coalition took 6 seats on 7.7% of the vote (again a preliminary figure). The overall Hamas majority, however, occurred because half the seats were selected in a system heavily favoring parties winning by a small margin.
(2) Hamas' victory doesn't mean that Palestinians want to abandon the idea of the peace process, or that they are suddenly Islamists. What it does mean is that (a) they didn't think the peace process was yielding any gains that a Hamas victory would reverse, and (b) they saw Hamas (Hamas succeeded at portraying itself) as the only "clean" party with a viable chance of winning. It doesn't mean they support all of Hamas' ideas about Islamic law or believe that erasing Israel from the map is a reasonable political goal (I won't venture a guess on "desirable" as I don't know the numbers).
(3) Hamas' victory isn't all that relevant, because the PA isn't all that relevant. Israel has basically destroyed any capacity the PA once had to administrate in the West Bank. As Israel controls all the levers of power, including control over travel between population centers, and is working unilaterally and not dealing with the PA regardless, nothing really changes. The PA cannot do anything except attempt to administer cities and prevent Palestinians from backlashing against their desperate situation. The Hamas victory does not change this.
With regard to Gaza, the one place where the PA might have a chance of actually administering something, Hamas already had effective control. There is no change.
Perhaps this victory will place the focus back where it belongs: on the Palestinian liberation movement as a whole. During the past 12 years the refugees abroad have become increasingly ignored, though they deserve a voice in the process alongside their brothers in the 1948 and 1967 territories ["1948 territories" is a common Palestinian euphemism for Israel]; and perhaps there will be a voice again for those who have been marginalized by the emergence of the autonomist administration. For a few years now I have advocated the dissolution of the PA as a protest against Israel's refusal to allow it any semblance of authority, and Israel's continued use of the body as a scapegoat; and perhaps now the PA can appropriately fade away.
What will happen now? Israel will not, publicly, work with a Hamas which is, publicly, committed to its destruction. The best-case scenario, though, is that the people behind Hamas are pragmatic and act as the Likud of Begin, the people in power in Israel (Olmert and his crew) are pragmatic and will talk to them behind the scenes, Hamas is actually able to assert authority in the territories in a way Fatah could not in recent days, and the groups can work out a settlement.
This is, of course, Israel/Palestine, where best case is never reality. I cannot hazard a guess as to what the ultimate outcome will be, but I will predict: (a) Hamas will form a "government" [of nothing] with smaller factions but not with Fatah; (b) Abbas will continue as president; (c) publicly no negotiations will take place, but back channel discussions will occur.
It's really not any of those things, though it's easy to think that way.
Here's the breakdown:
(1) Hamas won so big because of the PA electoral system, not because it actually won big. The method of election to the PLC involved 66 constituency seats and 66 proportional representation list seats. The constituency seats were divided into multi-member districts, from a size of one (Jericho, Tubas, Salfit) to nine (Hebron); the PR seats were divided based on an overall ballot.
This system was a major improvement on the previous system, which used only the constituency method; however, it still was meant to favor Fatah, the governing party. Since each voter had as many constituency votes as seats, most voters wound up (predictably) voting for all the members of a single slate. The top vote getters were elected, irrespective of percentage obtained. Therefore, this system functions in many respects like a first-past-the-post majoritarian system.
Fatah had, of course, intended that it would receive a narrow majority. Unexpectedly, the opposite occurred, resulting in the following results in the constituencies: [these are preliminary results]
Change and Reform [Hamas], 46 seats (but only 42.9% of the party list vote)
Fatah, 16 seats (but received 39.8% of the party list vote)
independents, 4 seats
The proportional seats, divided according to the party list vote, were much closer, and several small leftist/secular trends won seats: Mustafa Barghouthi's Independent Palestine, the Third Way of Hanan Ashrawi and Salam Fayyad, and the leftist PPP/DFLP/etc coalition took 6 seats on 7.7% of the vote (again a preliminary figure). The overall Hamas majority, however, occurred because half the seats were selected in a system heavily favoring parties winning by a small margin.
(2) Hamas' victory doesn't mean that Palestinians want to abandon the idea of the peace process, or that they are suddenly Islamists. What it does mean is that (a) they didn't think the peace process was yielding any gains that a Hamas victory would reverse, and (b) they saw Hamas (Hamas succeeded at portraying itself) as the only "clean" party with a viable chance of winning. It doesn't mean they support all of Hamas' ideas about Islamic law or believe that erasing Israel from the map is a reasonable political goal (I won't venture a guess on "desirable" as I don't know the numbers).
(3) Hamas' victory isn't all that relevant, because the PA isn't all that relevant. Israel has basically destroyed any capacity the PA once had to administrate in the West Bank. As Israel controls all the levers of power, including control over travel between population centers, and is working unilaterally and not dealing with the PA regardless, nothing really changes. The PA cannot do anything except attempt to administer cities and prevent Palestinians from backlashing against their desperate situation. The Hamas victory does not change this.
With regard to Gaza, the one place where the PA might have a chance of actually administering something, Hamas already had effective control. There is no change.
Perhaps this victory will place the focus back where it belongs: on the Palestinian liberation movement as a whole. During the past 12 years the refugees abroad have become increasingly ignored, though they deserve a voice in the process alongside their brothers in the 1948 and 1967 territories ["1948 territories" is a common Palestinian euphemism for Israel]; and perhaps there will be a voice again for those who have been marginalized by the emergence of the autonomist administration. For a few years now I have advocated the dissolution of the PA as a protest against Israel's refusal to allow it any semblance of authority, and Israel's continued use of the body as a scapegoat; and perhaps now the PA can appropriately fade away.
What will happen now? Israel will not, publicly, work with a Hamas which is, publicly, committed to its destruction. The best-case scenario, though, is that the people behind Hamas are pragmatic and act as the Likud of Begin, the people in power in Israel (Olmert and his crew) are pragmatic and will talk to them behind the scenes, Hamas is actually able to assert authority in the territories in a way Fatah could not in recent days, and the groups can work out a settlement.
This is, of course, Israel/Palestine, where best case is never reality. I cannot hazard a guess as to what the ultimate outcome will be, but I will predict: (a) Hamas will form a "government" [of nothing] with smaller factions but not with Fatah; (b) Abbas will continue as president; (c) publicly no negotiations will take place, but back channel discussions will occur.
Sunday, January 22, 2006
A workable two-state solution
In this blog in the past I have commented on the desirability of the "binational solution." It would be useful to note that such a solution is not favored, as a large majority both of Israelis and Palestinians desire their own states. However, my argument has been predicated on the inevitability of such a solution given the lack of political mobility on both sides and the demographic situation which prevails in the Occupied Territories as well as within Israel itself.
But there is another possibility: a workable two-state solution that recognizes the existence of Israel/Palestine as one land under two political leaderships. This is a two-state solution that stresses working and living together on the land while recognizing the right of each group to self determination within national boundaries.
As such, the principal tenets of such a solution would be:
*The agreement on final borders. Palestine includes the West Bank and Gaza (with East Jerusalem), excluding settlement blocs on the borders which are annexed to Israel. However, Arab areas north of the West Bank, including Nazareth, are annexed to Palestine. Certain areas deep within Palestinian territory are put on long-term sovereign lease to Israel (including Ariel, Ma'ale Adumim, and Qiryat Arba). The two parts of Palestine have a transportation connection.
*The agreement on security. Palestine agrees not to have a navy or air force, and an army of limited size for a certain period. Additionally, a transitional period will take place, under international supervision and with a peacekeeping force stationed in Palestine, to ensure stability.
*The agreement on refugees, return and citizenship. Everyone who is an Israeli citizen in areas coming under Palestinian control has the option of citizenship in Palestine or permanent residency while retaining Israeli citizenship; the opposite is true of Palestinians in areas coming under Israeli rule. Palestinian refugees born before 1948 may return to Israel as permanent residents (not citizens), but not with any descendants. All Palestinian refugees may return to Palestine as defined under Palestinian law. [However, right to live in Israel for all Palestinians as noncitizens is contemplated below, in a longer-term scope.]
*The agreement on Jerusalem. While Jerusalem is under two sovereignties, there is a Jerusalem Municipal Authority with representatives of the two municipal administrations to coordinate urban planning, and freedom of movement within the city.
*The agreement on holy places. Holy places are administered by the most appropriate religious authority, and open access is guaranteed both to residents of both countries and to pilgrims.
*"One land for two peoples". In places of "one country for two peoples," there is "one land." Split political sovereignty, but shared land. In that spirit, the long term goal of the agreement is to allow citizens of either Israel or Palestine to have permanent residency rights in the other, much like the European Union today. Such a goal is dependent upon improvement in economic conditions in Palestine, which will help with the other necessity, an improvement in the security situation. This end goal does not mean that citizenship and political rights will be obtained by one group in the other's country, but it means that a Jew can live in Hebron or Jerusalem or Nazareth or Tel Aviv or wherever, and a Palestinian Arab can live in Ramallah or Jaffa or Acre or Gaza or Safed... while preserving the separate political identity and statehood of each, in a piece of territory that really is too small to divide with walls and barriers.
Such an agreement would require daring on the part of both political leaderships, but if they wish to avoid being caught in the one-state solution, would be the best step. We have seen that "trust-building" steps always break down on the demands of one political constituency or another. What is needed is a bold initiative on the part of Olmert and Abbas to reach a permanent status agreement that will unite, rather than divide, the land, and tear down barriers rather than erect new ones.
But there is another possibility: a workable two-state solution that recognizes the existence of Israel/Palestine as one land under two political leaderships. This is a two-state solution that stresses working and living together on the land while recognizing the right of each group to self determination within national boundaries.
As such, the principal tenets of such a solution would be:
*The agreement on final borders. Palestine includes the West Bank and Gaza (with East Jerusalem), excluding settlement blocs on the borders which are annexed to Israel. However, Arab areas north of the West Bank, including Nazareth, are annexed to Palestine. Certain areas deep within Palestinian territory are put on long-term sovereign lease to Israel (including Ariel, Ma'ale Adumim, and Qiryat Arba). The two parts of Palestine have a transportation connection.
*The agreement on security. Palestine agrees not to have a navy or air force, and an army of limited size for a certain period. Additionally, a transitional period will take place, under international supervision and with a peacekeeping force stationed in Palestine, to ensure stability.
*The agreement on refugees, return and citizenship. Everyone who is an Israeli citizen in areas coming under Palestinian control has the option of citizenship in Palestine or permanent residency while retaining Israeli citizenship; the opposite is true of Palestinians in areas coming under Israeli rule. Palestinian refugees born before 1948 may return to Israel as permanent residents (not citizens), but not with any descendants. All Palestinian refugees may return to Palestine as defined under Palestinian law. [However, right to live in Israel for all Palestinians as noncitizens is contemplated below, in a longer-term scope.]
*The agreement on Jerusalem. While Jerusalem is under two sovereignties, there is a Jerusalem Municipal Authority with representatives of the two municipal administrations to coordinate urban planning, and freedom of movement within the city.
*The agreement on holy places. Holy places are administered by the most appropriate religious authority, and open access is guaranteed both to residents of both countries and to pilgrims.
*"One land for two peoples". In places of "one country for two peoples," there is "one land." Split political sovereignty, but shared land. In that spirit, the long term goal of the agreement is to allow citizens of either Israel or Palestine to have permanent residency rights in the other, much like the European Union today. Such a goal is dependent upon improvement in economic conditions in Palestine, which will help with the other necessity, an improvement in the security situation. This end goal does not mean that citizenship and political rights will be obtained by one group in the other's country, but it means that a Jew can live in Hebron or Jerusalem or Nazareth or Tel Aviv or wherever, and a Palestinian Arab can live in Ramallah or Jaffa or Acre or Gaza or Safed... while preserving the separate political identity and statehood of each, in a piece of territory that really is too small to divide with walls and barriers.
Such an agreement would require daring on the part of both political leaderships, but if they wish to avoid being caught in the one-state solution, would be the best step. We have seen that "trust-building" steps always break down on the demands of one political constituency or another. What is needed is a bold initiative on the part of Olmert and Abbas to reach a permanent status agreement that will unite, rather than divide, the land, and tear down barriers rather than erect new ones.
Saturday, January 21, 2006
The Middle East... and Canada.
Well, a lot has gone on in the world since I last posted, obviously. I'm going to go around and post about the biggest issues I see going on today.
First, I must admit that I'm impressed by how Evo Morales has handled his victory in Bolivia thus far. I somewhat regret my earlier, however reulctant, support for Quiroga (which was due to risk-averse assessments) and I'm hopeful for Morales, that he can turn Bolivia around and empower the indigenous majority, helping to create a truly democratic state.
Israel/Palestine
With Ariel Sharon out of the picture, Olmert looks like he is capitalizing on the resulting support that has remained with Kadima. He is maneuvering politically and has announced that he will withdraw from a number of outposts. I view Olmert, at this point, as a pragmatist. While Peretz has openly announced that his government will consider making Arab parts of East Jerusalem part of a Palestinian state, Olmert has not done so, but his comments (allowing a Palestinian 'presence' in East Jerusalem) point to much the same conclusion.
What must be attained, if the two-state solution is to succeed, is a two-state solution built on the eventual vision of free movement between Israel and Palestine. That is, Israel and Palestine are really one; they are the same country, held by two different peoples and nations with their own states; but they are the same land. The vision must be an Israel and Palestine where, though parts are governed by separate entities, there is free movement, free access to holy places, the right to live wherever one wishes. That is, a Palestinian could choose to reside for however long he wants in Jaffa, or Be'er Sheva, or West Jerusalem, or Safed, and so on. An Israeli could choose to reside in Hebron, Jericho, Nablus, wherever. The point is that the land belongs to all.
This vision does not entail flexible citizenship. That is to say, Palestinians are citizens of Palestine, and vote for its leadership; Israelis are citizens of Israel, and vote for its leadership. But anyone should, in the end, be able to reside anywhere within the territory of Israel and Palestine, because it truly is one land.
That said, this vision cannot be implemented immediately, first, obviously due to security concerns, and second, the economic gap. Palestine must catch up economically if the relationship is not to be an exploitative one. And of course, there must be agreement on the general issues of borders, security, and all that. But I will come to that in due course, in a separate entry.
What seems likely in the Palestinian elections is that Hamas will win a large faction in parliament; Fatah will win slightly more seats; and other factions will fill in the gap. I would see Fatah continuing to form the government, and the other factions siding with Hamas or Fatah as the case may be, on an issue-by-issue basis. The peace process will have to wait until Israel votes, although one can make the assumption that the Palestinians will be dealing with Ehud Olmert, a pragmatist like Sharon, probably in coalition with Labor.
Iraq
The results of the elections have just been released. I have to say that I certainly believe the strong showing of the UIA was assisted by compulsion of various types in the southern provinces, but also, it is an inevitable outcome of the power struggle in Iraq. Those wishing to uphold the rights of the Shia, who were still worried about Sunni dominance, had difficulty voting for Allawi, and we are seeing in Kurdistan the cartelization of power by the KDP and PUK instead of competition, with the Islamists the only alternative.
We must hope for a unity government; although such a government certainly holds out plenty of opportunities for corruption, so, honestly, does any government formed at the present moment, and it would be better to have the Sunni in government.
When will Iraqis begin to vote by political platform? When substantial agreement on the bases of the state has been attained. When will that be? Who knows. But there must be substantial compromise in order to see the salience of ethnic/religious cleavages reduced.
Canada
The Canadian elections are approaching shortly and I'm ready, of course, to watch the CBC coverage all night. The polls all show the Conservatives headed for a landmark victory that would make Stephen Harper the prime minister; the question is whether Harper will be able to form a government, as he'll certainly have to cut a deal with somebody if he doesn't get a majority.
A majority still seems unlikely, therefore, Harper will have to deal with the Liberals, Bloc, or NDP. The least likely scenario would be Harper and the Liberals, as the Liberals would likely prefer time to revitalize in opposition. Harper and the Bloc seems far-fetched, but might actually be the most likely, if they can reach agreement on some details of greater provincial control over various issues. The CPC and NDP are separated quite a bit on most major issues, except, at this point, on some gun control and crime issues, and it seems unlikely that agreement could be reached on much unless the CPC abandons substantial parts of its (already moderated) platform.
I, of course, endorse wholeheartedly the New Democratic Party of Jack Layton. The NDP is committed to defending Canada's Medicare system, and is looking toward electoral reform, an issue that I support, for those who don't know me. None of the parties have impressed me greatly, but the NDP is much more ideologically coherent than the diverse and somewhat opportunistic Liberal camp; and the NDP will be capable of providing a strong counterpoint to the Conservatives in Parliament. Hopefully, we can see a scenario where the NDP will play a kingmaker role in Ottawa.
As a final note, there are some interesting sites linked to by the CBC which project seats either based on poll numbers or as based on a trading market. Especially interesting is the UBC election stock market. The link to the links page is below:
http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes/voterstoolkit/projecting.html
First, I must admit that I'm impressed by how Evo Morales has handled his victory in Bolivia thus far. I somewhat regret my earlier, however reulctant, support for Quiroga (which was due to risk-averse assessments) and I'm hopeful for Morales, that he can turn Bolivia around and empower the indigenous majority, helping to create a truly democratic state.
Israel/Palestine
With Ariel Sharon out of the picture, Olmert looks like he is capitalizing on the resulting support that has remained with Kadima. He is maneuvering politically and has announced that he will withdraw from a number of outposts. I view Olmert, at this point, as a pragmatist. While Peretz has openly announced that his government will consider making Arab parts of East Jerusalem part of a Palestinian state, Olmert has not done so, but his comments (allowing a Palestinian 'presence' in East Jerusalem) point to much the same conclusion.
What must be attained, if the two-state solution is to succeed, is a two-state solution built on the eventual vision of free movement between Israel and Palestine. That is, Israel and Palestine are really one; they are the same country, held by two different peoples and nations with their own states; but they are the same land. The vision must be an Israel and Palestine where, though parts are governed by separate entities, there is free movement, free access to holy places, the right to live wherever one wishes. That is, a Palestinian could choose to reside for however long he wants in Jaffa, or Be'er Sheva, or West Jerusalem, or Safed, and so on. An Israeli could choose to reside in Hebron, Jericho, Nablus, wherever. The point is that the land belongs to all.
This vision does not entail flexible citizenship. That is to say, Palestinians are citizens of Palestine, and vote for its leadership; Israelis are citizens of Israel, and vote for its leadership. But anyone should, in the end, be able to reside anywhere within the territory of Israel and Palestine, because it truly is one land.
That said, this vision cannot be implemented immediately, first, obviously due to security concerns, and second, the economic gap. Palestine must catch up economically if the relationship is not to be an exploitative one. And of course, there must be agreement on the general issues of borders, security, and all that. But I will come to that in due course, in a separate entry.
What seems likely in the Palestinian elections is that Hamas will win a large faction in parliament; Fatah will win slightly more seats; and other factions will fill in the gap. I would see Fatah continuing to form the government, and the other factions siding with Hamas or Fatah as the case may be, on an issue-by-issue basis. The peace process will have to wait until Israel votes, although one can make the assumption that the Palestinians will be dealing with Ehud Olmert, a pragmatist like Sharon, probably in coalition with Labor.
Iraq
The results of the elections have just been released. I have to say that I certainly believe the strong showing of the UIA was assisted by compulsion of various types in the southern provinces, but also, it is an inevitable outcome of the power struggle in Iraq. Those wishing to uphold the rights of the Shia, who were still worried about Sunni dominance, had difficulty voting for Allawi, and we are seeing in Kurdistan the cartelization of power by the KDP and PUK instead of competition, with the Islamists the only alternative.
We must hope for a unity government; although such a government certainly holds out plenty of opportunities for corruption, so, honestly, does any government formed at the present moment, and it would be better to have the Sunni in government.
When will Iraqis begin to vote by political platform? When substantial agreement on the bases of the state has been attained. When will that be? Who knows. But there must be substantial compromise in order to see the salience of ethnic/religious cleavages reduced.
Canada
The Canadian elections are approaching shortly and I'm ready, of course, to watch the CBC coverage all night. The polls all show the Conservatives headed for a landmark victory that would make Stephen Harper the prime minister; the question is whether Harper will be able to form a government, as he'll certainly have to cut a deal with somebody if he doesn't get a majority.
A majority still seems unlikely, therefore, Harper will have to deal with the Liberals, Bloc, or NDP. The least likely scenario would be Harper and the Liberals, as the Liberals would likely prefer time to revitalize in opposition. Harper and the Bloc seems far-fetched, but might actually be the most likely, if they can reach agreement on some details of greater provincial control over various issues. The CPC and NDP are separated quite a bit on most major issues, except, at this point, on some gun control and crime issues, and it seems unlikely that agreement could be reached on much unless the CPC abandons substantial parts of its (already moderated) platform.
I, of course, endorse wholeheartedly the New Democratic Party of Jack Layton. The NDP is committed to defending Canada's Medicare system, and is looking toward electoral reform, an issue that I support, for those who don't know me. None of the parties have impressed me greatly, but the NDP is much more ideologically coherent than the diverse and somewhat opportunistic Liberal camp; and the NDP will be capable of providing a strong counterpoint to the Conservatives in Parliament. Hopefully, we can see a scenario where the NDP will play a kingmaker role in Ottawa.
As a final note, there are some interesting sites linked to by the CBC which project seats either based on poll numbers or as based on a trading market. Especially interesting is the UBC election stock market. The link to the links page is below:
http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes/voterstoolkit/projecting.html
Sunday, December 18, 2005
Queremos más
Tomorrow marks Bolivia's elections, the first time Bolivia has elected prefectos (the heads of the provinces) in addition to the national congress and president. The presidential election itself pits two diametrically opposed candidates against each other: Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga of the right-leaning Podemos (Democratic and Social Power) party, and Evo Morales of the MAS (Movement toward Socialism). There could hardly be a bigger contrast between Quiroga, who is Harvard-educated, has an American wife and was vice-president for the conservative president and ex-military leader Hugo Bánzer, and Morales, an indigenous anti-U.S. leader who advocates liberalization of coca growing and is backed by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.
This is a tough election for me in terms of who to sympathize with. Quiroga and Morales are clearly the two leading candidates, and one of them will be chosen president by the new congress, since neither will take 50% of the vote. This means the results of the congressional elections are also important. Despite my sympathies with the Left and the alienation of the indigenous population, I am going to prove myself to be one of the right-leaning social democrats and endorse Tuto Quiroga, who I believe has the expertise necessary to lead Bolivia to a more cohesive development strategy and constitutional reform with the constituent assembly in 2006. I am unimpressed by Morales' rhetoric, his refusal to debate other candidates and the lack of clarity in the MAS platform.
In Chile, as was expected, the Concertación candidate Michelle Bachelet was unable to reach 50% of the vote and the election will go to a runoff between Bachelet and the moderate-right wealthy businessman Sebastián Piñera. This election is not as divisive, and it is easy for me to come out for Michelle Bachelet, although I am unhappy that Bachelet and the coalition have decided to press electoral reform at this moment, when it seems like little more than a means to divide the opposition Alianza. The Bachelet slogan is "más" ... more of the Concertación, which has governed Chile for 16 years. But under Chile's two-bloc system, the Left remains the best choice.
Later, comments on Canada's prime ministerial debate, and more...
This is a tough election for me in terms of who to sympathize with. Quiroga and Morales are clearly the two leading candidates, and one of them will be chosen president by the new congress, since neither will take 50% of the vote. This means the results of the congressional elections are also important. Despite my sympathies with the Left and the alienation of the indigenous population, I am going to prove myself to be one of the right-leaning social democrats and endorse Tuto Quiroga, who I believe has the expertise necessary to lead Bolivia to a more cohesive development strategy and constitutional reform with the constituent assembly in 2006. I am unimpressed by Morales' rhetoric, his refusal to debate other candidates and the lack of clarity in the MAS platform.
In Chile, as was expected, the Concertación candidate Michelle Bachelet was unable to reach 50% of the vote and the election will go to a runoff between Bachelet and the moderate-right wealthy businessman Sebastián Piñera. This election is not as divisive, and it is easy for me to come out for Michelle Bachelet, although I am unhappy that Bachelet and the coalition have decided to press electoral reform at this moment, when it seems like little more than a means to divide the opposition Alianza. The Bachelet slogan is "más" ... more of the Concertación, which has governed Chile for 16 years. But under Chile's two-bloc system, the Left remains the best choice.
Later, comments on Canada's prime ministerial debate, and more...
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
